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Introduction
This volume offers a selection of papers that were presented at the In-
ternational Convention of Asian Scholars 2005 in Shanghai and in
2007 in Kuala Lumpur. In the best tradition of the ICAS conventions,
the eight chapters in this volume present original and new research,
introducing to-date unexplored, overlooked or ignored subject matter
as well as new interpretations and evaluations of a wide range of histor-
ical and contemporary issues.
Covering a timeframe of more than 1,400 years, this volume pre-
sents case studies that highlight new aspects and facets of the complex
interactions that inform the course of Chinese historical and contem-
porary development and examine hitherto unknown or little known fa-
cets and phenomena of historical and contemporary China. Together,
they underscore how China’s historical and contemporary development
is never a one-dimensional process, but a many-faceted, multi-level in-
terplay of different, often opposing forces and agents within the evol-
ving Chinese society and in China’s emergence on the world stage.
Following the ups and downs of China’s history, the research focuses
on issues from the rising Tang dynasty, then passes to a period of de-
cline during the Qing dynasty and to debates on modernization and
state-building at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of
twentieth century, salt distribution in Taiwan, Chinese labor in France
during the unstable period of World War One and finally to current
considerations of China’s rise and regulation of the internet.
These eight chapters focus on several episodes of Chinese history
from an innovative research perspective, which considers a great range
of actors such as officials, clergy, intellectuals, workers and the Chinese
diaspora, as well as the interaction between Chinese people and for-
eigners of different origins.
Starting from the early Tang dynasty, Friederike Assandri focuses on
a little-known institution of early medieval China: the inter-religious
debates at the court of that period. She examines the institution of pub-
lic inter-religious debate as a forum for interaction between the repre-
sentatives of the religious communities of Daoism and Buddhism with
each other and with the emperor during the early Tang period. Based
on a detailed study of unique reports of a series of such court debates
from the seventh century found in Daoxuan’s Ji gujin Fo Dao lunheng
(T 2104), she introduces scope, formal proceedings and rhetoric con-
ventions of inter-religious court debates. She discusses Indian influ-
ences on inter-religious debates and on argumentative and rhetoric
conventions, as well as their interplay with indigenous Chinese models
of debate and dialogue. Furthermore, she shows how seemingly ab-
stract religious or philosophical concepts were related to socio-political
issues like the ranking of the religions at court, thus emphasizing the
multi-level interaction and mutual influences of state and religion at
the center of power in early medieval China.
Focusing on the Jiaqing reign of Qing dynasty, which is often asso-
ciated with decline, Wensheng Wang analyzes the social crises and po-
litical reform during the Jiaqing reign (1796-1810s). He argues against
the prevailing view of this period as the crisis-ridden beginning of dy-
nastic decline after the prosperous Qianlong reign (1736-1796). Intro-
ducing the concept of sustainability into the discussion, he interprets
the escalating upheavals during the last decade of the Qianlong reign
as a crisis of an overloaded empire enmeshed in unsustainable political
development. He draws attention to how the social crisis of the 1790s
to 1810s caused by the White Lotus rebellion inland and contempora-
neous south sea piracy, triggered a pragmatic retreat that sought to pull
Qing empire building back onto a sustainable track of development. Ex-
amining policy changes regarding the White Lotus sect, capital appeals,
and tribute gifts, Wang re-evaluates the Jiaqing emperor’s politics of re-
treat as a realistic and successful attempt to create sustainability of gov-
ernment, which produced a path-shaping conjuncture in the interlock-
ing structural transformation of state and society.
The following three chapters present new perspectives on moderni-
zation, organization and state-building in the transition phase from
late imperial to early republican China at the end of the nineteenth to
the early twentieth centuries.
In the essay ‘China on Display at the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893:
Faces of Modernization at the Contact Zone’, Yuki Ooi examines the
Chinese presence at the World Columbian Exposition of 1893 held in
Chicago. Describing the complex negotiations between China, the US,
Chinese Americans, and other Americans, she interprets the World
Fair as a contact zone of modernization, a space where ideas about
modernization of American society and Chinese people in Chicago
could be detected.
Discussing a time and context, where concepts of national identity
and nation were just emerging, her case demonstrates how the identity
of these Chinese in Chicago as Chinese emerged while they were simul-
taneously becoming Americans. Based on this emerging identity, she
attempts to illuminate how the Chinese Chicagoans’ ideas about moder-
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nization were influenced by the dual or trans-national identity of being
Chinese and American and the reality of living in the dual social con-
texts of China and the United States. The chapter concludes that the
Chinese migrants, while acquiring a Chinese American identity, were
neither simply subjugated to nor assimilated into an American way of
modernization associated with white supremacy, but instead, they nego-
tiated and re-conceptualized modernization on their own terms.
In his chapter ‘Christianity and State-Building in Republican Chao-
zhou, South China’ Joseph Tse-Hei Lee provides a novel perspective on
state-society mediation by looking at Protestant churches in the turbu-
lent Chaozhou-speaking region of north-eastern Guangdong province
in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Re-conceptualizing
church-state relations as an integral part of religio-politics in Chinese
society, Lee centers his discussion on the relationship between state
power and religion, investigating the nature of religion and state power
at the local or grassroots level of Chinese society with a social history
approach. He explains how Chinese Protestant church leaders drew on
a wide range of political and cultural resources in their search for a
new basis for the Chinese state and nation in the transitional period
between the collapse of the Qing imperial order and the establishment
of the new modern state. They effectively employed the Christian mis-
sionary resources to achieve modernity by Western standards while
maintaining a distinctive Chinese identity and pursuing their local
agendas. Lee examines the complex interactions of Chinese Protes-
tants, local society, foreign missionaries and the state in the process of
nation-building and modernization in early Republican Chaozhou. His
discussion ranges from the integration of the Western church model
into traditional lineage and kinship networks, the expansion of the role
of the Protestants as educators, modernizers, relief workers and con-
flict mediators, to the dilemma of the missions contributing to China’s
modernization and fostering the growth of new social and cultural
forces that were antagonistic towards the missionary enterprises.
In the following chapter, the ‘The Distribution Structure of Taiwan
Salt, 1895-1945’, Tsu-yu Chen offers new insight on an almost forgotten
topic from studies on the salt trade: the organization of production and
trade of this commodity during the Japanese rule in Taiwan. Chen ex-
plains the economic objectives of the promotion of the salt monopoly
and complements them with a discussion of the political and social im-
pacts of these efforts. She demonstrates how trade and monopoly were
used by Japanese colonial powers in Taiwan as a catalyst for Taiwan’s
own development and to reduce its dependence on other countries. This
salt-trade also had political effects, linking the economy of Taiwan to Ja-
pan, but separating Taiwan from mainland China. Chen describes the
development from a monopoly policy aimed at filling the needs of Ja-
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pan without hampering its salt industry, to the investments of Japanese
zaibatsu in Taiwan under the control of the colonial government owing
to modernization of the salt industry, which then created monopoly ca-
pitalism. This is the transformation of the salt trade from an import-
substitution to an export-oriented industry, a strategy used many dec-
ades later by Japan and afterwards by the small ‘dragons’ of Asia, in-
cluding again Taiwan, to develop their economies. The author also
explains social consequences of such trade such as the intricate links
between different social players in Taiwan and Japan. Taiwanese salt
wholesalers, selected by the authorities, benefited from the monopoly
policy, accumulated capital and became the new gentry, which closely
cooperated with the colonial government. Chen Tsu-yu argues that the
salt distribution network aided the colonial government in controlling
Taiwanese society, and at the same time, it furthered social development
and ultimately was instrumental in the industrialization of Taiwan.
The following two chapters present new insights into issues concern-
ing China’s role at the international level during two different periods:
World War One and more recently since the end of the Cold War.
In his chapter ‘Semi-Colonialism and Cultural Interaction: Chinese
Indentured Labor in World War One France and the Sino-French con-
nection’ Paul Bailey focuses on a little-known episode, which occurred
during World War One: the recruitment of Chinese labor for war-re-
lated work in France. In contrast to the image of a passive victim of
semi-colonialism, China demonstrated the intention of playing a more
active role at the international level, which may have begun by active
participation in the Paris Peace Conference. According to the author,
this is one of the reasons for China’s official positive response to the
French request for China labor at that time. Another reason is con-
nected to the influence of Francophile intellectuals who cultivated deep
links with Chinese politicians and French officials and intellectuals. Fi-
nally, the author documents that the Chinese were involved in a wide
variety of jobs related to France’s war efforts and partially responded to
labor shortages in France. In contrast to the coolies at the end of the
nineteenth century, who had come as indentured laborers from Asia to
the colonies, these workers claimed good working conditions, often
protesting if something was not right. The chapter concludes by high-
lighting the long-term political significance of the episode, arguing that
the Chinese government’s political use of Chinese labor in World War
One anticipated the foreign policy of the post-1949 Maoist state in its
relations with Africa.
Analyzing a more contemporary topic, in her chapter ‘China’s Rise:
Some Considerations’, Dora Martins discusses how, half a century later,
the emerging China started to use the ‘peaceful rise’ as the core of its
foreign policy discourse. As Chinese economic power was rising, the
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political leaders started to use the ‘peaceful rise’ slogan to lessen other
countries concerns regarding its intentions. After a brief assessment of
features of China’s contemporary rise, the author explains how the con-
cept of ‘peace’ and ‘rise’ has been used in Chinese culture and through-
out Chinese history. As a response to the recent resurgence of the theo-
ry that China is a threat put forth by some countries, the Chinese gov-
ernment started to use the concept of ‘China’s peaceful rise’. In fact,
this concept is not new and may be understood as a continuation of
the ‘peace and development’ used by Deng Xiaoping as a guideline of
China’s foreign policy from the early eighties. The author questions
whether China is indeed following a peaceful path while emerging,
concluding that the current path of Chinese foreign policy is driven by
three major features: economic diplomacy, cooperative and comprehen-
sive security, and soft power.
The last article presented in this volume, Zhao Jinqiu’s ‘A Snapshot
of Internet Regulation in Contemporary China: Censorship, Profitabil-
ity and Responsibility’, addresses one of the most recent developments
during China’s recent growth in power, the issues evolving from the
growing use of the Internet in China, the tensions between the free ar-
chitecture of the Internet, and the Chinese government’s need to con-
trol it. Zhao reviews and evaluates China’s attempts at regulating the
Internet in the cases of two controversial issues confronting the Chi-
nese government – news copyright and online satire. The study high-
lights the underlying tension in the current policies of the Chinese
government, which promote a more open market economy while
maintaining tight censorship over news media and freedom of speech,
and discusses the socio-economic implications of Internet censorship
on media, society and individuals in China.
Taken together, the different ‘micro’ facets of historical and contem-
porary issues and case-studies presented in this volume not only offer
new perspectives in the study of the respective times and events dis-
cussed. They also portray in a kaleidoscopic fashion the complex multi-
level interaction of different agents, which are at the heart of any his-
torical and contemporary development, from intellectual debates to po-
litical and social dynamics, from economic politics to modernization,
identity-building and state-building, from the center of power to the
periphery of China to the Chinese diaspora and to Chinese interna-
tional relations.
We would like to conclude with a personal word of thanks to Dr.
Paul van der Velde, general editor of the ICAS Publications Series and
initiator of this project, without whose concrete involvement in the se-
lection of contributions and the publishing house this volume would
not have come into existence.
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1 Inter-religious Debate at the Court of
the Early Tang: An Introduction to Daoxuan’s
Ji gujin Fo Dao lunheng
Friederike Assandri
Introduction
This chapter introduces the institution of inter-religious court debate
according to a to-date neglected source text, Daoxuan’s Ji gujin Fo Dao
lunheng (Collection of Critical Evaluations of Buddhism and Daoism
from the Past and Present, T1 2104). During the Six Dynasties and the
Tang dynasty inter-religious debate constituted a forum of intellectual
exchange between Daoists and Buddhists and between secular authori-
ties and clergy. A detailed study of Daoxuan’s reports allows us for the
first time to describe the rhetoric characteristics and formal proceed-
ings of these debates.
In early medieval China, Buddhism and Daoism influenced each
other as they developed, yet documentation of their meeting points
is scarce. Court debates represent a comparatively well-documented
forum where Daoism and Buddhism were in direct contact. Debate in
various forms was an important part of the intellectual life of the litera-
ti elite in early medieval China.
Studies of the introduction and spread of Buddhism in China have de-
monstrated that the tradition of ‘pure talk’ (qingtan 清 談), an indigen-
ous Chinese form of debate, was instrumental in the spread of Bud-
dhism among the literati (Zu¨rcher 1959: 95, 159). In addition, Buddhists
also fostered scholarly debate following Indian customs of debate.
Travelling masters challenged each other on specific points of doc-
trine or on debates about texts (Tang 1938: 200-203).
After the revelations of the Daoist Highest Clarity (Shangqing) and
Numinous Treasure (Lingbao) scriptures in the last quarter of the
fourth century, which were geared to the tastes of the educated elite
(Bokenkamp 1997: 278), literati circles became increasingly interested
in Daoism.
During Six dynasties, Daoists as well as Buddhists gained access to
the highest levels of society and to the imperial court in the south and
in the north of China. The situation of the divided empire had under-
mined traditional legitimation of the emperor as the son of heaven; the
many emperors of the new smaller states needed to find new legitimat-
ing strategies. Buddhism and Daoism vied to offer such strategies, of-
ten in return for imperial patronage and material support.
As of the fifth century, apologetic writings (e.g., Sengyou Hongming
ji T 2102, Daoxuan Guang hongming ji T 2103) document a strong com-
petition between the adherents of the two religions in the environment
of the courts (Schmidt-Glintzer 1976, Kohn 1995).
Increasingly, the protagonists who shaped the development of Bud-
dhism and Daoism were in some way or other tied to the court. Im-
perial sponsorship allowed the Buddhist translation academies to func-
tion and finance libraries; it seems that by the Sui and the early Tang
dynasties joining the great monasteries located in the capital Chang’an
was ‘a dream’ for many educated monks (Daoxuan Xu Gaoseng zhuan
T 2060, 15: 547b). Many of the Daoist masters instrumental in shaping
the formation of Daoism in early medieval China had ties to the courts
as well; several of them engaged in court debates against Buddhists
(Assandri 2004: 546-575).
One reason for the growing attraction of the imperial court for Bud-
dhists and Daoists was certainly the increasing grip of the state on reli-
gious institutions. Intensified administrative control, but also generous
imperial patronage (Benn 1977, Weinstein 1973) ultimately led to close
relationships between the leaders of the clergy of both religions in the
capital and the secular powers. Buddhists and Daoists who were invited
to debate at court were members of the intellectual, religious and social
elite of their times, often well acquainted with eminent personalities or
with the imperial family.
Inter-religious court debates became an important arena of interplay
for political authorities and religious communities and of competition
between the religious communities. Several emperors held such de-
bates, sometimes with the clearly stated aim of deciding which of the
two teachings was the better for the state, sometimes with the aim of
bringing general blessings for the empire (Assandri 2004: 36-68).
The Ji gujin Fo Dao lunheng (T 2104)
While references to court debates between Buddhists and Daoists in
the official and religious histories of the Six Dynasties, Sui and Tang
are numerous, they are usually too fragmentary to provide a clear pic-
ture of these debates. An important exception is the fourth chapter of
the Ji gujin Fo Dao lunheng (T 2104), which contains a collection of de-
tailed reports on inter-religious court debates between Buddhists and
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Daoists, held between 658 and 663 at the court of Tang emperor Gao-
zong (r. 650-683).
Table 1.1 Inter-religious court debates of the Early Tang Dynasty reported in T 2104, 4
Date Place Occasion
Xianqing 3 (659), 4th month Imperial Palace, Hebi hall
Xianqing 3 (659), 6th month,
12th day
Imperial Palace, Linde hall Emperor’s birthday and
inauguration of Ximing
temple
Xianqing 3 (659), 11th month Imperial Palace Sacrifice to bring about snow
Xianqing 5 (661), 8th month,
18th day
Imperial Palace of Luoyang
Longshuo 3 (664), 4th month,
14th day
Imperial Palace, Penglai hall Note: Two days later,
Gaozong issued the edict that
the monks had to bow in
front of their parents.
Longshuo 3 (664), 5th month,
16th day
Imperial Palace, Penglai hall
Longshuo 3 (664) 6th month,
12th day
Imperial Palace, Penglai hall Emperor’s birthday
The Ji gujin Fo Dao lunheng is a record of the competition between
Buddhism and Daoism since the introduction of Buddhism in China.
Its author, the Buddhist Daoxuan, presented this document to the
throne in 664. It is part of the Buddhist apologia in a time of intense
competition between Buddhism and Daoism at court, but also between
clerics and the secular authorities.2 This context has to be considered
when interpreting the reports. The fact that all the debates reported
end in favor of the Buddhists raises questions: Were the Daoists not up
to their Buddhist counterparts or did Daoxuan falsify and distort the re-
ports? Or else, did he selectively report only the debates where the Bud-
dhists won?
Professor Luo Xianglin (1906-1978) from Hong Kong University has
proposed the Daoists were no match for the Buddhists (1955: 165).
However, a study of the biographies and writings of the Daoist partici-
pants in the debates (Assandri 2004: 154-168) suggests that the Daoist
were highly qualified and well versed in their own scriptures as well as
in Buddhist teachings. Instead, we can confirm that Daoxuan reported
selectively: there are references to debates in contemporary texts, which
Daoxuan did not include in the Ji gujin Fo Dao lunheng.3
With regard to the question of the reliability of the reports, we do
not have any texts to conduct a cross-reference check. But we may spec-
ulate: The Ji gujin Fo Dao lunheng was presented to the emperor Gao-
zong, in front of whom all the debates reported in the fourth chapter
were held. There is evidence that at the time Gaozong favored the Dao-
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ists over the Buddhists (Assandri 2004: 148-150). We assume that un-
der such circumstances a major distortion of the reports would have
been noticed and censured.
Combining these detailed reports with fragmentary information
from other sources, we can describe the workings and proceedings of
the court debates of the Six Dynasties and Tang dynasty.
The purpose of inter-religious court debates
Inter-religious court debates in early medieval China had two different
purposes: they aimed to be pragmatic competitions of participants to
determine who was better, more profound or more efficient in helping
the emperor and the state, and they also aimed to educate and enter-
tain the audience.
Debates tending towards the pragmatic purpose often concerned the
relationship of clerics to the state and the question to what extent the re-
ligious community could ask for independence from the socio-political
rules of the state. This type of debates prevailed in times when the em-
peror was seeking ideological tools to rule, or when he was trying to in-
tensify control over the religions. Examples of debates with a pragmatic
orientation are the debates held under the Emperor Wu of the Northern
Zhou dynasty in 569-573 (Kohn 1995: 31), as well as the earlier debates
in the south about the independence of the Buddhist sangha (Zu¨rcher
1959: 254-288 and Kohn 1995: 17-21). The pragmatic aspect prevailed
also in the debates at the court of the first two Tang emperors.4 At other
times, especially under the third Tang emperor Gaozong, entertainment
and education was the principal purpose for debate.
Polemics, jokes and ridicule
The text of the Ji gujin Fo Dao lunheng as well as the institution of
court debates have so far not received much scholarly attention. In fact,
at first sight the text discourages study and even suggests that the de-
bates don’t offer much insight for a serious researcher: The debates
consisted of extremely concise and difficult verbal exchanges, mixed
with large quantities of polemics and invectives, like the following:
Daoist Li Rong, the hair hanging down from your head makes it
look like the head of a sheep. On your mouth, there is a mous-
tache; it looks just like a deer’s tail! Your mouth is barely good
enough for small snacks, but not to discuss literature! … When
you raise your hands to greet, it looks like donkey’s hoofs being
raised, when you move your legs, it looks as if you are swaying
on the knees of a crane! (Daoxuan T 2104, 4: 392a27).
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This certainly does not fit with our idea of a serious philosophical or
spiritual environment – after all, we are talking about the elite of Bud-
dhism and Daoism of the time!
These rather crude polemics have discouraged the study of the text
and of court debates in general. However, it is here that we have to re-
consider our own assumptions: Who says philosophical debate has to
be serious, sober, and unsmiling? In fact, it seems that polemical ridi-
cule was fashionable among intellectuals and ‘high society’ at that
time. The thirteenth chapter of the New Tales from the Great Tang (Da
Tang xinyu) contains a section ‘Ridiculing’ (Xiexue 諧謔), which starts
with the comment: ‘[Emperor] Taizong (r. 627-650) often approached
his ministers and ordered them to ridicule each other, which amused
him greatly’ (Liu Su, Da Tang xinyu: 135). The chapter continues to list
amusing polemics and ridicule from well-known contemporary person-
alities.5 Presumably, this kind of polemical ridicule had been popular
for a long time: The Taiping guangji (Extensive Records of the Taiping
Era), chapters 245-257, lists under the headings ‘Jokes’ (Huixie 詼諧)
and ‘Mockery’ (Chaoqiao 嘲 誚) many similar examples of polemical ri-
dicule. One example is part of a debate, which concluded a Buddhist
lecture organized by emperor Gaozu (r. 550-557) of the Qi dynasty
(Taiping guangji, 247: 1915-1918). Others report many different witty
polemical exchanges of famous personalities from the Han through
the Tang dynasties.6 Only a small part of the entries rely on informa-
tion from official historiographies; the major part of the entries cites
two texts, Record of Explaining Countenance (Qiyan lu 啓 顏 錄) (Six Dy-
nasties - Sui) and Concourse of Conversation (Tansou 談 藪 ) (Tang).
These texts are listed in the bibliographical section of the dynastic his-
tories under the heading ‘Xiaoshuo’ (小説)7 together with several texts
with titles containing additions like ‘Forest of Debate’ (bianlin 辯 林),
‘Leisure Talk ’ (xiantan 閑談), ‘Playful Talk ’ (jutan 劇談),8 suggesting
that they may have contained witty polemical verbal exchanges as
well.9
The detailed analysis of argumentative strategies in the debates (As-
sandri 2004: 114-117) shows that the polemics were integrated into the
court debates with a precise function, namely they presented a legiti-
mate way out of an impending defeat.
Indian influences
In the court debates reported by Daoxuan, elements reminiscent of in-
digenous Chinese traditions, like ‘pure talk’ (qingtan) and witty po-
lemics combine with elements from the Indian tradition of scholarly
debate.
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During the Six Dynasties, a Buddhist master would be distinguished
not as belonging to a certain school, but rather as an expert on a cer-
tain text. This expertise had to be confirmed in debates against challen-
ging masters (Tang 1982: 201, 209). Conventions of debate as prac-
ticed in India must have found attention in China with the introduc-
tion of the different Buddhist S´a¯stras, which had originated in India in
an environment of competing schools of thought10. In fact, there are
several fifth and sixth century translations of Indian eristic texts: The
Table 1.2 Nyāya sutras and Rushi lun catalogues of possible mistakes in debate
Nyāya-sutra catalogue of the 22 mistakes
(Stcherbatsky 1962: 340-341)
Rushi lun catalogue of mistakes
(Xu 1928: 141-142)
1. Annihilation of one’s own thesis (by an
unsuitable example)
1. Hurting the Proposition1 (huai zi li yi壞自
立義)
2. Shifting to another thesis (during the
same debate)
2. Shifting the Proposition (qu yiyi取異議)
3. A contradictory thesis 3. Opposing the Proposition (yin yu liyi
xiangwei因與立義相違)
4. Abandoning one’s own thesis 4. Renouncing the Proposition (she zi liyi捨
自立義)
5.-6. Changing the reason or the topic 5. Shifting the Reason (li yi yinyi立異因義)
6. Shifting the Topic (yiyi異義)
7.-10. A meaningless,
unintelligible,
incoherent,
or inopportune argument
7. Meaningless (wuyi無義)
8. Unintelligible (you yi bu kejie有義不可解)
9. Incoherent (wu daoli yi無道理義)
10. Inopportune (bu zhishi不致時)
11.-12. Insufficiency or
redundancy in expression 11. Saying too little (bu juzufen不具足分)
12. Saying too much (changfen長分)
13. Repetition 13. Repetition (chongshuo 重說)
14. Silence 14. Silence (bu neng tong不能通)
15. Confession of ignorance 15. Ignorance (bu jie yi不解義)
16. Failing to understand (the question) 16. Non-ingenuity (bu neng nan不能難)
17. Stopping the debate under the pretext of
going to attend another business when
seeing that the defeat is inevitable
17. Evasion (li fangbian bi nan立方便避難)
18. (Indirect) admission of a charge 18. Admission of an [opponents] opinion
(xinxu ta nan信許他難)
19.-20. Neglecting to rebuke the questioner
when it is necessary or doing so when it is
not necessary
19. Overlooking the censurable (yu duofuchu
bu xian duofu于墮負処不顯墮負)
20. Censuring the non-censurable (feichu
shuo duofu非処說墮負)
21. Not keeping faithfully to one’s own
principles
21. Deviating from the tenet (wei xi tan duo
suo wei為悉檀多所違)
22. Fallacious logical reasons 22. Semblance of a reason, or fallacy (siyin
似因)
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Fangbian xinlun (‘Essay on the core of expedient means’, Upa¯ya-kaus´alya-
hrdaya-s´astra), T 1632, translated in 47211 by Jijiaye and Tanyao in the
state of Wei12, the Huizheng lun (‘Essay on refuting disputes’ Vigraha Vya¯-
vartani ka¯rika¯), T 1631, translated 541 in the state of Liang, and the
Rushi lun (Tarkas´astra), T 1633, translated in 549 by Parama¯rtha in the
state of Liang (Tucci 1929 and Xu Dishan 1928). These texts contain
rules on how to present and prove a logically correct thesis, and very
detailed lists of possible mistakes of the defendant and the opponent,
which were probably intended as a manual for the arbiter of a debate.
They are similar to the listings found in the Indian texts on logic and
eristic, the Nya¯ya sutras, as table 1.2 shows.
This Buddhist tradition of debate may have gained popularity with
Xuanzang’s (600-664) report from his travels in India. As of 645 this
great Buddhist scholar and translator, who had travelled and studied ex-
tensively in India, taught and worked in the capital Chang’an. In India,
he had successfully taken part in the grandiose inter-religious court de-
bates organized by the Indian emperor, and accounts of the debates fig-
ure prominently in his report ‘Records of the Western Regions from the
Time of the Great Tang’ (Da Tang xiyu ji T 2087). Xuanzang introduced
a new form of logic, the Indian hetuvidya¯ (yinming 因 明)13, to chosen
disciples as a powerful tool in debate. He also translated an essay on
Seven Points of Debate, which is contained in almost identical versions
in seven different texts he had translated.14 The seven points of debate
refer not only to intellectual aspects of debate like the correct proposi-
tion of a thesis and possible logical mistakes; they also discuss the con-
text of debate, such as the place and general conditions for debate as
well as the qualities of the debater:
1. Lun tixing 論體性 The general character of speech. This part lists
different types of speech; positive, like laudatory or educating
speech, and negative, like polemical or belligerent speech.
2. Lun chusuo 論處所 The place of debate. Appropriate places to hold
a debate are a royal palace, mansions of high officials, public meet-
ing places, an aggregation of scholars and wise men, of monks, or
of people who accept the Buddhist teaching.
3. Lun suoyi 論所依 The basis of a thesis. This central point explains
in detail how to propose and prove a logically correct thesis. It is
the core of the seven points.
4. Lun zhuangyan 論莊嚴 Dignified and brilliant speech. This section
presents a long and detailed list of the characteristics of excellent
rhetoric and of a brilliant orator. The description covers speech, lo-
gic of argumentation, outward appearance, behavior and manners
of the speaker (Assandri 2004: 203-206).
5. Lun duofu 論墮負 Mistakes. This section lists in detail the mistakes
leading to defeat in debate, comprising logical mistakes as well as
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mistakes in behavior, such as impoliteness or aggressiveness (As-
sandri 2004: 206-209).
6. Lun chulizhe 論出離者 Compatibility of the speech with what is
considered generally good or fortunate. This section contains a
summary of sine qua non conditions to consider before starting de-
bate. The debater has to be convinced of the positive result of the
debate; he has to make sure the audience will be able to understand
the debate and he has to be sure that he is well versed in his own
and in his opponent’s teachings.
7. Lun duo suo zuo fa 論多所作法 Rules for the accomplished debater.
This section summarizes three essential characteristics of a good
debater: He has to have perfect knowledge of his own and his oppo-
nent’s teachings, he has to be fearless in front of any kind of audi-
ence, and he has to have rhetorical talent.
The rules presented in the different manuals and eristic texts seem to
have been applied in the court debates to a certain extent, however,
there were also divergences.
Indian debate had found much interest among the Buddhists. The
terminology used in the debates shows that the Buddhists were famil-
iar with the Indian rules of debate and applied them15; however, the
Daoists were not.
The formal proceedings
On a special occasion, e.g., the imperial birthday or a special sacrifice,
well-known clerics of Buddhism and Daoism were invited to debate at
court. In the Northern Zhou and under the first two emperors of the
Tang dynasty as well as in some cases in High Tang, a representative
of Confucian teachings, often a high-ranking minister or scholar of the
Imperial Academy, also participated (Assandri 2004: 118). The audi-
ence of the debate typically included the emperor, the imperial family,
officials and scholars from throughout the whole empire. There were
also cases, where princes, provincial governors, or high officials orga-
nized such debates in their mansions16 (Daoxuan T 2104, 3: 383a28;
T 2060, 3: 442a).
The host, often the emperor, had the role of the arbiter. He opened
the debate and proclaimed the subject to be debated. Then he invited –
in strict observance of the official ranking order of the teachings – the
defendant to take his seat on the raised platform. The chosen defen-
dant started with a eulogy on the emperor. This eulogy was composed
of standard expressions, a set of stock phrases, which we also find in
the official correspondence of ministers or other people with the em-
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peror of the time. Daoxuan reports the eulogies presented, sometimes
shortened, in almost all of the debates he documented.
The eulogy, and the importance conceded to it by Daoxuan in his re-
ports, emphasises that apart from the complementary positions of
speaker/hearer there was the position of the emperor not merely as a
hearer, but as the actual recipient17 or addressee of the debate.
Chart 1.1 The relative positions and roles of discussants and emperor
emperor
addressee addressee
defendant hearer/speaker opponent
direct interaction; indirect interaction
Thus, in any debate there was a level of direct interaction between op-
ponent and defendant and a level of indirect interaction of the partici-
pants with the addressee, the emperor. The level of indirect interaction
with the emperor conditioned the choice of argumentation.
After the eulogy, the defendant proposed his lecture. This was tradi-
tionally about a text, but under Gaozong we also find the proposition
of a thesis. Nevertheless, it seems that the thesis was often based on
the title of a text, such as ‘benji yi’ 本際義, ‘thesis on the concept of ori-
ginal time’, based on the Daoist Sutra of Original Time (Benji jing 本際
經) (Daoxuan T 2104, 4:389c). The lecture presenting a text is reminis-
cent of the dharma meetings (fahui 法會), held at the courts of the
southern dynasties, especially of the Prince of Jingling (460-494) and
Liang Wudi (r. 502-549), which began with a lecture on a Buddhist text
(Jansen 2000: 95f).
Daoxuan in no case gives us a full report of a lecture, but we have
an intact example of a lecture presented at the emperor’s birthday on
the 21st day of the fourth month in 792 in the Linde hall of the imper-
ial palace: The Da fangguang Fo huayan jing xuanyi (Jingju T 1743).18 A
comparison of the fragments of lectures reported by Daoxuan in T
2104 with the Da fangguang Fo huayan jing xuanyi suggest that this lec-
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ture’s structure was similar to the ones held during the early Tang peri-
od (Assandri 2004: 79), as the following example of the respective ex-
planation of the title of the text presented shows.
The title Da fangguang Fo huayan: ‘Da fangguan’ designates the
teaching‚ ‘Fo huayan’ designates the man. Furthermore, ‘da’
(big) means the substance is omnipresent; ‘fangguang’ (emit
rays) means, the effect is everywhere. Depending on substance,
effect rises. This is meant by ‘da fangguang’. ‘Fo’ (Buddha) is the
man who realized and said [this truth]. ‘Huayan’ (the garland)
means... This is why the sutra is called Da fangguang Fo huayan
jing. (Jingju T 1743: 1065a)
This excerpt can be compared with a fragment of a lecture from the
early Tang period:
The thesis I will present today is Maha¯prajn˜a¯paramita¯. This is
the elephant chariot of Maha¯ya¯na… ‘Maha¯’ means great, ‘prajn˜a¯’
means wisdom. ‘Paramita¯’ means to reach the other shore. With
regard to this term, not even [the expression] ‘dark source’ is apt
to exhaust its profoundness and brilliance, that is why we rely
on the word ‘great’ to contemplate it. Not even a mirror of water
can symbolize its purity and clarity. This is why we rely on the
word ‘wisdom’ to explain it... (Daoxuan T 2104, 4: 390b)
This and other fragments of lectures in Daoxuan’s report19 suggest that
the structure of the lecture as visible in T 1743 may have been standar-
dized, consisting of the following elements:
1. Short summary of content of the Sutra, listing the chapters with ti-
tles and number of juan.
2. Explanation of the chapter titles.
3. Interpretation of the single characters of the title of the Sutra.
4. Description of the contents of each chapter.
5. Summary connecting the chapter contents (4) with the single char-
acters of the title of the Sutra explained in step (3).
6. General remarks on Buddhism and wishes of blessing for the im-
perial birthday.
It is noteworthy that a very similar structure can also be found in long-
er texts such as Tiantai Zhiyi’s Fahua xuanyi (Hurvitz 1960-1962: 205-
297) or Cheng Xuanying’s Daode jing kaiti xujue (Yan Lingfeng 1983:
239-264 and Robinet 1977: 227-260). It seems possible, that these
texts grew out of an original presentation.
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Only after the initial lecture, the emperor designated the opponent,
who then went to take his seat on the podium. Like the defendant be-
fore him, he started with a eulogy on the emperor. After the eulogy, he
proposed his first objection to the lecture. This started the actual debate,
consisting of concise objections and answers.
Each objection required an immediate answer. As stipulated in the
Indian rules of debate, inability to answer an objection or incompre-
hensibility would cause defeat. Differing from the Indian rules, in
cases of an imminent defeat these debates allowed participants to
switch to polemic ridicule of the opponent or to change the subject.
These polemics and witty diversions into unrelated subjects like litera-
ture take a form reminiscent of the pure talk (qingtan) debates of the
Six Dynasties. If even this strategy of evasion did not help, the emperor
declared defeat. Whatever the tone of an objection was, serious or po-
lemic, it seems to have been mandatory to reply immediately on the
same level of discourse.
The use of paraphernalia, such as the flywhisk (zhuwei麈尾), was in-
teresting. Every debater was equipped with a flywhisk. When answer-
ing, the debater raised the flywhisk, when he could not respond or was
defeated he lowered it. Daoxuan mentions this explicitly in the reports
(T 2104, 4: 390a19, Assandri 2004: 52-54).
In the earlier debates, when a defeat was declared, the debate was
ended. Instead in the debates of the Xianqing era (656-661) we find
teams of seven participants on each side, taking turns until victory was
declared. Once a defendant was defeated, he had to leave the debater’s
seat. A new defendant was chosen from the winning team, who then
took the seat and proposed his new thesis (Daoxuan T 2104, 4: 387c).
If instead an opponent was defeated, he left his seat and a new mem-
ber of his own team took the opponent’s seat to debate against the the
original defendant (Daoxuan T 2104, 4: 389c). In this way, a debate
could last for more than a day (Daoxuan T 2104, 4: 393b).
A victorious debater would usually receive lavish presents of silk and
clothes from the emperor. Often the emperor offered him an important
position in a monastery or even asked him to become an official – a re-
quest, which was declined in all the cases Daoxuan reported.
Strategies of argumentation
Argumentation in the inter-religious debates followed three major stra-
tegies: pointing out a contradiction with scriptural authority, logic and
analogy.
Pointing out a contradiction with the authoritative texts was the most
important and most frequent strategy. Quotations from the sacred texts
of Buddhism or Daoism, as well as from the classics or historical re-
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cords constituted valid proof in a debate. Actually, the discussants used
the classics as a kind of ‘toolbox’ to extract proofs for their theses,
sometimes even distorting the citations. If a statement from the clas-
sics contradicted a logical conclusion or deduction, the statement from
the classic prevailed as the essential proof (Daoxuan T 2104, 3: 381b10;
4: 389b3).
Nevertheless, debaters also used argumentative strategies based on
logical reasoning. Several Buddhist texts of that time contain examples
of logical refutation of heretic views, like Cheng weishi lun (T 1585, 1),
Xianyang shengjiao lun (T 1602, 10, 11, 12, 16), and Yujia shidi lun (T
1579, 6,7). Generally, these texts also refer to the Daoist teaching of
Laozi and Zhuangzi, which they subsume in the category of ‘Heretics
[believing in] the Of-itself-so’ (ziran waidao自然外道). The strategies
proposed in these texts were used only in two cases by the Buddhists
Huili (615- ca. 675) and Lingbian (ca. second half of the seventh cen-
tury), both disciples of Xuanzang (T 2104, 4: 387 and 393).
Xuanzang introduced yinming logic to his disciples. This Indian logic
had not only epistemological value, it was also a highly efficient weap-
on in debate. Huili employed it once in debate (T 2104, 4: 387c-388a;
Assandri 2004: 257-266). Although he carried away a great victory in
that debate, Buddhist yinming logic did not become popular with the
Buddhist debaters.
A far greater number of discussants relied on the logic of reductio ad
absurdum, the prasanga method introduced in China with the Ma¯dhya-
mika school of Buddhism. Not only the Buddhists, but also the Daoist
participants were versed in this type of logic, which therefore offered
more possibilities of dialogue.
Analogies were used frequently and treated very carefully. The single
terms used in analogies were analyzed in detail to prove the validity, or
lack of an analogy. When an analogy was proved as inappropriate, this
was considered a valid refutation of the opponent’s argument.
Some remarks on the contents of the debates
The subject, which the Buddhists and Daoists in the debates of the
early Tang period discussed most often, was the concept of Dao as the
origin of all being and at the same time original non-being (T 2104, 3:
381b; 4: 387c, 390a, 393b). In Daoism, these two conceptions of Dao
stand as a paradox. The Buddhists repeatedly attacked this paradoxical
interpretation of the Dao. The Daoists, mostly representatives of ‘Two-
fold Mystery’ (chongxuan 重玄) teaching (Assandri 2005), tried to ex-
plain the paradoxical relationship of being and non-being, e.g., in
Cheng Xuanying’s commentary to the first chapter of the Daode jing
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(Yan Lingfeng 1983: 295). However, in the debates it became obvious
that these explanations were not yet mature enough to withstand a con-
frontation with the Buddhists.
Discussion about the aspects of Dao as eternal non-being and origin
of all being was complicated by the fact that the Daoists of the early
Tang regarded Laozi, reputed author of the Daode jing, as a personifica-
tion of the Dao, and therefore as identical with the Dao. During the Six
Dynasties, Daoism had undergone a process of adaptation and integra-
tion of soteriological and cosmological concepts from Maha¯ya¯na Bud-
dhism. This process was well advanced but not fully matured by the
early Tang. In particular, the association of soteriological aspects of
Dao personified in Laozi with the cosmogonic aspect of Dao as begin-
ning and origin of all being caused difficulties in the debates. The Bud-
dhists seem to have been aware of the problem, since they attacked the
subject repeatedly.
The amalgamation of cosmogony and transcendence in the term
Dao in Daoism represents one of the fundamental differences of the
two teachings. In Buddhism, cosmogony is part of the circle of life and
death, dependent on conditioned causation and completely separate
from the transcendent. Daoism and Buddhism had assimilated many
of each other’s practices and concepts in the course of the Six Dynas-
ties, but at this point, there remained an unbridgeable difference. How-
ever, the reasons for the heated debates on the thesis of Dao as origin
of all being were not only of a philosophical nature. There was a rather
practical issue involved: the question of the official ranking of the
teachings in the state.20
One important argument in the competition for the first place in the
official ranking of the teachings was the relative age of the ‘founders’
or ‘lords’ (jiaozhu 教主) of the teachings (T 2110: 499a; Assandri 2004:
455-459). The relative ages of Laozi, often referred to as founder of
Daoism, and Buddha had been a major issue discussed also in the con-
text of the ‘conversion’ debate (huahu 化胡), the debate on the theory
that Laozi, after leaving China, went to India to become the Buddha
and convert the Barbarians.
The gist of the underlying argument was that if the Dao, in this con-
text identified with its personification Laozi, was the beginning of all
being, it must have been also prior to the Buddha. With this kind of ar-
gumentation the conversion (huahu) debate, which was originally con-
cerned with the historical persons Laozi and Gautama Buddha, was
transposed to a cosmic level. Yet, the underlying question, of whether
Buddha or Laozi was first, remained. The importance of this question
in the context of the competition in the official ranking may hinge on
the Chinese Confucian cardinal virtue of piety: the younger owes re-
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spect to the older, and in an official ranking must certainly have the
lower position.21
It is noteworthy that in many of the debates on the Dao Buddhists
as well as Daoists had terminological difficulties. The discussants
rarely managed to discuss the different aspects of Dao separately.
Although there were attempts to define the term Dao and to distin-
guish different connotations (Daoxuan T 2104, 3: 381c), more often
than not, debaters did not distinguish between the different aspects,
leading to misunderstandings and confusion in debate.
Another frequently debated subject was to what extent language is
adequate to describe the absolute, which is necessarily beyond the realm
of definition by language. This question had been a focus of attention in
the interpretation of the Daode jing for a long time.22 In the court de-
bates, discussants analyzed this issue along the terms of the theory of
the twofold truth, which Buddhism had brought to China. Buddhists
and Daoists both used this theory very proficiently in the debates.
Apart from philosophical discussions mentioned so far, some de-
bates also contained concrete criticism of Daoist contemporary prac-
tices by Buddhists. The attacks against the religious practice of Daoism
in the debates correspond largely to the polemics in the different writ-
ten apologies of the Six Dynasties. The main target of these attacks
were the rituals of the Heavenly Masters as well as some cults closely
related to popular religious practices.
The Daoist court debaters were ‘representatives of the Twofold Mys-
tery philosophy’ and lived as celibate monks (chujiaren出家人) just like
their Buddhist counterparts. Interestingly, in no case did they claim
their distance of the attacked practices and cults, which largely belonged
to the Heavenly Masters tradition, a tradition which did not advocate ce-
libacy. This demonstrates how the process of integration of different tra-
ditions in Daoism in the early Tang dynasty was well advanced.
One attack frequently levelled against the Daoists was the accusation
that they plagiarized Buddhist scriptures. The Daoist reaction to such
charges suggest that there must have been some solid ground for these
accusations: in no case did a Daoist address such an attack by claiming
authenticity of his texts. They preferred to change the subject or switch
to polemics.
Concluding remarks
Daoism and Buddhism in China did not develop in a vacuum, but in a
dynamic process, in which certain given sets of beliefs, ideals, ideas,
and practices responded to outside stimuli. Socio-political circum-
stances like the interplay of the religious communities with the secular
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authorities, but also the dialogue or competition among different reli-
gious communities, were important stimuli in this process.
In inter-religious court debates different spheres of interaction are
present all at once. This requires a multilevel reading strategy. Under-
standing the mechanisms, rhetoric and proceedings of court debates,
enables us to get a glimpse of an important forum of interaction of
Buddhists and Daoists in medieval China. Being oral exchanges, the
debates reflect the interaction between Buddhists, Daoists, and the im-
perial court differently than written apologetic essays.
As documented points of ‘direct encounter’ of Buddhism and Dao-
ism, the inter-religious court debates can open new perspectives on the
development of Buddhism and Daoism in medieval China, as well as
on specific issues such as the reception of Indian logic in China or the
development of court Daoism.
Notes
1 T refers to the Taisho¯ shinshu¯ daizokyo¯ edition of the Buddhist Canon, Tokyo, 1924-
1932.
2 In addition to the Ji gujin Fo Dao lunheng Daoxuan had also presented the Guang
hongming ji, T 2103. In 662, Yanzong had presented his Ji shamen bu ying baisu deng-
shi, T 2108, about the dispute over whether clerics should bow to the throne and to
their parents.
3 See e.g., the biography of Li Xuanzhi in the Former History of the Tang (Jiu Tang
shu), chapter 189b: 596a.
4 The debates under the first Tang emperor Gaozu developed largely around the fa-
mous 11 point essay of Fu Yi; see Daoxuan T 2104, 3: 379c.
5 Including e.g., Li Rong, one prominent Daoist debater of that time (Liu Su Da Tang
xinyu: 136).
6 Compare Li Fang et al. Taiping guang ji: Han dynasty: three entries (chapter 245).
Sanguo period: six entries (chapter 245). Jin dynasty: six entries (chapter 245), seven
entries (chapter 246), eight entries (chapter 253). Dong Jin: three entries (chapter
246), Song: four entries (chapter 246), Qi: five entries (chapter 246), Liang: six en-
tries (chapter 246), Chen: one entry (chapter 247). Northern Wei: three entries (chap-
ter 247), Northern Qi: one entry (chapter 246) + nine entries (chapter 247) + one en-
try (chapter 253). Sui dynasty: eight entries (chapter 248); eight entries (chapter 253).
Tang dynasty: 14 entries in chapter 248, the complete chapters 249, 250, 251, 252,
254, 255, 256.
7 Xiao shuo in early medieval China was a designation for popular or entertaining lit-
erature in general.
8 See for example Sui shu, 34: 125a for two entries of texts with the title ‘Bianlin’, Xin
Tang shu, 59: 165a: Rongmu xiantan and Kangpian jutan lu.
9 A comparison of the lists of titles, which suggest collections of polemical or witty dia-
logues, under the heading ‘Xiaoshuo’ in the bibliographical chapters of the Jiu Tang
shu (chapter 47) and the Xin Tang shu (chapter 59) shows that this genre of literature
seems to have been growing. This indicates that this kind of polemical ridicule
gained popularity during Tang times.
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10 This refers to the Ma¯dhyamika texts Zhonglun (T 1564), Shi’ermen lun (T 1568), Bai-
lun (T 1569), introduced by Kuma¯rajı¯va, as well as the Yoga¯ca¯ra texts, introduced by
Parama¯rtha.
11 This text had previously been translated during the eastern Jin (317-420 CE) by Bud-
dhabadhra, but that version was lost.
12 465-471 CE was the reign of emperor Xianzu. Wei Shou wrote about this emperor:
‘When Hsien-tsu mounted the throne, his earnest faith was most profound. He ex-
amined the various scriptures and treatises and delighted in Lao and Chuang. He al-
ways invited sramanas and gentlemen able to discourse on the mysteries, and with
them discussed the essence of the Great Principle’ (Hurvitz 1956: 73). His son and
successor held Buddhist scholarly debates and pure talk meetings as well (Tang 1938:
501-502).
13 Xu Dishan’s term ‘proposition’ translates the same Sanskrit term as Schterbatsky’s
term ‘thesis’.
14 He translated the Nya¯yapraves´a (Yinming ruzhengli lun, T 1630) and the Nya¯yamukha
(Yinming zhengli men lun, T 1628). For a study, see Frankenhauser 1996.
15 In chapter 15 and 18 of the Yujia shidi lun (T 1579, Yoga¯ca¯rabhumis´a¯stra), in Dacheng
apidamo jilun (T 1605, Maha¯yana¯bhidarmasan´gı¯tis´a¯stra), in Xianyang shengjiao lun (T
1602, Prakaran¸ya¯ryava¯ca¯s´a¯stra) and in Zaji lun (T 1606, Dacheng abhidamo zaji lun;
Maha¯ya¯na¯bhidharmasamyuktasan´gı¯tis´a¯stra).
16 Cf. Assandri 2004: 216-431 for a detailed analysis of the rhetoric strategies in the de-
bates.
17 In these cases the emperor was not present, the host and his family were usually the
highest ranking people present.
18 Goodwin 1990: 291, in an analysis of context and dynamics of speech exchange uses
the term ‘recipient’ as ‘encompassing but not restricted to explicit addressees’ in addi-
tion to the complementary terms hearer/speaker.
19 The author of the text is Jingju from the Anguo monastery, about whom nothing else
is known. There are no other records of this debate in 792; however, a debate in the
Linde palace on the emperors birthday in the 12th year of Zhenyuan is documented
(Luo Xianglin 1955: 169-170).
20 See in particular Daoxuan T 2104, 3: 383b, cf. Assandri 2004: 77-78 and 241-244.
21 The official ranking of a religion in the state would have practical consequences re-
garding imperial patronage, permits to open tempels and to accept novices.
22 We should also remember that in the revelations of scriptures in southern Daoism of
the Shangqing and Lingbao traditions one of the most important legitimizing strate-
gies of the texts was the claim of revelation through a more ancient, more original
god.
23 The best known of the treatment of this issue is Wang Bi’s commentary to the Daode
jing (cf. Wagner 2003: 44ff).
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2 Social Crises and Political Reform during the
Jiaqing Reign of Qing China, 1796-1810s
Wensheng Wang
The Qianlong-Jiaqing transition1 in the 1790s was an eventful and a
highly troubled period for the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). It was marked
by a riotous crescendo of widespread, often clustering upheavals – the
South China piracy (1790s-1810), the Miao uprising (1795-97), and the
White Lotus rebellion (1796-1805) – that engulfed much of the empire
and shook the foundation of Manchu rule. This extraordinary conjunc-
tion of crises served as a foretaste of the escalating internal and exter-
nal calamities that would convulse the late Qing state during the first
Opium War (1839-42) and the Taiping rebellion (1850-64). It is also re-
garded as an important example of the worldwide phenomenon of
‘state breakdown’ at the turn of the nineteenth century (Goldstone
1991: 4-12).2
Despite being beset by this cluster of upheavals, unlike his French
royal counterpart, the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796-1820) was not deposed.
The Qing state rode out the challenges it faced from below and threats
of war on its borders. What explains this outcome? There are many fac-
tors, to be sure, but the most important is the Jiaqing reform – a mis-
cellany of moderate but decisive modifications of central institutions as
well as innovations in policymaking. Focusing on only one part of this
underrated political reform, this chapter takes an in-depth look at pol-
icy changes regarding the White Lotus sect, capital appeals and tribute
gifts.
The dramatic combination of upheavals in the 1790s had convinced
Emperor Jiaqing that the late Qianlong state had failed to maintain a
working balance with the increasingly expansive, complex and densely
populated society. The young monarch gradually retreated from his
father’s fantasy of firmly controlling a society that was undergoing un-
precedented transformation. Instead, he tried to create a new kind of
order, which supported conservative but sustainable socio-political devel-
opment. Jiaqing’s primary task was to deal with the mounting crises by
enacting new, ameliorative policies to alleviate social injustice as well
as to relax aggressive state control over local society and the official-
dom. He also tried to cut down excessive government expenditures. In
a word, retreat, stabilization and rejuvenation became the main watch-
words of Qing state policy and the dominant theme in political dis-
course during the Jiaqing reign.
Toleration of the White Lotus sect
The first important reform was to change stringent policy toward im-
perial China’s most influential popular religious group – the White Lo-
tus sect. The Jiaqing emperor and his officials came to realize that this
sectarian tradition could never be extirpated as his father had wished,
given its long history, extraordinary vitality and atomised nature (Over-
myer 1976: 48). There was no single leader or congregation whose
elimination would render the whole tradition incapable of carrying on.
What the state could do was to undermine its popular base through a
systematic program of pacification, the first step of which was to admit
its existence.
The White Lotus sect, as a principal vehicle of Chinese popular reli-
gion, ‘had its origins in the eleventh century as a form of lay piety, heir
to a much older tradition of Pure Land Buddhism’ (Mann and Kuhn
1978: 136). It also incorporated elements of folk shamanism, Daoist
magical techniques and Manichaean theologies (Overmyer 1976: 48).
Ideologically syncretic and regionally diverse, the White Lotus sect had
great vitality and widespread appeal among common people due to its
simplified rituals, flexible invocations and popularized preaching. Its
leadership in the Qing dynasty was ‘a loosely-articulated network of
sect-masters, whose positions had commonly been gained through her-
editary transmission and whose interrelationships were cemented
through teacher-disciple bonds’ (Mann and Kuhn 1978: 136). In addi-
tion, White Lotus sectarians had no distinguishable clothing or hair-
style recognized by the government (Overmyer 1976: 48).
Scholars have long noted the extraordinary ability of the traditional
Chinese state to regulate popular religious beliefs across the huge em-
pire. The imperial government was so potent that it ‘created a religion
in its own image’ by promoting a bureaucratic and Confucian version
of heaven. As a result, the supernatural world of most popular reli-
gions is ‘a detailed reflection of the social landscape of traditional Chi-
na’ (Wolf 1978: 135, 175). This apparent parallel between the religious
and secular bureaucracies entails that the pantheon of popular worship
was not used to question or undermine the general system of political
authority. Partly through the processes of ‘standardization’ (Watson
1985), ‘superscription’ (Duara 1988) or ‘gentrification’ (Guo 2003
2005), state-approved or local co-opted deities espoused a traditional
morality of filial piety and loyalty to the government. These religious
34 WENSHENG WANG
beliefs could take root and flourish precisely because they legitimated
and reinforced prevailing socio-political relationships.
The White Lotus ideology, in striking contrast, could never serve as
such a sort of mirror reflection or confirmation of the power hierar-
chies that existed in reality. Its perceived otherworld – ‘True Empty Na-
tive Land’ (zhen kong jia xiang, 真空家鄉) – was separated from or even
opposed to this world; and the cycling of kalpas (jie, 劫, the Buddhist
world ages) controlled by the supreme deity, the Eternal Venerable
Mother (wu sheng lao mu, 無生老母), largely depended on the denial
and destruction of the secular socio-political order. Much of this sectar-
ian ideology was ‘a reworking of borrowed symbols to deny the secular
political hierarchy, to claim a higher legitimacy…’ (Weller 1982: 481).
Thus it could never be standardized, superscribed or gentrified as one
part of the official religious system. Mainly for this reason, the name
‘White Lotus teachings’ (bai lian jiao, 白蓮教) became a convenient la-
bel used by the late imperial government to represent all varieties of
heterodox popular religions (Ter Haar 1992: 242-245). Consequently,
during the Qing dynasty, many of the uprisings in North China were
said to be motivated by the White Lotus sect (Naquin 1982: 337).
In addition to promoting violence, this rebellious sect also posed a
grave challenge to the ideological foundation of imperial rule: Confu-
cianism. Its scriptures, Precious Scrolls (bao juan, 寶卷), incorporated
Confucius into the White Lotus pantheon, but ranked him only eighth
among all the deities (PXXB 1982: 22). Worse still, this sect developed
totally different perceptions about family and filial piety from those of
Confucian teachings. Connected by their devotion to the Eternal Vener-
able Mother, all White Lotus believers formed a big family in which
their relationships were those of brothers and sisters.3 Furthermore,
the three bonds (san gang, 三綱) between father and son, husband and
wife, as well as monarch and officials, were discarded or even reversed.
Only after entering the White Lotus sect could people fulfil the real fil-
ial piety: helping their parents achieve rebirth (PXXB 1982: 22).
Both imperial officials and Confucian literati, not surprisingly,
viewed this sect as a major threat to the orderly functioning of state, so-
ciety and culture, so they made every effort to get rid of this danger.
Hence there was persistent government suppression of the White Lo-
tus religion, especially after the mid-fourteenth century when a mas-
sive, anti-dynastic rebellion inspired by this sect broke out and helped
to destroy the alien Mongol Yuan rule. This trend became even more
evident after the Ming-Qing dynastic transition. The new imperial
edicts issued in 1646 and 1656 reaffirmed a hard line toward the
White Lotus religion (Chu 1967: 134).
The Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-1795) certainly inherited this long tra-
dition of unrelenting hostility and carried it to the extreme. As the
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soul-stealing scare of 1768 suggests (Kuhn 1990),4 the ambitious em-
peror had enacted overly aggressive policies against unauthorized reli-
gious activities across the empire. Consequently, ‘religious rebellions
crowded the records of every decade after the middle of the eighteenth
century’ (Yang 1961: 166). Particularly, the outbreak of the Wang Lun
uprising (1774) in Shandong greatly heightened the danger of White
Lotus sectarianism. Shortly thereafter, there was a sharp hardening of
state policy toward this influential popular religious group (Gaustad
1994: 31). The Qianlong emperor called the White Lotus sect ‘the most
heterodox of the heterodoxies,’ (xiejiao zhong zhi xiejiao, 邪教中之邪教,
QDJPSS, 1996: 54), vowing to extirpate it once and for all. He issued a
harsh regulation that those who ‘established heretical sects, taking pu-
pils, deluding the masses and arousing chaos’ should receive the same
punishment as rebels: the practitioners were to be executed by slow sli-
cing and the relatives of the chief culprits were to be killed or given
away as slaves (Shi 1999: 11).
During the next two decades, however, White Lotus activities turned
toward growing violence and better coordination, a trend, which con-
tinued through the early Jiaqing period. Under extreme pressure from
government persecution, previous sporadic, peaceful sectarian activities
developed into more militant and unified movements of a mass charac-
ter. To cope with this deteriorating situation, Qianlong further strength-
ened his harsh policy in the closing decade of the eighteenth century
and launched pre-emptive strikes against the White Lotus congrega-
tions across central China.
Then came the 1794-1795 investigations, which were one of the old
emperor’s ‘last campaigns and the most ruthless’ (Liu, 2004: 293).
They were unprecedented both in terms of geographical scope and
number of people prosecuted, thereby posing a most formidable threat
to the sect and its members across central China. Several hundred sec-
tarian leaders and lay believers were captured and executed in Hubei,
Sichuan and Shaanxi, while many more were extorted and brutalized
(Gaustad 1994: 250). The yamen runners and clerks took this hard-hit-
ting campaign as a license to enrich themselves by extorting the local
people. They carried out a family-by-family search in some areas; those
who failed to pay bribes were arrested as sectarians and tortured. The
injustice and cruelty reached such proportions that it provoked wide-
spread, intensifying popular discontent. To exploit this unstable situa-
tion, meanwhile, sectarian leaders built up a large following through
preaching their hopeful teachings and instigating revolt whenever pos-
sible. Forced to pay or die, even those who were not insurgents opted
to become rebels. With nowhere to hide, peaceful sectarians had to
arm themselves and to rise up for self-preservation during this time of
extraordinary hardship.
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Consequently, the aggressive prosecution campaign directly touched
off the explosive flame of the White Lotus uprising. I argue that this re-
bellion emerged from a protective reaction (Perry 1980: 3-4) against the
predatory state intrusion and the perceived injustices in the local gov-
ernment. While spreading across various regions, this sectarian rebel-
lion exploited the mounting tensions traversing local society and played
a role similar to ‘circuits for electric current’, creating a large ‘magnetic
field’ that assimilated diverse unstable elements and wove them into
fairly coherent and massive protests (Kamachi 1990: 352-353).5
One month into the uprising, on February 30, 1796, Qianlong or-
dered that the White Lotus sect be banned forever (QZQWS vol. 2 1981:
225; yong jin bai lian ming mu, 永禁白蓮名目). But this measure was of
no avail. During the next three years, the growing tide of the uprising
sent a strong signal to the Qing court that the old emperor’s goal could
never be achieved. Thus the succeeding Jiaqing emperor, upon taking
full control of the government, drastically changed the state policy to-
ward the White Lotus sect. In 1800, he issued a remarkable proclama-
tion entitled ‘On the Heretical Religious Sects’ (xie jiao shuo,邪教說):
It is self-evident that the White Lotus sect is different from the insur-
gent group. If there are one or two Buddhist monks and Daoist
priests among the rebel forces, could we exterminate Buddhism
and Daoism altogether? If there are one or two shengyuan mem-
bers6 who have joined the rebels, should we abolish the Civil Ser-
vice Examination system? Hence, the White Lotus sectarians
who have joined the insurgents should be executed according to
imperial law. For those peaceful members who have not en-
gaged in any rebellious activities, how could we allow their exter-
mination? Considering this important distinction, it is apparent
that what we have been dealing with in the past five years is a
serious case of rebellion. It is not our goal to get rid of the hetero-
dox sects (QDJPSS 1996: 58; Chu 1967: 168; emphasis added).7
In another edict of May 21, 1800, the young emperor said that the two
characters ‘White Lotus’ (bai lian, 白蓮), like other sectarian words,
‘have been commonly used in Buddhist scriptures. How can we label it
as heterodox?’ (JQSYD 2000: vol. 5, 267) Later he went so far as to
proclaim that: ‘The genuine White Lotus sectarians are good people of
our Great Qing’ (QZQWS 1981: vol. 2, 331). All of these documents
fundamentally changed the meaning of being a White Lotus believer
after forcing the Qing government, for the first time, to officially recog-
nize the validity of this religion, at least in name. Jiaqing drew an im-
portant line between peaceful and rebellious White Lotus participants
and laid down the policy of ‘punishing the rebels, not the sectarians’.
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In these edicts, Jiaqing reached a reluctant compromise with the sect
and relaxed state coercive sanctions against its practices. This practical
and tolerant policy changed the long-established imperial law against
the White Lotus group and set a brand-new tone for the official attitude
toward this sectarian tradition in the late Qing. Moreover, the new ap-
proach relaxed the stringent limits set by the Qianlong emperor on ac-
ceptable forms of religious mobilization, and it thereby eased the
mounting tensions between state and society.
In his classic study on the Empress of Heaven (tian hou, 天後),
James Watson argues that the Qing state made every effort to dominate
and enforce standardized forms of worship on the people (Watson
1985). Jiaqing’s new policy of tolerating the White Lotus sect suggests
that it had become increasingly difficult to enforce this kind of standar-
dization by the end of the eighteenth century. But my study supports
Watson’s argument that the primary concern of the government was
political consequences rather than religious ideology. After the end of
the rebellion, sectarians had more freedom to pursue their White Lotus
beliefs. As a result, they embarked on an activist phase and mush-
roomed in different parts of the empire. In the Eight Trigrams uprising
of 1813, the White Lotus religion even infiltrated the eunuch circle and
thereby seeped into the centre of imperial rule – the Forbidden City
(Naquin 1976).
The two sectarian rebellions during the Jiaqing reign were usually ta-
ken as a clear sign of the decline of Qing ideological control. But what
is more important, the young emperor understood this decay and
made pragmatic policy changes to deal with the unwelcome reality.
Even though the policy for easing up on attempts to suppress the
White Lotus religion gave way to a new round of persecutions provoked
by the 1813 uprising, in the long run the Qing state began to take a ra-
tional, realistic approach toward the rebellious subculture of the hetero-
dox sects and increasingly fought it with indoctrination rather than
military force. Abandoning the fantasy of eradicating the White Lotus
religion altogether, the imperial government tried to reduce the reli-
gion’s appeal through an in-depth examination and criticism of sectar-
ian scriptures and ideologies, especially at the local level.
A good case in point was the writing of ‘A Detailed Refutation of
Heterodoxy’ (po xie xiang bian, 破邪詳辨) by Huang Yupian, a county
magistrate in the Daoguang reign (1820-50). To save people from
heresy, he collected a total of 68 White Lotus scriptures and criticized
them one by one.8 The basic accusations in Huang’s critique were irra-
tionality, vulgarity and deviation from classical Confucian mythology
(Overmyer 1976: 31). Interestingly enough, Huang seldom used Confu-
cianism itself to attack the White Lotus teachings. Instead the Buddhist
and Daoist doctrines became his major weapons. In addition, some
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folk stories about ghosts and gods also loomed large in Huang’s criti-
cism.9
Thus ideological indoctrination replaced military suppression as the
major state policy toward the White Lotus sect. Such an important pol-
icy change proved to be very effective in curbing the rebellious poten-
tial of the White Lotus sect and, slowly but surely, it declined after the
Jiaqing reign. Most interestingly, the label of ‘White Lotus’ was seldom
used openly, albeit the sect continued under the cover of numerous
small groups using different names. Henceforth, no large-scale, long-
term uprising was motivated and organized by this sectarian tradition
in the late Qing.10
Promotion of capital appeals
Besides the toleration of the White Lotus sect, another important policy
reform was to promote the tradition of capital appeals (jing kong 京控).
Generally speaking, carrying a mishandled or an unadjudicated case to
the capital was not a typical way of expressing local grievances in the
Qing dynasty, because most people found this process arduous, diffi-
cult and risky. As Jonathan Ocko puts it, ‘… unless provincial justice
was truly ineffective or distorted, people would not subject themselves
to the fiscal and physical rigors of the journey to Beijing to lodge the
appeal and then head back home for its adjudication by either the se-
nior provincial officials or a specially commissioned imperial agent’
(1988: 294).
Nonetheless, this kind of petition was an important last resort for or-
dinary people who had no other way to vent their grievances. Without
resorting to such violent means as outright rebellion, local people re-
lied on this peaceful avenue of remonstrance to have the central gov-
ernment somewhat remedy its own injustice. Seen from this perspec-
tive, in my opinion, capital appeals served as an effective institutional
absorber or buffer of radical social protest in Qing China. As for the
central government, dealing with those cases in general could enhance
its knowledge of local situations as well as check the corruption and
abuses of local officials.
Therefore the Jiaqing emperor had good reason to be greatly con-
cerned about capital appeals. He believed that the White Lotus rebel-
lion and South China piracy had a great deal to do with unsolved peti-
tions and accumulated legal cases (JQQJZ 2006: 410; JQSYD 2000:
vol. 4, 241). Thus, successful suppression campaigns required that the
state fulfil its judicial responsibility by hearing people’s unaddressed
grievances and dealing out swift justice. The emperor specifically used
the number of capital appeals as a standard to evaluate the perfor-
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mance of provincial officials (JQSYD 2000: vol. 9, 21; vol. 12, 130),
meting out quick punishment to bureaucrats accused of misbehavior.
In so doing, Jiaqing turned capital appeals into a weapon at his dispo-
sal to better control the regular officialdom outside Beijing.
Before the start of his political reform in 1799, however, the emperor
did not closely supervise the scope and flow of petitions. As Jiaqing
pointed out in an edict,
People from various provinces bring their charges to the offices
of the censorate and the capital gendarmerie11. The responsible
bureaucrats decide which cases warrant my attention, which can
be remanded to their respective provinces for retrial, and which
should be dismissed on the spot. These are the three ways of
dealing with capital appeals. Charged with upholding those stan-
dards, the officials in both agencies can always make a decision at
will (JQQJZ 2006: 512, emphasis added).
Therefore, they could forestall unfavorable accusations, guard against
any damaging upward flow of information and avoid scrutiny from the
emperor.12
After taking full control of the government in 1799, Jiaqing decided
to change this situation by stipulating that all capital appeals be ac-
cepted. As he continued to write in the aforementioned edict:
Now the avenue of communication has been broadened, it is
hoped that all true information can reach my ears. If officials
make bold to recklessly rebut or suppress any appeals against
the provincial officials or other powerful bureaucrats, it will lead
to more bribery and concealment which are matters of great
consequence. From now on, the censorate and the capital gendarm-
erie cannot flatly reject any appeals from the province. Those serious
cases should be sent to me immediately (JQQJZ 2006: 512, empha-
sis added).
Some officials like Jia Yunsheng wanted to push the reform even
further by proposing that no capital appeals, no matter how minor they
were, could be returned to their respective provinces. This suggestion
would have overburdened central government agencies with a wide
range of cases, while provincial officials would have been left with little
to do. It comes as no surprise that Jiaqing dismissed this idea as utterly
impractical. He still thought that minor cases should be returned to
their original provinces for retrial. But he ordered that, depending on
the amount of appeals, a monthly or bimonthly summary report with
clear explanation of each case should be sent to me. If I discover that a
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significant case is passed down to the provinces rather than being
transmitted to me, responsible officials will be punished harshly
(JQQJZ 2006: 512).
To ensure their secrecy, the emperor also ordered that relevant offi-
cials should not open the sealed petitions before forwarding them to
him. Consequently, a flood of requests flowed out of this important de-
cision of promoting unrestricted capital appeals (Ocko 1988: 296). Ac-
cording to the memorial of Jishan, vice censor-in-chief, the number of
petitions reached its peak in 1799 and 1800. This trend continued un-
til 1806 when there were still 10 to 30 requests per month, in addition
to other routine reports (JQJJC: 03-1489-087; JQSYD vol. 11 2000:
961).
Provincial leaders rarely shared the Jiaqing emperor’s enthusiasm
for fixing this long-standing problem. To those senior officials, capital
appeals were always a troublesome thorn, which increased their work
load, damaged their political reputation or even invited imperial scru-
tiny or punishment. Therefore, they often rejected local appeals with-
out any investigation. For instance, Fujian peasant Zhang Kao sub-
mitted his petition to various provincial agencies as many as 62 times,
but no one accepted it. Finally, he had no choice but to resort to a capi-
tal appeal (JQSYD vol. 5 2000: 292). Partly to protect their subordi-
nates or themselves, some governors or governors-general did their
best to stop people like Zhang from carrying their charges to Beijing
(JQSYD vol. 12 2000: 499). When some of the appeals did reach the
emperor’s table and were later remanded back for further investigation,
instead of processing those cases themselves, many provincial officials
forwarded them to their original adjudicators in lower governments or
simply dismissed them as baseless fabrication. Consequently, most
passed-down appeals went unheeded or dragged on forever; and few of
the accused were brought to justice (JQSYD vol. 8 2000: 451).
The resulting severe judicial backlogs plagued the system of capital
appeals (Ocko 1988: 301). On February 5, 1800, for example, the em-
peror found out that most appeals in various prefectures of Zhili were
never adjudicated; this amounted to 500 to 600 cases (JQSYD vol. 5
2000: 56). The problem was even more serious in Southeast China,
the epicentre of the piracy disturbance. According to the investigation
of Bai Ling, a newly-appointed Guangdong governor, such unsolved le-
gal cases as lawsuits, land rights conflicts and homicides totaled as
many as 2,000 in 1806, the height of the maritime violence (JQJJC:
03-1496-001). In his four-year term as Fujian governor, Wang Zhiyin
accumulated more than 800 unconcluded cases. As for his successor
Wen Chenghui, there were over 300 cases piled up during his seven-
month service in that province (JQJJC: 03-1629-068). Under such
hopeless circumstances, more and more people had no choice but to
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trek to Beijing again to lodge a second or third appeal. Some warlike
appellants in coastal south China became so desperate that they joined
the pirates to vent and rectify their grievances.
The Jiaqing emperor took great pains to pressure provincial officials
to deal with the accumulated unsettled cases (qing ji an, 清積案) in a
swift and just way. He issued a series of edicts to establish strict dead-
lines for the trial of different types of capital appeals. Specifically, impe-
rially remanded cases were to be resolved by the governors or gover-
nors-general themselves within two months. As for those petitions re-
turned by the central agencies, they were to be investigated and closed
within four months. Otherwise, dilatory officials would face stern pun-
ishment (JQJJC: 03-1629-068, 03-1527-058, 03-1537-048; JQSYD vol. 8
2000: 203, vol. 11 2000: 306, 961). This strict regulation, once routi-
nely enforced, proved to be effective in eliminating the serious legal
backlogs accumulated during the late eighteenth century. The follow-
ing chart is based on Vice Censor-in-chief Wang Ji’s report to the Jia-
qing emperor. It shows the number of unsolved cases in various pro-
vinces in 1810, when the South China piracy was finally suppressed
(JQJJC: 03-1537-048):
Table 2.1 Number of Unsolved Capital Appeals in Various Provinces in 1810
Province Unsolved Capital Appeals
Shuntian Fu 5
Zhili 16
Shandong13 68
Shanxi 1
Henan 1
Jiangxi 3
Liangjiang 15
Jiangsu 2
Anhui 4
Zhejiang 2
Huguang 5
Liangguang 2
Guangxi 1
Shaangan 2
Sichuan 2
Source: JQJJC (Jiaqing junjichu lufu zouzhe, Jiaqing Grand Council Draft Memorials),
December 21, 1810, 03-1537-048.
The low numbers of unsolved capital appeals in 1810 stood in a stark
contrast to the large backlogs during the late Qianlong and early Jiaq-
ing reigns. It is my argument that the extraordinary conjunction of the
White Lotus rebellion and South China piracy played a crucial role in
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precipitating this dramatic change, which contributed to dampen social
protest at the turn of the nineteenth century.
Capital appeals also helped to disclose and rectify widespread, local
administrative malpractice, such as extortion and abuse of power, in
the course of the suppression campaigns. As censors Chang Wen and
Lu Yan pointed out, 80 to 90 per cent of the petitions were about over-
taxation and plundering by county officials and yamen runners. This
was corroborated by the major slogan of the White Lotus rebels: ‘the of-
ficials forced the people to revolt’ (JQJJC: 03-1629-024; JQSYD vol. 13
2000: 702; guan bi min fan, 官逼民反). For instance, Sichuan peasant
Wu Tianxiang from Dingyuan County went to the capital gendarmerie
office to appeal the magistrate’s extortion of local people on the pretext
of preparing for military campaigns. Liu Renlong, magistrate of Naxi
County in Sichuan, was cashiered due to his exploitation disclosed in
peasant Ding Keyu’s capital appeal in June 1799. So were three other
magistrates in Lidu, Jiangyou and Wenjiang counties (JQJJC: 03-1710-
037). Wang Weiping, magistrate of Shishou County in Hubei, was also
similarly punished (JQJJC: 03-1477-088, 03-1477-090).
In addition, capital appeals provided opportunities for those who
wished to advance themselves by offering services during the time of
crises. For instance, in October 1799, the general commandant of the
capital gendarmerie Buyandalai forwarded four sealed petitions to the
Jiaqing emperor. They were sent by Sichuan gongsheng14 Ren Siyue, dis-
missed yamen runner Xiao Rui from Guangdong, Wang Zhengzhi
from Jiangsu and shengyuan Yang Shangqiong from Hunan. With first-
hand experience of the upheavals, all of them volunteered to serve on
the battlefield without salary (JQJJC: 03-1477-083).
Other petitioners of various backgrounds were also eager to present
their bottom-up solutions to the escalating disturbance. These people
were from all over the country, especially from the crisis-torn areas. To
give a few examples, Zhili jiansheng15Zhu Shouhai came up with 13
strategies to deal with pressing social ills (JQJJC: 03-1500-039). Jiangsu
peasant Pang Dachun focused on 14 urgent matters in his petition
(JQJJC: 03-2497-024). Jiangxi jiansheng Kuang Yuanli travelled to Beij-
ing at the age of 70 to propose five suggestions for subduing the South
China pirates (JQJJC: 03-1600-006, 03-1600-008). Fujian shengyuan
Wu Zhi and Shuntian yamen clerk Yu Ruiying also voiced their opi-
nions on the maritime violence through the delivery of sealed letters
(JQJJC: 03-2173-059, 2943). Most interestingly, even a Buddhist monk,
Huiming, presented a message, but with a threatening and sermoniz-
ing tone. If the responsible official brought his letter to imperial atten-
tion, the monk claimed, he would be blessed by the Buddha; otherwise,
great disasters would befall him (JQJJC: 03-2497-037).
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This enthusiastic (and sometimes humorous) overflow of grassroots
wisdom and intellectual mobilization was facilitated by Jiaqing’s ‘broad-
ening of the communication avenues’ after 1799. The new emperor re-
warded most of those petitioners with imperial gifts or honorary titles.
He also took their suggestions seriously, some of which were later ap-
plied to the suppression campaigns. Therefore, the soaring social crises
and capital appeals not only provided golden opportunities for those lo-
cal people to enjoy some sort of upward social mobility, but also indir-
ectly influenced policymaking and personnel selection at the high le-
vels of imperial bureaucracy. In other words, capital appeals became an
important tool to broaden political participation during the time of
crises. Elizabeth Perry defines political development as ‘a process
whereby different social elements gain an institutionalized voice for ar-
ticulating their political interests and demands’ (1997: 251). In this
sense, social crisis could serve as a catalyst for change and as a carrier
of political progress in pre-modern China.
Discontinuation of sending tribute gifts
Apart from promoting the practice of capital appeals, the Jiaqing em-
peror also ended the time-honored practice of sending tribute gifts
(JQDHL: 91; jin gong, 進貢). On numerous occasions every year, espe-
cially on imperial birthdays and major holidays, high-ranking officials
throughout the country, particularly those in border provinces, had
been obliged to present all kinds of lavish gifts as tribute to the throne.
During his long reign, Qianlong issued at least two edicts to nominally
prohibit this tradition. But, in effect, the flamboyant emperor encour-
aged this practice through his own proverbial extravagance. For in-
stance, one of the main reasons that Qianlong indulged in pleasure
trips to the South was to collect gifts for himself and his mother (Kahn
1971: 91-95).
Some scholars tend to neglect the overall significance of this tradi-
tion and its pernicious influence. Nancy Park, however, contends that
its damaging impact should not be overlooked. Specifically, the eco-
nomic burden of providing tribute gifts was directly related to the in-
creasing official corruption during the Qianlong reign. ‘Most provincial
officials spent vast amounts of time and money preparing unique and
costly tribute gifts in an attempt to insinuate themselves into the em-
peror’s good graces’ (Park 2002: 172). Since their salary was always in-
sufficient to fund their purchases, bureaucrats inevitably resorted to
bribery, de facto extortion, or other forms of corruption. As Hong
Liangji, a contemporary Hanlin Academician, stated, ‘all of this money
is extracted from chou and hsien officials, who in turn get it from the
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people’ (Mann 1972: 176). The insatiable imperial demand for tribute
gifts thus contributed to Qing China’s intensifying crisis in the late
eighteenth century.
David Nivison argued specifically that Qianlong’s favorite minister
Heshen was the fountainhead of this problem. ‘Vast sums were em-
bezzled by officials under constant pressure to secure themselves by
gifts and bribes to Ho-shen and his immediate subordinates. Every-
where local treasuries were depleted. The groaning people, goaded to
desperation by the rapacity to which their magistrates were driven,
turned to revolt’ (Nivison 1966: 209). Hence the problems of tribute
gifts, official corruption and local extortion closely interacted with each
other, precipitating the clustering crises throughout the empire. As one
of the greatest scourges of the Qing dynasty, they partly contributed to
the disruption of the balanced tension between the state and society (as
well as emperor/officialdom interactions) at the turn of the nineteenth
century.
To ease this heightened conflict, Jiaqing issued the following edict to
denounce the deep-seated problem: ‘Provincial officials send tribute
gifts in the name of serving the emperor, but in fact this is just an ex-
cuse for them to fatten and empower themselves. They use declined
gifts to bribe high-ranking bureaucrats, some of which are drained off
to their own private coffers. Furthermore, lower officials find them-
selves competing with each other in flattering their senior officials with
valuable gifts, even if this means squeezing local people. So sending
tribute gifts is the worst evil to politics, which I understand very well’
(JQSYD vol. 4 2000: 21-22; JQDHL: 68).
Only twelve days after asserting his personal power, on January 15,
1799, the new emperor promised in an edict that he would never ac-
cept any gifts from provincial officials other than simple local products
like tea and oranges for daily use (JQSYD vol. 12 2000: 924; yong du
gong xian, 永杜貢獻). In striking contrast to his father, who had an ex-
travagant lifestyle, Jiaqing fostered an image of himself as a thrifty em-
peror. He shared his grandfather Yongzheng’s distaste for conspicuous
consumption, finding luxury and waste abhorrent and reprehensible.
The new emperor said: ‘In my eyes, so-called treasures like antiques,
not to be eaten or worn, are no better than shit (fen tu, 糞土)’
(JQGZZP: 04-01-06-0005-002; JQSYD vol. 4 2000: 22; JQSL: 427).
In stark contrast to his father, Jiaqing extolled frugality through per-
sonal example and official policy. Rumors had it that his imperial robes
were repeatedly patched. He also cancelled all repair work on palace
buildings to curtail their soaring upkeep cost. No gifts of congratula-
tion were allowed at the birth of any imperial sons or grandsons
(JQSYD 2000: vol.13, 291). The new emperor, moreover, ‘ended the tra-
dition of extravagant southern tours that had been a hallmark of his
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father’s rule’ (Mann and Kuhn 1978: 118). He knew that, as Qianlong
himself had admitted toward the end of his reign, this sort of imperial
tour would inevitably burden the people no matter how much he
might admonish officials against abuses.
Further thought: A re-evaluation of the Jiaqing reform
As this chapter describes, the shock of the clustering crises during the
Qianlong-Jiaqing transition forced a reconsideration of state policy, in-
cluding tolerating the White Lotus sect, encouraging capital appeals
and prohibiting tribute gifts. Taken together, all of these changes seem
to suggest that the temper of the Jiaqing reign was one of increasing
stringency and diminishing state power, both of which have often been
taken as clear signs of incorrigible dynastic decline.
Therefore existing studies tend to downplay the Jiaqing reform as
another case of unsuccessful piecemeal modification, overlooking its
impact on late Qing history. They argue that due to his personal timid-
ity or to systematic inertia, Jiaqing made little meaningful attempt to
deal with acute problems inherent in the socio-political system (Mann
and Kuhn 1978: 116-119). Beatrice Bartlett, for instance, even contends
that the term ‘Jiaqing reform’ is a misnomer because ‘a new, inexperi-
enced monarch would hardly have possessed sufficient power, let alone
acumen, to carry out reform on his own’ (1991: 241).
Nonetheless, it is the central argument of this article that the young
emperor and his officials, through their pragmatic efforts of political re-
treat embodied in the Jiaqing reform, pulled Qing empire-building
away from a vicious cycle of excessive ambition that bred resistance
back onto a sustainable track of political development. In responding to
the White Lotus rebellion and South China piracy, they recreated more
workable bases for the state-society and emperor-bureaucracy relation-
ships through policy adaptation (and institution modification). All of
these endeavors exercised a pivotal influence on the sustainable develop-
ment of Qing state making and social mobilization before the full rise
of Western assault in the mid-nineteenth century.
What is ‘sustainable development?’ To borrow a definition from the
Brundtland Report of the World Commission on the Environment and
Development, it refers to ‘meet(ing) the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs’ (Willis, 2006).16 So the concept is not as much about the cur-
rent situation as it is about how the situation will impact the future.
When most people think about the issue of sustainability, economic
growth and ecological stability invariably come to mind. However, I
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think this category also has a political component, which can be em-
ployed to measure the process of state making.
Unlike its counterpart in economic and environment changes, politi-
cal sustainability is less about humans’ relationship to their supporting
natural environment and resource bases. Instead, in my view, it refers
to creating and maintaining viable, renewable and dynamically ba-
lanced relationships among the socio-political actors or agencies at var-
ious levels. This general concept means organizing individuals and
groups bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives, as well
as mobilizing collective actions in the face of complex conflict and
making cost-efficient negotiation or allocation. Most importantly, sus-
tainable political development is also about coordinated and compatible
growth among the various arenas or sub-mechanisms of state making.
The essence of political sustainability, simply put, is a tense yet dyna-
mically balanced relationship between the state and society.
Judging from this criterion, without being able to quantify precisely,
I assert that a major bottleneck to sustainable political development ap-
peared in Qing Empire during the Qianlong-Jiaqing transition. This
period witnessed an overloaded and ungovernable Chinese state, which
had become ‘a system working near the limit of what was possible by
pre-modern means’ (Elvin 1973: 309). The cost of political operation,
transaction and control17 had reached unacceptable heights due to the
Qianlong emperor’s aggressive empire-building and highly interven-
tionist policies, sweeping social transformation, as well as bureaucratic
struggles. All of these nullified the structures and cultures, which fa-
cilitated obedience and compliant behavior from the officialdom and
the populace.
As an unmistakable sign of this unsustainable development, military
campaigns against internal rebellions were becoming more frequent,
more serious and exceedingly costly toward the end of the eighteenth
century. The suppression campaign against the White Lotus rebels, in
particular, was the most costly military operation in which the dynasty
had ever engaged. According to the estimates of the Board of Revenue,
the first three years of the campaign cost almost 100,000,000 silver
taels. This amounted to about two thirds of the total expense for the
‘Ten Great Military Campaigns’ (QZQWS vol. 2 1981: 265; shi quan wu
gong, 十全武功)18 during the long Qianlong reign, and half of the total
expense of the decade-long suppression of the sectarian rebels. More-
over, half of the funds were used for illegitimate purposes (JQJJC: 03-
1708-069).
From this we can see that the survival of the Qing state became in-
creasingly contingent on the capacity of the central government to use
material and instrumental rewards as well as on relaxed control to en-
force acquiescence from its officials with state goals. Worse still, the
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Qianlong emperor used his power and enforced policies in a way that
compromised, rather than promoted, a sustainable, constructive rela-
tionship between the throne and his bureaucracy. Consequently, estab-
lished socio-political relations and institutions came under increasing
pressure as the monarch and the state became more and more aggres-
sive.
Instead of creating an increasingly capable state in the closing dec-
ades of the eighteenth century, overly ambitious political practices
seemed to undermine the administrative capacities and resource bases
of the state, which in turn necessitated even more unpopular policies.
This had initiated a vicious cycle of predatory state making and mount-
ing social protests which shaped the character of the late Qianlong
reign: a chain reaction of increasingly unbalanced tension between
state and society. And it was this impasse that prompted the dramatic
combination of crises during the Qianlong-Jiaqing transition.
The Jiaqing emperor had the bad luck to face more daunting chal-
lenges with fewer options and less room to maneuver than his father.
This strained situation suggests that the Qing state had entered into a
period when sustainable political development became extremely diffi-
cult if not impossible. Fully aware of his unique historical challenge
and daunting mission, the realistic emperor set his mind to preserving
the dynasty (shen shou pi ji, 慎守丕基, JQSYD 2000: vol. 12, 149)
through a proactive state retreat instead of a path-dependent aggressive
expansion. Thanks to his successful policy reform and crisis-manage-
ment, Jiaqing relaxed the intolerable pressure on the empire, eased the
mounting tensions within it and adjusted the state’s political commit-
ments to make its functioning compatible with shifting structural chal-
lenges and capacities.
Once we take the pragmatic state retreat embodied in the Jiaqing re-
form seriously, we see that it laid the foundation for the long-term suc-
cessful strategies of late Qing state making. This crucial political ad-
justment helped a hard-pressed yet tenacious empire survive an extra-
ordinary series of internal calamities and external assaults in the mid-
nineteenth century. The White Lotus rebellion and South China piracy,
viewed in this light, also became an opportunity, which the Jiaqing em-
peror used to undertake initiatives that had durable constructive bene-
fits for the Chinese state and society.
Notes
1 After sixty years on the throne, on January 1, 1796, the 85-year-old Qianlong carried
out his promise to step down and became the ‘Supreme Abdicated Monarch’. His fif-
teenth son Yongyan ascended the throne as the fifth emperor of the Qing, with the
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reign title Jiaqing. However, Qianlong still retained substantive power after his abdi-
cation and relied on his imperial favorite Heshen to rule. As for the new emperor, he
became a figurehead who was allowed to reign but not to govern. Jiaqing did not as-
sume full power until he executed Heshen 15 days after Qianlong’s death on January
3, 1799.
2 The concept of ‘state breakdown’ is put forth by Jack Goldstone. It refers to a particu-
lar conjunction of events, but not quite a revolution, which ‘involved the collapse of
the central authority’s ability to dominate in a confrontation with other politically
powerful actors, rather than the breakdown of all political institutions’ (Goldstone
1991: 4-5).
3 The Eternal Mother appeared in the White Lotus scriptures during the mid-Ming. As
the supreme goddess and ancestor of humans, she was said to save her believers by
sending different Buddhas to the world when the new kalpa came. Only in this way,
could her children survive the calamities and live happily in the ‘True Empty Native
Land’.
4 In his book Soulstealers, Philip Kuhn describes a series of local events that occurred
in 1768, which began with rumors of soulstealing by queue-cutting spreading
through east-central China. According to contemporary popular culture, by cutting
other people’s queue, one could steal his soul and make use of it for malicious pur-
poses. The person with his queue cut would get sick or even die. From the govern-
ment’s perspective, queue cutting was taken as a rebellious act and symbolic rejec-
tion of Manchu hegemony. Motivated by the dual fear of sedition and ethnic assimi-
lation, the Qianlong emperor intentionally exaggerated this ordinary, local sorcery
scare as a ‘political crime’. In response, he launched a massive political campaign to
inject his own arbitrary power and to avoid becoming bureaucratized himself.
5 Both terms were first used by Japanese historians Ueda Makoto and Atsushi Shigeta.
See Noriko Kamachi’s article.
6 Shengyuan was the lowest degree and rank in the Civil Service Examination system
in imperial China.
7 I consulted and modified Richard Chu’s translation.
8 This was the first time that the Qing government tried to criticize the White Lotus
sect in terms of its own scriptures.
9 The most influential story was ‘Record of Infernal Nemesis to the Heterodoxies’ (xie
jiao yin bao lu, 邪教陰報錄). In this story, an executed rebel – Zhong Fa – told his
own grim experience about how he suffered from macabre tortures with other rebels
in hell. The highest deity, Eternal Mother, was portrayed as a mule in heaven that
transmigrated to this world as a female. Because of disseminating heterodoxies, she
was killed by the supreme god in the end.
10 Joseph Esherick discredits the once common claim that the Boxer Rebellion of 1900
had a White Lotus link (Esherick, 1987).
11 “Gendarmerie” here refers to a Qing institution, also called Capital Infantry Brigade
or garrison, which was given responsibility of enforcing law and order in Beijing, in-
cluding accepting capital appeals along with the Office of Censorate.
12 It is not unreasonable to infer that Heshen, as long-time General Commandant of
the Capital Gendarmerie, had played an important role in restraining capital appeals
during the late Qianlong reign (JQQJZ 2006: 364).
13 In comparison with other provinces, Shandong and Zhili had far more unsolved
cases in 1810, which might partly explain the mobilization and outbreak of the Eight
Trigram uprising in both areas three years later.
14 Gongsheng refers to those shengyuan who were selected as ‘tribute student of the im-
perial academy’. Many people could become gongsheng or jiansheng through direct do-
nations or other contributions.
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15 Like gongsheng, jiansheng means ‘imperial college student’. The status of jiansheng, in
general, was also available for purchase.
16 The Brundtland Commission was also called the World Commission on the Environ-
ment and Development. It was established in 1982 by the Secretary-General of the
UN to study the world’s environmental problems. This commission came up with
this definition of sustainable development, which emphasizes meeting needs, not
just now, but in the future as well.
17 Political operation, transaction and control consist of the processes that seek for opti-
mal alignment in the distribution of wealth, power and prestige among various ac-
tors and agencies. Therefore most political problems, traditional or modern, are con-
cerned with the distributive question of achieving and maintaining a dynamic equili-
brium between socio-political forces.
18 Qianlong describes his ‘Ten Great Military Campaigns’ in the following edict of
1798: ‘Since my ascension to power, I pacified Zunghar twice (1755-59), suppressed
the Muslims (1765, 1780s), and defeated the two Jinchuan (1747-49, 1771-76), recov-
ered Taiwan (1787-88), mollified Burma (1766-70) and Annam (1788-89), and made
the Kuorke surrender twice (1790-92)…’
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3 ‘China’ on Display at the Chicago
World’s Fair of 1893:
Faces of Modernization in the Contact Zone
Yuki Ooi
Introduction
At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twenti-
eth century, many changes were taking place in China. At that time,
the government of the Qing dynasty was struggling to modernise the
nation in order to survive, while Chinese people on American soil were
also struggling with modernisation. Chinese who lived in the United
States maintained transnational relations with their homeland and
cared about this relationship, but at the same time they had begun to
settle into American society. Because of their experiences living in a
Western country, it can be assumed that their idea of modernization
was influenced by the United States and thus was somewhat different
from that of those Chinese who remained in their homeland.
This chapter will focus on what this modernization meant, not to
people in China, but to the overseas Chinese living in the United
States. There are two issues we shall explore in this chapter. One is
how the new identity of Chinese residents in the US as Chinese became
evident in the United States as they were simultaneously becoming
American. ‘Chinese’ here means a national identity in the context of
China and an ethnic identity in the context of the United States. It was
not until the late nineteenth century that an awareness of having a
‘Chinese’ identity began to emerge among the Chinese living in Ameri-
ca. Before this period, other types of identity such as clan or birthplace
were stronger among Chinese in the US, as will be discussed later in
this paper. In addition, this chapter will also examine what Chinese im-
migrants in the US thought about modernization while being influ-
enced by American modernization. As a case in point, I will examine
the World’s Fair held in Chicago in 1893, and hence focus on Chinese
residents in the Chicago area, because the Fair, which was planned as a
celebration of modernization, created and served as a contact zone
where American and Chinese ways of modernity encountered each
other. In order to explore these two points fully, the chapter begins by
giving some background on the situation in China at the end of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century and
how this situation affected the modernization and the national identity
of Chinese in China. After that, the focus will turn to Chinese immi-
grants in America and the Chicago World’s Fair.
China at the turn of the nineteenth century
At the turn of the century, the Chinese empire was weakened by inter-
nal wars such as the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) and the Boxer Up-
rising (1898-1900) and the wars with Britain, France and Japan in the
mid- to late-nineteenth century. The Chinese empire was on the verge
of being divided into smaller parts by imperialist forces, such as Brit-
ain, Japan, France, Russia, Germany, Austria, Italy and the United
States. The Boxer Uprising turned out to be the final blow delivered to
the Qing government. The Boxer rebels, many of whom were peasants,
declared themselves anti-foreign and anti-imperialist. With this excuse,
they assaulted and murdered foreigners and Chinese Christians living
in Beijing. The Empress Dowager proved ineffective in protecting the
people against the insurgency. Realising this, an International Relief
Force of eight countries was organized and besieged the capital to pro-
tect their own nationals. Fearing them and the possibility of dismem-
berment of the country, the Empress Dowager finally conceded that
the Qing dynasty could not keep its soil closed to foreign countries and
maintain the status quo, which meant that the country required reforms
in all areas, but in particular in education, the military and the consti-
tution. By modernizing these national institutions, the government
sought to avoid being colonized.
It was during this period that the national border was clearly deter-
mined. In addition, the people started to identify themselves nationally
as Chinese, rather than identifying themselves locally (Yoshizawa
2003). As for the national border, the Qing government regarded bor-
ders as expandable; with the emperor at the center of the empire, terri-
tory could expand depending on how virtuous in a Confucian sense
the emperor was. That is, the more virtuous he became the greater the
areas that his domain could govern. In this belief system, which origi-
nated from Confucianism, the Qing government formed loosely con-
nected networks with its surrounding nations through the practice of
accepting tribute. Any group, in principle, could join the network as
long as they appreciated the emperor’s virtue and paid tribute. In other
words, the center was established where the Emperor resided, whereas
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the periphery of the empire was ambiguous, because the empire con-
stituted the aforementioned open-ended networks. At the turn of the
century, however, territorial skirmishes and Japan’s attempts to invade
Korea and Taiwan forced the government to determine a national bor-
der (Mogi 1994). Now China had to claim its own border, and this
meant the periphery could not be ambiguous any longer. The determi-
nation of its national border was a significant change in China at this
time of modernization.
In addition to this development related to the physical awareness of
China, the mental awareness, the consciousness of being ‘Chinese’ or
the collective identity of being ‘Chinese’, emerged around this time,
too (Yoshizawa 2003). This raises the question, why did people in Chi-
na not think of themselves as Chinese before? Earlier studies have
pointed out two reasons. First, it has been argued that, traditionally,
people identified themselves with the place from which they origi-
nated. This strong connection to the local level even applied to emi-
grants living in other countries; they organized themselves for mutual
help along the lines of where they came from or according to their
clan. The second reason why they did not earlier identify themselves as
Chinese was that the Qing government did not establish the nationality
law until 1910. This nationality law literally gave nationality to the Chi-
nese people. Before this, there was no official nationality. What accen-
tuated the identity of being Chinese at that time was a nationwide boy-
cott movement of American products in 1905, which first developed in
Guangdong Province and spread to other areas such as Shanghai and
Tianjin (Kikuchi 2005; Yoshizawa 2003). Guangdong was the original
home of many of the Chinese who emigrated to the United States in
the nineteenth century; more than 90 per cent of them came from the
Pearl River Delta area. The boycott was mobilized as a protest against
discrimination in the United States against Chinese immigrants, which
I will discuss in more detail later. In order to organize this widespread
movement, people gradually developed their new identity beyond re-
gion into a trans-regional consciousness, namely, the identity of being
Chinese. This transformation was significant, since in China emigrants
who had left the country to go abroad were deemed ‘traitors’, who had
discarded their motherland (Yen 1985). In the course of the boycott,
however, those who joined it regarded the emigrants as their fellow
countrymen. In this way, the national identity emerged in addition to
the local identity in China.
These two developments, the emergence of a clear-cut national bor-
der and the establishment of a national identity, constituted necessary
steps in becoming a modern nation-state, as Benedict Anderson dis-
cussed in his book, The Imagined Community (1991). Therefore, it can
be said that the Qing dynasty attempted to mold itself into a modern
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nation-state while actually carrying out reforms of the pre-existing state
structure.
World’s Columbian Exposition of 1893, Chicago
Modernization was an issue not only for the Chinese in China, but also
for the Chinese abroad. In 1893, Chicago, a city in the midwestern
United States, welcomed approximately 27.5 million visitors to the
World’s Fair. It was the third such fair held in America, coming after
those that took place in New York (1853) and Philadelphia (1876). The
Fair was designed to celebrate the 400th anniversary of the ‘discovery
of the New World’ by Columbus, as well as the progress and moderni-
zation of America since that time. Thus, the Fair was called the
‘World’s Columbian Exposition.’ In the initial preparation stage, four
cities had launched a bid to host the Fair; in addition to Chicago, New
York, Washington DC and St. Louis in Missouri vied to host the exposi-
tion. To win this competition, Chicagoans began to organize them-
selves as early as 1889. Among the four candidate cities, many people
expected New York to win. However, thanks to an internal feud among
New York statesmen, Chicago won the bid at the US Congress in
1890. There was yet another reason why the city was chosen. The Chi-
cago Tribune, a local newspaper, pointed out the insularity and provinci-
alism of New York, which failed to recognize and did not pay enough
attention to the fact that there were cities and other Americans living
in the West beyond the Allegheny Mountains (25 February 1890).
Therefore, the Tribune expected that choosing Chicago would make
Eastern states recognize that cities and people in the midwestern or
the western US were also cultivated and modernized (Lederer II 1972;
Parmet 1972).
In 1893, after more than two years of preparation, the Fair finally
opened on May 1st, and lasted until October 23rd. The venue was di-
vided into two parts, the White City and the Midway Plaisance. The
White City was designed to show American progress and how civilized
the nation had become. For this purpose, the newest technologies and
sciences were exhibited in buildings for ‘Manufactures and Liberal
Arts’, ‘Machinery’, and ‘Agriculture’. Several of these exhibition build-
ings were advertised as being huge. For example, the Manufactures
and Liberal Arts Building was the largest building in the world then,
three times bigger than St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome. In addition, the
architects involved designed the buildings to be white, emulating those
of ancient Rome. They believed that the Fair should represent the pure
ideal of this ancient civilization (Doenecke 1973). In sum, visitors were
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to find at the venue of the White City an eclecticism of ancient and
new civilizations.
The Midway Plaisance was conceptualized differently. This exhibi-
tion ground was planned by the Fair’s Department of Ethnology and
Archaeology, headed by Professor Frederic Ward Putnam of Harvard
University. He decided that the Midway exhibits had to have anthropo-
logical value, which was new and thus entertaining to the American
people. Among the Midway exhibits were, for example, villages of the
Javanese, Native Americans, and Samoan and Dahomeyan cultures. Ja-
panese and Chinese exhibits were also housed there. In other words,
the Midway was a living museum of various people, which entertained
visitors from all over the world. Interestingly, exhibits such as the Irish
Village, Japanese Bazaar and German Village were placed closer to the
White City, whereas the space allotted to China was far from the civi-
lized precincts of the White City. It was reported that the exhibits of
the Midway were organized along an evolutionary line (Chicago Tri-
bune, 1 November 1893), proceeding from least to most civilized; the
closer the participant countries’ exhibition spot to the White City, the
more civilized they were regarded by the American public and the expo
organizers. In sum, the Midway Plaisance represented ‘barbarian’ cul-
tures, while the White City embodied ‘civilization’ (Rydell 1984; Beder-
man 1996). Therefore, the Fair was a ‘contact zone’ (Pratt 1992) be-
tween the uncivilized and the civilized.
Chinese exhibits at the Fair
Declining or accepting the offer to join
As mentioned above, there was a Chinese exhibit on the Midway Plai-
sance. However, this Chinese exhibit was not constructed by the gov-
ernment of China, but by Chinese Chicagoans. Although the Qing gov-
ernment had been officially invited to the Fair with the mantra, ‘All the
World is here!’ the government had wavered as to whether or not to ac-
cept the invitation, changing its decision several times and finally re-
fusing. The reason given was the discriminatory immigration policies
of the United States toward Chinese immigrants (Chicago Tribune, 23
December 1891). The Qing government cited a series of policies; by
the time the plan for the Fair was made public, the US Federal Govern-
ment had already implemented several discriminatory policies, begin-
ning with the prohibition of naturalisation in 1870. Five years later,
Chinese women were restricted from entering the United States under
the Page Law (1875). In 1882, the notorious Chinese Exclusion Law
was implemented, which forbade the new entry onto American soil of
Chinese laborers for the next ten years, except for those who fell within
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an exempt class of applicants.1 This act became known as the first
American law prohibiting immigration based on ethnicity. The Scott
Act of 1888 prohibited the re-entry of Chinese laborers who had lived
in the US and were temporarily outside of America.
What infuriated the Qing government most seems to have been the
Geary Act, approved on May 5, 1892, which resulted in a worsening of
US-China relations. This act initially appeared on the agenda of the US
Congress with a view to extending the Chinese Exclusion Law for an-
other ten years. One of its features was that it required even the Chi-
nese who legally resided in America to apply for a residential certificate
and carry it at all times. The act stipulated that any resident found
without the certificate would be automatically regarded as an illegal im-
migrant and therefore be deported without due process of law. There-
fore, the Chinese residents had to carry the certificate any time and
anywhere they went. In this way, the residential certificate worked as
an internal passport. The underlying intention of this new law was that
the government wanted to distinguish illegal from legal immigrants.
Newspapers reported numerous attempts at illegal immigration (Chica-
go Tribune, 10 September 1892: 16, 26 April 1893; New York Times, 20
April 1893: 2 May 1893; Lee 2002, 2003).2 The government anticipated
that once the Geary act was enforced, it would be easier to find and to
deport illegal Chinese immigrants. The Chinese were the only ethnic
group on which the US government imposed this measure.
It is easy to imagine that the Geary Act infuriated not only the Chi-
nese residents in the US, but even the Chinese government, which
had been demanding improved treatment of Chinese immigrants in
the US based on bilateral treaties, such as the Burlingame Treaty of
1868, which guaranteed free bilateral migration and the Angell Treaty
of 1880, with which the US government promised to provide adequate
protection for Chinese immigrants. The series of racist immigration
policies accounted for the Qing government’s mounting rage, and as a
way to protest and to save face, the Chinese government decided not to
participate in the Fair.
Despite their government’s stance, Chinese immigrants in Chicago
wanted to have their exhibit at the World’s Fair. Just like the Chinese
government, they were very critical of the discriminatory immigration
laws, but at the same time, they also lamented the Qing government’s
decision. They were afraid that they would lose the opportunity to prop-
erly present themselves to American society. The Chinese residents
wanted to have a respectable and correct representation of the Chinese
and China. They also wanted to correct the prejudices European Amer-
icans had against the Chinese such as the stereotypes that they were
morally corrupt (addicted to opium and prostitutes) and agents of in-
fectious diseases. Thus, they regretted that the Chinese government
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failed to join the Fair and decided to join on their own initiative and in-
itiate a building project. This was made possible by donations from
three Chinese Chicagoans: Gee Woo Chan, Hong Sing and Wong Fee.
Chan worked as a doctor, while Sing and Fee were merchants. Thanks
to them, the Temple of China, the Chinese Theater, and a garden, cafe´
and bazaar were constructed at the Fair. The local newspaper the Chi-
nese American, published by the Chinese immigrant Wong Chin Foo
praised these residents: ‘The wealth of these three bright gentlemen
were [sic] combined to give their country the first-class representation
before the nations of the earth’ (24 June 1893). This is how the Chinese
exhibits came into existence.
Displaying ‘China’
In examining the significance of the Chinese exhibits for the Chinese
Chicagoans, there are three key points. First of all, the Fair attracted
many Chinese immigrants from other parts of the United States to
Chicago. They flocked to Chicago not just to enjoy the Fair, but also to
seek employment. Many found jobs in laundry services or restaurants.
To serve these Chinese laborers’ daily lives, new businesses like grocery
stores and curio shops opened (Lin 1997). As a result, the Chinese po-
pulation grew, as did Chicago’s Chinatown. The first Chinatown had
appeared in the south part of downtown Chicago, on Clark and Van
Buren Streets, earlier in the 1880s, as a result of the anti-Chinese senti-
ment in California, which had caused some Chinese to flee to Chicago.
Thus, the growth of Chicago Chinatown in the 1880s was a conse-
quence of the eastward migration from California (Moy 1995), while
the Fair caused growth in the 1890s. Even though the Chinese commu-
nity became bigger, the number of women was extremely small. This
was due to the Page Law of 1875, the Chinese Exclusion laws, as well
as the ‘sojourner mentality’ of Chinese culture, in which sons were
sent to other countries as guest workers and their wives were expected
to take care of parents-in-law at home in China. In 1880, only three
out of 209 Chinese in Chicago were female, less than 1.5 per cent. By
1890, even though the female population had increased, the ratio was
still imbalanced: 31 out of 1,503 or approximately 2 per cent were wo-
men. Chinatown was regarded as a bachelor society where prostitution
was widespread and Chinatown became known as a vice district. This
caused prejudices against the Chinese.
The second way in which the Fair was significant for Chinese Chi-
cagoans was that the Fair provided them with an opportunity to gain
recognition from American society, by representing China ‘correctly’
and not in a way that was prejudiced or distorted by American society.
Some residents even affirmed that showing that they were good Chi-
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nese and that China was respectable was a way to obtain social recogni-
tion as good Americans and facilitate their assimilation into American
society. Despite the prejudice and discrimination against them, they
tried to become good Americans by being good Chinese.
Curiously, even though the Qing government and the Chinese
Americans in Chicago shared the aim of saving face for China and
Chinese subjects, their actions were in opposition. We assume that this
was because the Chinese in Chicago were not only Chinese; they
sought to be and needed to be Chinese and American at the same
time. As long as they lived in the United States, they could not turn
their back on America, but had to engage with it. Therefore, it is fair to
say that the Chinese Chicagoans sought recognition by providing a ‘cor-
rect’ representation at the Fair, not only in order to show that China
and Chinese people were respectable, but also to prove that they could
become good Americans.
It is worth noting that Chinese people cared about both China and
the entire Chinese community of Chicago. Chinese Americans, like
Chinese in general, held a strong local or clan identity. They had estab-
lished several associations for mutual help. The Chinese Consolidated
Benevolent Association (or the Chinese Six Companies), an organiza-
tion based on one’s place of origin in China, was the most well known
and influential among them. It had started in San Francisco in the
mid-nineteenth century and later spread to other regions. In Chicago,
the immigrants were divided mainly along the lines of their clans. It
was reported that there were 14 factions in Chinatown around the time
of the World’s Fair; all of them were under the influence of the Six
Companies (Chicago Tribune, 17 May 1893). The strongest among them
was the Moy family, which intentionally instigated and agitated inter-
nal discord in order to dominate Chinatown. They even had secret rela-
tions with the police and investigators, and made them raid their rival
clans on trumped-up charges. The Chicago Tribune depicted these
skirmishes as ‘clan wars’. However, through preparation for the
World’s Fair and with the chance to represent China as a whole, the re-
sidents forged a group identity of being Chinese, which was more in-
clusive than the fractious local identities.
The emergence of a ‘Chinese’ consciousness does not mean that the
dividing lines according to clan disappeared suddenly: Actually, vested
interests in mounting the exhibition created a new source of conflict
between the Moy and the Wong, the second most influential clan. This
‘war’ was exacerbated by a competitive bid to establish a Chinese exhi-
bition at the World’s Columbian Fair. Despite the efforts of the Moy
clan, a company run by a Wong clan member named Wong Kee (Khe)
was appointed to mount the exhibition. This defeat cemented the Moy
clan’s determination to ruin the Wongs and their allies (Chicago Tri-
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bune, 7 April 1893). The conflict intensified; aggravated by a near fatal
assault on a Northwestern University student and Wong clan member
named Wong Aloy. On the night of March 29, 1893, Wong Aloy came
to Chicago from Evanston and was attacked in Chinatown. Although
he survived, he was for a while in a comatose state (Chicago Tribune 7,
12, 13, 16, 29 April 1893). Two Moy clan members were accused of this
attempted murder in court. The clan conflict continued.
Nevertheless, the World’s Fair exhorted the residents to be aware that
they were ‘Chinese’, a more overarching identity than a clan identity.
Therefore, it can be said that the Fair provided them with an opportu-
nity to acquire a Chinese identity in the process of becoming Chinese
Americans. Although the dividing line by clan was still there, they now
had a new identity of ‘Chinese American’, which would be able to con-
solidate all the clans. In other words, this was the emergence of a na-
tional identity in the context of China, and the sprout of an ethnic
identity in the context of American society.
Last, but not least, the third significance of the Fair to Chinese Chi-
cagoans was that it provided a contact zone between Chinese and
Americans. Usually, the Chinese residents’ lives were pretty much con-
fined to Chinatown, and it was difficult for outsiders to visit this area
(Light 1974) because it was believed to be ‘a vice district’, which was re-
ported in newspapers such as the Chicago Tribune. American preju-
dices held that the Chinese were addicted to opium and prostitution
(as there were few Chinese women; in fact, there were brothels staffed
by Chinese in Chinatown for both Chinese and white men). China-
town was associated with filth, depravity and danger, which were
thought to be a threat to Christian civilization. It is true that some
white people visited Chinatown and that most of them came for gam-
bling, opium or prostitution. Due to this and the anti-Chinese preju-
dices of some Americans, the residential area for Chinese immigrants
had the reputation of being a den of vice. Therefore, there were few op-
portunities for white Americans and Chinese to have direct contact.
Against this background, the Fair provided opportunities for the Chi-
nese to show ‘China’ in a way they preferred, and also to do so directly
to the general American public. They did this by building and exhibit-
ing a temple, a theater, and a Chinese residence. In addition, they pre-
sented Chinese people dressed in magnificent traditional clothes. They
also tried to introduce how to enjoy Chinese theater to the American
public and some news papers such as the Tribune announced these ac-
tivities (Chicago Tribune, 16, 26 April, 24 September 1893). In this
sense, the fairground allowed the Chinese people to ‘show’ and be
seen.
‘CHINA’ ON DISPLAY AT THE CHICAGO WORLD’S FAIR OF 1893 61
The World’s Fair as contact zone
The relation between showing and being seen was, however, asymmetri-
cal, because the Chinese Exhibits were placed on the Midway Plai-
sance, the field of ‘the uncivilized,’ while the civilization of America
was represented in the White City. Such a space, where asymmetrical
encounters take place, can be called ‘a contact zone,’ as initially sug-
gested by anthropologist Mary Louise Pratt. She explained that such a
zone is ‘the space of colonial encounters, the space in which peoples
geographically and historically separated come into contact with each
other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of
coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict’ (Pratt 1992: 6). As
examples, Pratt depicted European adventurers and naturalists encoun-
tering ‘the uncivilized’ in Africa and South America. In this contact
zone, European conquerors contextualized the cultures of Africans or
South Americans in the European context and attributed inferiority to
them. In other words, through their encounter with African or South-
ern American tribes, Europeans gained confirmation of their supre-
macy and the degree to which they were civilized. In the case of the
World’s Fair, even though the Chinese residents intended to introduce
‘the finest part of Chinese civilization’ to the American people, they
were placed in the Midway Plaisance, the venue of ‘the uncivilized,’ in
contrast to the White City, the venue of the ‘civilized.’
In this sense, we can say that a contact zone is a sphere within
which Orientalism, in the sense of Edward Said’s usage, works, mean-
ing that a certain group of people constructed “the inferior and exotic
others” to secure and be assured of their superiority. At the Chicago
World’s Fair, a similar Orientalism was at play: the Midway Plaisance
contrasted with the White City, through which “white” America reaf-
firmed its supremacy, supported by civilization and modernization,
while trying to place ‘the exotic others’, such as the Chinese, Japanese,
Javanese, Africans and native Americans, in their proper place, the
field of the ‘uncivilized.’ Why, then, did American society need such a
confirmation of its supremacy? The reason is that America was losing
confidence in its own supremacy and its future due to the financial
panics of the 1890s, the rapid industrialization in cities such as Chica-
go, the high incidence of labor strikes, and the growth of ‘new’ immi-
gration from Southern and Eastern Europe. All of these factors put a
question mark next to the assumed national cohesion of America. In
addition, at the time the historian Frederic Jackson Turner had declared
that the United States had exhausted its frontier, that is, ‘the existence
of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of
American settlement westward’ (Turner 1893: 199), which had served
as a safety valve for American development. In a sense, America was
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suffering an identity crisis (Bramen 1994; 2000). That is why the
White City alone was insufficient; something else was needed to satiate
America’s need for a confirmation of its supremacy, that is, the Midway
Plaisance as the arena of the subjugated. In this way, with the Fair as a
contact zone, Orientalism was at work.
However, it should be noted that the Chinese Chicagoans were never
resigned to silence and subjugation as ‘uncivilized inferior barbarians.’
This becomes clearer by looking behind the scenes at the World’s Fair.
There was resistance from the Chicago Chinese against the American
society, which marginalized them. The acknowledgment and discus-
sion of such resistance are missing in Mary Pratt’s original idea of the
contact zone. In the 1890s, Chinese Chicagoans began to mobilize
themselves to claim their rights as citizens of the United States. Led by
a Chinese person, Wong Chin Foo, an organization called the ‘Chinese
Equal Rights League’ was established in 1892. Its primary purpose was
political: gaining rights to naturalization, voting and citizenship. The
group also developed an anti-discrimination law movement. Severely
criticizing America, Wong pointed out that America could be neither
fully modernized nor civilized as long as the United States retained dis-
criminatory laws against Chinese immigrants. Citing former President
Lincoln, Wong condemned American society for failing to embody Lin-
coln’s ideals. He attributed the source of this discrimination to Chris-
tianity. Later, he and his organization would actually turn to Confucian-
ism as a code of conduct to correct the ‘evils’ of Christianity. Wong be-
lieved that the modernization of America could be fully realized by
being corrected by Confucianism. That is, the intermingling of Ameri-
can and Chinese ideas could make modernization and civilization per-
fect. In this way, the group used the logic of modernization and civili-
zation to make a case to rid America of discrimination. In other words,
if America ever wished to be fully modernized and civilized, it had to
end discriminatory immigration laws. By relating the issue of moderni-
zation to the issue of discrimination against Chinese immigrants, the
Chinese Equal Rights League criticized America.
In addition to demanding that America be completely modernized
and civilized, Wong and his organization also strongly advocated for
modernization to be taken up by Chinese immigrants and China. Ac-
cording to the group, this meant abolishing the habits of opium smok-
ing and gambling. It also meant cutting the characteristic queue,
adopting Western dress and speaking English. All of them Wong called
‘Americanization.’ As for China, the group expressed strong support
for revolution and the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. Later, they be-
came ardent supporters of Sun Yat Sen and claimed to have connec-
tions to him. They maintained that China should be modernized and
become a republic. The group believed that through modernization of
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the Chinese immigrants as well as China, the Chinese could gain a re-
spectable place in American society.
Conclusion
Thus far, the paper discussed the significance of the World’s Colum-
bian Exposition to Chinese Chicagoans on three levels, that is, the for-
mation of community, social recognition and the establishment of a
contact zone. What the Fair meant to Chinese residents of Chicago in
terms of their own identity and orientation toward modernization was
also mentioned. The emergence of identity and the discourse of moder-
nization were closely linked to the discriminatory immigration laws in
place in America at that time and the incipient identity of being Chi-
nese American and their ideas about modernization were influenced
by the concept of equality, an idea borrowed from American civiliza-
tion. In this regard, there is a difference with the concept of moderni-
zation that prevailed in China at that time.
The Chinese Chicagoans struggled with different faces of moderni-
zation. One of them was the ‘modernization’ that American society im-
posed on them, which granted ‘supremacy’ to white America, while de-
grading the Chinese to ‘inferior barbarian’ status. Another face was the
‘modernization’ that the Chinese government promoted in order to
avoid being colonized. The Chinese immigrants, living in the dual con-
texts of America and China, were thus caught between two nations. As
Chinese and Americans, they chose to mount an exhibition at the Fair,
unlike the Qing government, which rejected participation in the Fair.
Such a duality, that is, belonging to both China and the United States,
was recognized in Chinese Chicagoans’ decision to establish the Chi-
nese Exhibition as Chinese American. In this sense, the World’s Colum-
bian Exposition was not only a contact zone for the subjugator and the
subjugated, but also the contact zone where Chinese and American
identities intermingled.
Notes
1 The exempt class comprised teachers, students, government officials, merchants, tra-
velers, their families, and/or their servants, who were not subject to the Chinese Ex-
clusion laws.
2 Correspondence exchanged among custom officers, who were in charge of the matter
of Chinese immigration, also showed that the officers tried to locate and to expel Chi-
nese illegal migrants. Some of these migrants came to the United States with false
documents that claimed that the holder of the paper belonged to the exempt class.
Others first arrived in Canada or Mexico and then were smuggled into America. This
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correspondence is stored at branches of the United States National Archives and Re-
cords Administration.
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4 Christianity and State-Building in Republican
Chaozhou, South China
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee
Introduction
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Qing imperial order col-
lapsed and the new modern state had not yet been established, so there
was an opportunity for Chinese to search for new ideas of moderniza-
tion and state-building. This chapter presents a case study of the rela-
tions between Protestant Christianity and state-building in the Chao-
zhou region of South China from 1900 to 1930. Although twentieth-
century Chinese nationalism was predicated on secularism, the reach
of Christianity, repressed but far from domesticated, returned to haunt
the secular state from the late Qing to the Republican era. By examin-
ing church-state relations during that period, this study investigates the
making of the Chinese nation state through the prism of the continu-
ous tension between religion and nationalism. It analyzes the conflict
between Christianity and state power, as well as the influence of the
state on the religious and political identities of Chinese Christian com-
munities. It also explores the meanings of key concepts like ‘sacred
and profane’, ‘public and private’ and ‘state and society’ as they relate
to church-state relations, the expansion of state power and collective be-
havior.
Rather than separating the sacred and the profane as two separate
spheres, this study re-conceptualizes church-state relations as an inte-
gral part of religio-politics in Chinese society. At the centre of the dis-
cussion is the relationship between state power and religion. In recent
years, Anthony C. Yu at the University of Chicago has called for more
attention to the state’s control of religion during the imperial and con-
temporary eras in China. According to Yu (2003), ‘there has never been
a period in China’s historical past in which the government of the
state, in imperial and post-imperial form, has pursued a neutral policy
toward religion, let alone encouraged, in terms dear to American ideal-
ism, its “free exercise”. The impetus to engage religion, on the part of
the central government, is for the purpose of regulation, control and
exploitation whenever it is deemed feasible and beneficial to the state’
(Yu 2003: 4). The Chinese imperial dynasties of the past and the Re-
publican state of the early twentieth century have continuously pursued
a policy of engaging religions as long as these religions supported the
state.
This research expands on Anthony C. Yu’s argument and points out
that the complexity of church-state relations can be better understood if
one takes into account the involvement of Chinese Christians in nego-
tiating with the state over sacred and secular matters. In twentieth-cen-
tury China, the church, the state and the community constantly nego-
tiated with each other over the control of religion, religious institutions
and rituals. When the state was strong, the church and community par-
ticipated in the formation of state power. But as the state’s power de-
clined, the church and community reverted to their original autonomy
and they crossed the boundaries between sacred and profane in order
to claim political, social and economic influences. The church and
community were active agents that contributed to the theories justify-
ing the state’s claim to legitimacy. At the grassroots level, the situation
was further complicated by the impact of pre-existing internal conflicts
that had shaped the interactions between church, state and community.
Therefore, the contest for religio-political power is a focus of discussion
(Lee 2003a; Lee 2003b; Lee 2004; Lee 2005; Lee 2007a).
Furthermore, this article provides a unique perspective on state-so-
ciety mediation by looking at Protestant churches in Chaozhou during
the Republican era. Historians have often portrayed foreign mission-
aries as undermining state authorities and upsetting the state-society
balance in China. This study contextualizes Protestant missions and
Christian churches within the traditional patterns of state-society medi-
ation. While the local Christians negotiated with the state authorities,
they simply used the missionary enterprises as additional political and
social resources. During the 1910s, civil unrest enabled foreign mis-
sionaries to emerge as effective mediators between competing factions
in local politics. This mediating role was undermined in turn by the
rise of anti-imperialism in the early 1920s. But the change of political
climate allowed some Christian communities to gain autonomy from
the control of missionary enterprises, to accommodate the growing Na-
tionalist party-state and to contribute to the state-building process.
Methodologically, this research employs a social history approach to
investigate the nature of religion and state power at the local or grass-
roots level of Chinese society. This approach, known as ‘history from
the bottom up’, looks at particular Christian communities on their own
terms. The main contention in this study is that to search for a new ba-
sis for the Chinese state and nation, Christian leaders in Chaozhou
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drew on a wide range of political and cultural resources, foreign and
native, national and local, modern and traditional. They integrated
Christianity into the state-building process through the efforts to initi-
ate social reform, mediate warlord conflicts, provide welfare and recon-
cile their religious and national identities. They effectively employed
Christian missionary resources to achieve modernity by Western stan-
dards while maintaining a distinctive Chinese identity and pursuing
their local agendas. This pattern of Christian religious activism high-
lights the role of human agency in the process of state-building in early
twentieth-century China (Dunch 2001: 80-177).
Beginning with an overview of Christianity in Chaozhou in the years
before 1900, this study discusses the symbiotic relation between mass
conversion and anti-Christian violence in the interior. The period of
1900-1920 saw the growth of a national consciousness and of China’s
revolutionary movement. The foreign missionaries and native Chris-
tians repositioned themselves as a modernizing force within local so-
ciety. But during the 1920s to 1930s, the expansion of party politics
and the growth of revolutionary nationalism marginalized Christian
communities in local politics. The Anti-Christian campaigns of the
1920s reflected an intense negotiation between church and state in a
specific local setting.
The Baptist and Presbyterian churches as power holders in
Chaozhou
On the map of China, Chaozhou seems to be an isolated region. Lo-
cated on the South China coast, Chaozhou was far away from the cen-
tral and provincial governments and notorious for its long history of
rural violence. The Chaozhou dialect was the dominant language in
the coastal areas, whereas the Hakka dialect was widely spoken in the
poorer interior. Since the eighteenth century, large numbers of people
from Chaozhou left their families to look for job in Siam (now Thai-
land), planning to return to China upon retirement. While living
abroad, they maintained close contacts with their home villages
through strong kinship and native place ties, which provided an effec-
tive network of support. Beginning in the 1830s, American Baptist mis-
sionaries who preached among overseas Chinese in Siam found in the
process a way to reintroduce Christianity to the Chinese mainland
(Christianity was banned as a heterodox religion in China since 1724).
They encouraged overseas Chinese converts to spread the Christian
faith through native place networks abroad in Siam and, later, through
kinship networks after they returned to China. Because these networks
were outside Chinese official control, they provided a stable and effec-
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tive channel of religious transmission to facilitate Baptist expansion
from Siam to China. Christianity was thus not simply a foreign imposi-
tion but spread through specifically Chinese venues. This pattern of de-
velopment in the 1830s highlights the importance of established Chi-
nese maritime routes from Siam to Chaozhou in missionary efforts to
bring Christianity to the Chinese mainland before the creation of the
unequal treaty system. This system was institutionalized by the treaties
of Tianjin (1858) and of Beijing (1860), which encouraged the tolera-
tion of Christianity, permitted the missionaries to preach across the
Chinese empire, and ordered the Chinese government to protect native
Christians from persecution.
The Beijing Convention of 1860 laid down the framework for Chris-
tian expansion throughout the late nineteenth century. The treaty
opened Chaozhou prefectural city (Chaozhoufu) as a new treaty port,
but due to strong anti-foreign sentiment, foreign diplomats chose to
move to Shantou, about 60 km from the prefectural city. After estab-
lishing themselves in Shantou, the Baptist and Presbyterian mission-
aries encountered much hostility from Chinese literati, government of-
ficials and lineage elders in administrative cities and market towns.
Faced with these antagonistic power holders, the Baptist and Presbyter-
ian missions shifted the focus of evangelization towards the interior
(Lee 2003a: 1-16).
Before the Communist Revolution of 1949, most villages in Chao-
zhou were fortified settlements dominated by several lineages and were
multi-surname communities. The proliferation of lineages character-
ized the political landscape in Chaozhou throughout the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Lineages were corporate units. Men from the
same lineage organized themselves into a defence group during the
frequent raids on other lineages. In areas with little government con-
trol, lineages were responsible for investigating alleged crimes com-
mitted by any members, and acted collectively in cases of disputes with
outsiders. Beyond that, lineages were of economic significance because
the lineage elders were in charge of distributing communal resources
such as land, water and firewood among all the members. Communal
rituals and ancestral worship were held to maintain lineage cohesion.
Equally important were temple organizations, which coexisted with
lineages and helped maintain communal solidarity through the hold-
ing of temple festivals. These festivals drew the boundary between vil-
lage insiders and outsiders (Eng and Lin 2002). People who had always
made contributions to temple activities were considered to be insiders
and given access to the use of land and water resources for agricultural
production. People who had formerly participated but were reluctant to
become involved after conversion to Christianity were viewed with sus-
picion and hatred. The situation became more complicated when some
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villagers joined the Christian church and broke away from the lineage
and temple communities.
Throughout the late nineteenth century, there were many reports of
villagers seeking the help of the Baptist and Presbyterian missions.
William Ashmore recalled a meeting with an elderly man, who visited
the Baptist mission compound in the midst of the imperial govern-
ment campaigns against those fortified ‘rebellious’ villages (feixiang).
The old man asked Ashmore to establish a chapel in his village. Suspi-
cious of the visitor’s motive, Ashmore enquired as to whether the gov-
ernment forces had been to the village yet. The old man replied that
the troops would pass through his village soon, and urged Ashmore to
go with him at once. After hearing the reply, Ashmore asked the visitor
to settle all problems with the local government before joining the
church. When Ashmore wrote about this incident in 1899, he taught
the new missionaries to be wary of some Chinese adherents joining
the church merely for protection. Nonetheless, the Baptist converts in
Shanhu and Quxi villages were successfully exploiting the missionary
resources to their advantage. The more hostile the government forces,
the more likely some villages would affiliate with the Christian mis-
sions (Lee 2003a: 47).
Overall, Protestant Christianity in Chaozhou grew as a grassroots
movement, appealing to a large number of people in the remote areas.
With more baptisms in the interior than on the coast, conversion in
Chaozhou was predominantly a rural phenomenon. It was the country-
side, not urban areas that became the center of Christian movement.
The higher concentration of church members in the interior challenges
Paul A. Cohen’s argument that in late imperial China, people along the
coast were more likely to subscribe to Christianity than people in the
hinterlands. These rural Christians came from diverse social back-
grounds: they were farmers, artisans, merchants, medical practitioners,
beggars and widows. Rather than living on the fringes of the society,
they were deeply integrated into the political, social, economic and cul-
tural spheres of the local communities. They successfully used their so-
cial networks to bring relatives, neighbors and friends to the churches,
a pattern of church growth that not only fitted well with the missionary
expectation of self-propagation through native agency but also marked
the beginning of mass conversions in grassroots society (Lee 2007a).
Equally significant was a considerable overlap of Chinese kinship
and Christian identities. Where the churches were erected outside the
walled villages and surrounded by Christian households, they were of-
ten misunderstood as independent Christian settlements. In fact, these
Christian households constituted an essential part of the local commu-
nity, as they identified themselves with a particular denomination and
their own lineage or village factions. This remarkable overlap of reli-
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gious, kinship and territorial identities characterizes most of the Bap-
tist and Presbyterian congregations in Chaozhou (Lin 2003; Liu 2003).
As Christianity began to take root in Chaozhou, the complexity of
political issues involving foreign missionaries and Chinese converts
were acute. Initially, cases of anti-foreign and anti-imperialist disputes
broke out in the treaty port of Shantou, district cities and market towns
where foreign missionaries were concentrated. They were spreading
into the interior and were woven into the local kinship, intra-lineage
and intra-village conflicts, through the influence of Chinese Christians.
Not only did missionaries and converts provoke violence, wittingly or
otherwise, endemic violence and pre-existing resource conflicts them-
selves became Christianized, as local rival factions searched for new
sources of influence and identity to strengthen their positions. Mis-
sionaries were often at a loss to know where they stood because intra-
lineage/-village conflicts and anti-Christian violence frequently over-
lapped. In particular, Protestant denominational differences and Chris-
tian sectarian competition could only too easily be wedded to long-
standing disputes in a deeply divided society. Even experienced
missionaries were open to exploitation by opportunists seeking Chris-
tianity for political, social and economic advantages rather than genu-
inely religious consolations. The missionaries’ ability to successfully in-
tervene in local conflicts had to do with powerful backing from foreign
powers in Shantou and beyond. Through their effective intervention,
missionaries could provide an alternative source of authority, thereby
empowering the Christian communities and undermining the tradi-
tional power holders such as lineage leaders, temple managers, local
constables and yamen runners (Lee 2002). In areas notorious for a
long tradition of collective violence and little government control, the
church became what English Presbyterian missionary John Campbell
Gibson called ‘a protective society’, whose members and leaders would
help each other in all matters of disputes and litigations (Gibson 1901:
184). It is an improbable situation that the Baptist and Presbyterian
Christianities expanded into Chaozhou in the midst of social unrest
and became a powerful institution in rural politics. This political fea-
ture of the Protestant missionary expansion into Chaozhou, similar to
that in late nineteenth-century Shandong province studied by R. Gary
Tiedemann and Lydia Gerber, reveals that Christianity became a potent
new element in Chinese local politics (Tiedemann 1991; Gerber 2004).
Institutionally speaking, the Chinese Baptist and Presbyterian
churches followed a set of rigid regulations enforced by the mission-
aries, but the Western approaches to church implantation were a radi-
cal departure for rural China where human interactions were shaped
by different types of social networks. In Chaozhou, the status of the lo-
cal church founders, their personal networks and the factions to which
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they belonged were extremely important. It was these variables, not the
missionaries’ rigid regulations, that determined how the church should
be constructed, and who should be included and excluded in a Chris-
tian community. While this study emphasizes the use of kinship and
lineage networks in church implantation, it does not deny the impact
of the Baptist and Presbyterian Church regulations, the personalities of
particular missionaries and Chinese evangelistic staff, and the specific
local circumstances. For example, the Baptist and Presbyterian mis-
sions created two different institutional forms of Christian church net-
works, each adhering to a particular missionary enterprise and foreign
power. Under the Baptist model, the diffusion of church authority to
local congregations gave rise to an extensive network of loosely orga-
nized Christian villages. Under the Presbyterian model, the centraliza-
tion of church authority in the Presbytery integrated all the congrega-
tions into a hierarchical confederation that was oriented towards Shan-
tou. Despite the denominational differences, the internal distribution
of power within the Baptist and Presbyterian churches was organized
vertically, because the church leaders were also the dominant figures in
the Christian lineages or sub-lineages. One implication of this vertical
hierarchy was that the Christian leaders could easily monopolize the
management of local church affairs and even turn the church into their
new power bases. These political features of church implantation had a
far-reaching impact on the interactions between church and state in
the early twentieth century.
The Protestant Church as a modernizer after 1900
The outbreak of the Boxer Uprising (1899-1901) completely changed
church, state and community relations in modern China. By the end of
1900, there were powerful forces in favour of the Christians. In Octo-
ber 1900, the Imperial Court was in exile to Xi’an. Li Hongzhang, the
governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces along with
other coastal governors proposed to make peace with the Allied armies.
The central government reversed its anti-foreign stand and ordered all
the provincial authorities to protect Christian churches from the Box-
ers’ attacks (Guangxuchao donghualu 1958: 4526; Lee 2002: 234). The
failure of the Boxer Uprising increased the prestige of Western mis-
sionaries and the Christian church was now looked upon as a powerful
political institution on Chinese soil.
In the meantime, the imperial officials and literati realized that Chi-
na could not survive without modernizing herself based on the Wes-
tern model. Therefore, the central government introduced the New Po-
licies to restructure the military and the education system in order to
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transform China into a modern state. When the Confucian civil service
examination was abolished in 1905, the government put in its place a
Western-style education system. Western-style education had begun
with missionary schools in the treaty ports, but these schools and their
students were concentrated along the coast of China and existed at the
fringes of Confucian society. Education along Western lines was con-
sidered to be a technical training for various professional careers rather
than a process to train imperial government officials. But the New Poli-
cies redefined education so as to make it a means to create good citi-
zens, to train competent officials and to enrich the nation. In this new
political climate, Christian educational missionaries were recruited to
run state schools and train teachers for the new system (PCE, FMC,
series 1, box 42B, folder 10). This development completely transformed
the educational landscape across China as shown in the studies of Stig
Thøgersen (2002) and John R. Stanley (2004). Although the patterns
of Christian involvement in educational reform varied from place to
place, both the Catholic and Protestant missionaries successfully cre-
ated an extensive network of private educational facilities in parallel
with the government-run school system (Ashmore 1902: 87-119; Hood
1966; Du 2005: 16-51). A good example is the Anglo-Chinese College,
founded by the English Presbyterian mission in May 1905 and spon-
sored by Chen Yuting, a wealthy merchant in Shantou, to offer Wes-
tern-style education for young people (PCE, FMC, series 1, box 31,
folder 7). What was striking about this Sino-Western educational pro-
ject was that the Anglo-Chinese College was erected in Shantou rather
than the Chaozhou prefectural city. This reveals that the local mer-
chants and landholders with considerable political, socioeconomic and
cultural resources were determined to bypass the prefectural and dis-
trict authorities and to rely on the Western missionaries to provide
modern education outside the prefectural city.
While Christian missions had contributed to the rise of nationalism
through the spread of Western ideas, the development of Western-style
education, social reforms and other evangelistic activities subversive of
the old social order, their success as an agent of change opened the
door to secular ideas that attracted young people in search of China’s
salvation. As Chinese accepted modernization as a critical component
of national salvation, they embraced the importance of science and
technology. A nationwide conversion to science and technology took
place in dramatic fashion during the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury (1900-1910). This marked a significant step in China’s search for
modernity. In contrast, conversion to Christianity proceeded slowly, for
it was the Western technical advance that impressed the Chinese most
(Wang 2003; Yip 1982; Yip 2003). In the name of science and technol-
ogy, many intellectuals in the early Republican era rejected the civiliz-
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ing mission of Christianity and saw the Christian faith as redundant in
the modern world. John Fitzgerald correctly points out that Chinese
awakening was a secular phenomenon (Yip 1980; Fitzgerald 1996: 37).
As nationalism became the dominant discourse in national and regio-
nal politics, there were growing attacks on Christian missionary enter-
prises and Chinese denominational churches.
In parallel with the rise of nationalism was the expansion of Sun Yat
Sen’s revolutionary movement. Prior to the 1911 Revolution, the late
Qing New Policies created a generation of young people who had been
taught radical moral and political values calling for absolute loyalty to
the Chinese nation. But the state nationalism promoted by the late
Qing reformers went beyond the government control because of the
spread of Han Chinese nationalist ideologies in newspapers and the ra-
pid growth of revolutionary activities (Harrison 2001: 81-131). It is
against this background of political radicalism that the interaction be-
tween endogenous and exogenous forces of change will be examined
in post-1911 Chaozhou.
In the early twentieth century, the treaty port of Shantou was con-
trolled by the Shantou Chamber of Commerce. The merchants and
their military police responded on November 5, 1911 to a call from the
revolutionaries in Guangzhou for self-government, and they estab-
lished an armed merchant corps to extend their power. But when the
old Governor-General of Guangdong drew back from provincial inde-
pendence, the Shantou merchants hesitated to act. Only some young
radicals seized the opportunity to occupy the banks, salt offices and
centers of communication in Shantou. These radicals were predomi-
nantly Hakka-speaking journalists, schoolteachers and writers. They or-
ganized themselves into the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance. The Shan-
tou Chamber of Commerce saw the latter as a competitor for power in
the post-revolutionary era and therefore, was determined to crush it
(Friedman 1970; Galbiati 1985: 1-53).
Underlying this power struggle was a sub-ethnic conflict in which
the Chaozhou-speaking Shantou Chamber of Commerce was worried
about the expansion of the Hakka-dominated Chinese Revolutionary
Alliance. Through an alliance with Chen Jiongming, the man chosen
as provincial governor in Guangzhou in 1912 and the support of Brit-
ish and American consuls, the Shantou Chamber of Commerce kept
the Hakka radicals out of power. Clearly, the wealthy men in Shantou
only supported the revolution provided that they could keep the salt
revenues and other financial resources to themselves (Wang and Wu
2003). Of particular importance is the theme that allegiance to local
community and concern for communal interests often took precedence
over loyalty to any political regime. This theme was replayed on count-
less occasions in Chaozhou throughout the Republican era.
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The Church as a mediator in warlord conflict
Although the Shantou Chamber of Commerce won the power struggle,
they failed to use the 1911 Revolution to implement progressive reform
and to extend their control into the countryside. Their reliance on for-
eign protection seemed to preclude any need for establishing a better
form of governance. As a result of ineffective state control, intra/inter-
village violence frequently broke out in the interior of Chaozhou
throughout the 1910s (China Records Project, the Ellison and Lottie
Hildreth Papers, RG 15, box 3, folder 28).
Strategically located at the border of Fujian and Guangdong pro-
vinces, Chaozhou was a place of contest between rival warlords. In the
winter of 1917, Chen Jiongming’s troops advanced upon Fuzhou troops
stationed at Chaozhoufu. As one Chinese writer observed, ‘Outside the
city wall there was severe conflict. The sound of cannon thundered in
the sky. Bullets fell like raindrops. Residents of both city and villages
were fearful of death’ (China Records Project, the Ellison and Lottie
Hildreth Papers, RG 15, box 11, folder 118). The local chief of police and
the chair of the Chaozhou Chamber of Commerce asked T.W. Douglas
James and Malcolm Ross of the English Presbyterian mission, Ellison
Hildreth of the American Baptist mission, and Father Roudie`re of the
Missions E´trange`res de Paris (MEP) to act as negotiators between the
opposing armies. The missionaries set up a joint committee with the
local chief of police and merchant leaders to draft an armistice. With
the intervention of the American and British consuls in Shantou, the
missionaries brought Chen Jiongming’s troops to the negotiation table.
Eventually, an armistice was arranged and the Fuzhou troops withdrew
from the area. To commemorate this event, a granite monument was
put up in the spring of 1918 at the largest temple in Chaozhoufu. Each
missionary was presented with a banner (14 feet long and 30 inches
wide) with four Chinese characters in gold thread, translated as ‘com-
ing to the aid of people in distress’ (Hood 1986: 215-217).
In this incident, the missionaries’ intervention saved the city from at-
tack. In Chaozhoufu and Shantou, the missionaries were now seen as
guardians of law and order. They gained prestige and acceptance in the
circle of local elites. There was even an informal political alliance be-
tween the missionaries and local merchants. As with the native Chris-
tians, the merchants could use the missionaries to gain access to the
foreign consuls in times of crises and to obtain additional resources to
resist the provincial armies in Guangzhou.
This experience encouraged T.W. Douglas James to pursue closer re-
lations with the local elites who had sought his help. Ever since their
arrival at Chaozhoufu in 1860, the English Presbyterian missionaries
had failed to establish a foothold inside the walled city. T.W. Douglas
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James took advantage of the new political climate to relocate the Pres-
byterian mission compound outside the southern gate into the center
of the city. As he discussed the change of popular mood towards the
Presbyterian mission,
When in December 1917, the missionaries were able to act as
mediators between the opposing forces it was as representing
the local people, and at the instance of the local gentry and for
the purpose of saving the whole City [Chaozhoufu]. When we
came in from the Southern Camp it was between rows of an-
xious people lining the long streets; and when we entered the
Chamber of Commerce it was to be greeted by silent and im-
pressive rising to their feet of 50 or 60 men who knew that their
lives and fortunes hung on the news we brought. It struck the
imagination of the men most concerned and they have not wear-
ied of showing their appreciation and gratitude. We did little but
we were on the spot and God uses us (Hood 1986: 388, endnote
59).
While the missionaries were trapped in a warlord conflict, the only op-
tion for them was to exercise their treaty rights by appealing to the for-
eign consuls for help. In this incident, the close connection between
the Bible and the gun proved to be a blessing in disguise. To the local
officials and merchants, reliance on the foreigners to protect their in-
terests precluded any needs for cultivating better relations with the war-
ring factions in Guangzhou and Fuzhou and for creating strong de-
fence forces. But the tie with the missionaries and foreign consuls was
their weakness as well as their strength. The local officials survived a
military crisis, and the merchants and absentee landlords continued to
prosper in these relatively safe urban enclaves. But these power holders
failed to implement progressive reforms, to address the grievances of
rural communities and to establish law and order in the countryside.
Therefore, the political climate of Chaozhou followed the fluctuating
fortunes of Chen Jiongming. From 1921 onwards, Chen was increas-
ingly in conflict with Sun Yat Sen, and this power struggle added a
new dimension to the politics in Chaozhou.
In 1920, Sun founded the new Guomindang in Guangzhou to rally
mass support. But Sun’s position in Guangzhou depended on the city’s
warlord politics. Real power in Guangzhou shifted between Chen
Jiongming and the mercenary troops from Yunnan and Guangxi pro-
vinces that Sun had invited into the city to counter Chen’s power. After
Chen’s successful expedition against Guangxi warlords in May-July
1921, his rivalry with Sun intensified. Sun used Guangzhou as a power
base to organize a Northern expeditionary campaign in alliance with
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Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria against Wu Peifu in central China. Sun’s
goal was in conflict with Chen’s policy of putting the interests of
Guangdong first, ‘Guangdong for Cantonese’. Sun’s temporary flight
from Guangzhou in 1922 was followed by Chen’s own expulsion from
the same city in 1923. When Sun returned to reorganize the Guomin-
dang with the help of the Soviet Union, Chen simply retreated to his
traditional base in East Guangdong. As a local man and a native of
Haifeng district, Chen directed resources towards local development.
Chen was hailed in the Presbyterian missionary circle as a symbol of
law and order and a guardian of local economic interests. Despite his
remarkable contributions to the development of East Guangdong,
Chen was still a warlord and his troops often disturbed the local Catho-
lic and Protestant communities.
The church as a welfare provider in natural disasters
While fighting and troop movements severely affected the people’s live-
lihoods in Chaozhou, natural disasters such as earthquakes, droughts
and typhoons put tremendous pressure on local resources. The ty-
phoon and tidal wave of August 2, 1922 swept across Shantou and its
surroundings. Hundreds of corpses and the carcasses of animals were
mingled with the debris. It was estimated that 75 per cent of the city
buildings in Shantou were destroyed. The Mother Superior, Sister Ma-
rie du Rosaire who was in charge of the Ursuline convent at Shantou
was caught in the tidal wave that followed the typhoon. She floated on
a drifting bed until daybreak when she was rescued. Sister Marie du
Rosaire later described the magnitude of the disaster in one of her let-
ters:
Swatow alone has 50,000 dead – either lost or drowned. At
every moment of the day or night the stretcher-bearers pass in
front of the [Catholic] bishopric with their dead. At first they had
coffins; but now the bodies are simply put in matting. They have
been picking them up now for five days. The Chinese are very
respectful of their dead and will not let anyone go without bur-
ial. The way the Chinese have taken this disaster is truly remark-
able. They don’t seem to be crushed. They collect the debris
from their houses and their little bamboo huts as though it were
something quite ordinary (Mahoney 1996: 35-36).
This graphic account of the disaster showed that Shantou was like a
war-torn city. The material damage was enormous and the number of
casualties was uncountable. Many Baptists and Presbyterians in coastal
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villages were drowned. A Presbyterian rural congregation was reported
to have lost 250 of its members, and of one Christian family number-
ing 25 only three survived (Band 1948: 350; Hood 1986: 216-217).
Although the Baptists and Presbyterians were little prepared for it,
the foreign missions and native churches found themselves to be the
only viable institutions after the disaster, and as such, had to bear the
burden of relief work (Jenkins 2002; Sanneh, 2003: 14-20). In Shan-
tou, the Baptist and Presbyterian missions together with the Shantou
Chamber of Commerce coordinated the relief efforts to bury the dead
and to distribute food among the poor. The missions also used their ex-
tensive market and village church networks to distribute food and med-
icine in the countryside. One of the badly hit Christian communities
was the Presbyterian congregation in Yanzao village in Chenghai dis-
trict, the first Presbyterian Church in Chaozhou. The Yanzao congrega-
tion lost 119 of its members, 50 baptized adult church members, 35
children and 34 religious inquirers. The death toll made up 25 per cent
of the village population, of which three deacons and one elder were
killed, and one Christian family lost eighteen of its members (Wei
1949: 1-4). Chen Chunsheng points out that after the typhoon, many
emigrant villages (qiaoxiang), such as Zhanglin market town in Chen-
ghai district, where local inhabitants received remittances from South-
east Asia, turned to their overseas relatives for help (Chen 1997). What
distinguished the Yanzao congregation from these emigrant villages
was its tie to the extensive regional and transnational Presbyterian net-
works. The Yanzao congregation called for financial assistance not only
from their missionary patrons in Shantou and other Christian commu-
nities in unaffected areas, but also from the Chinese Presbyterian mi-
grants in Hong Kong, British Malaya and Singapore and from the
headquarters of the English Presbyterian mission in London.
Most of the overseas donations were administrated through the Eng-
lish Presbyterian mission in Shantou and in 1923 the majority of the
missionaries were involved in relief and charitable work. They ad-
dressed the immediate concerns of the refugees and rebuilt the badly
hit communities through provision of livestock, farm implements and
loans to farmers. The Presbyterian mission certainly welcomed the op-
portunity to make contacts with local officials and merchants (Band
1948: 351). Despite the missionaries’ optimism, there was a growing
concern over the future of the Guomindang-Communist United Front
government in Guangzhou. The outbreak of the Anti-Christian Move-
ment there in December 1924 alarmed the missionaries and church
leaders in Shantou.
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The church as a target of the Anti-Christian Movement (1925-1927)
The Anti-Christian Movement was an integral part of revolutionary
politics in the 1920s. Michael G. Murdock argues that the Guomin-
dang leaders manipulated anti-Christian sentiment to rally support as
a mobilization tactic. In so doing, the Guomindang government used
this as leverage to maintain ties and continue talks with foreign powers
that had refused to recognize it. This tactic extended far beyond the
Guomindang’s power basis in Guangdong province and allowed the
party to expand its influence through local anti-Christian organizations
(Murdock 2000; Murdock 2002; Murdock 2006).
During the First Eastern Expedition in the spring of 1925, the Guo-
mindang leaders in Guangzhou decided to remove the threat of Chen
Jiongming and his troops in Eastern Guangdong. The training regi-
ments of the Whampoa Military Academy and the Peasant Unions of
the Hailufeng area contributed to the success of the Eastern Expedi-
tion. After defeating Chen’s troops, the Guomindang controlled Shan-
tou and its hinterlands. The Guomindang permitted the formation of
Labour Unions and Agricultural Societies and allowed them to de-
nounce Christianity as a vanguard of Western imperialism and Chris-
tians as the ‘running dogs’ of the foreigners. The Guomindang armies
acted with caution in relation to the foreign community in Shantou.
The Baptist and Presbyterian missions continued their ministerial,
educational and medical work despite the anti-imperialist and anti-
Christian agitation of the Guomindang. When there was an attempt to
organize an anti-Christian demonstration in Shantou on May 4, 1925,
the Presbyterian school students withdrew in protest from the student
union. Although a newly formed pro-Guomindang student union
launched a bitter anti-Christian campaign in Chaozhoufu, students of
the Christian schools did not participate (China Records Project, the El-
lison and Lottie Hildreth Papers, RG 15, box 7, folder 94). In Haifeng
and Lufeng districts, the Peasant Union declared its policy to expropri-
ate the landlords, to expel foreigners and to destroy the churches. With
the support of the Guomindang authorities, bands of students went to
the countryside, propagating communist and anti-religious ideas.
The most severe challenge to the Baptist and Presbyterian missions
was the May 30th incident in Shanghai and the Canton-Hong Kong
strike in June 1925. In areas controlled by the Guomindang govern-
ment in Guangzhou, the May 30th and Shamian incidents added fuel
to the explosive anti-imperialist and anti-Christian agitation. In Chao-
zhoufu, the local Christians were concerned for their safety, when stu-
dents at two of the state schools were seeking rifles to arm themselves
against the Christian institutions. In Shantou, the Student and Labour
Unions planned to organize anti-foreign demonstrations. Although ru-
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mours of the return of Chen Jiongming’s troops reduced the scale of
the protest, a citywide strike and boycott took place throughout late
1925 and early 1926 (Hood 1986: 228-231).
The popular reaction in Shantou to the May 30th and Shamian inci-
dents had its immediate effect on the English Presbyterian mission.
The Presbyterian educational missionaries had to withdraw from the
Anglo-Chinese College and leave it in the hands of the Chinese staff.
The most hostile reaction towards the English mission was expressed
by a group of Chinese Christians in the Shantou Church, the largest
Presbyterian congregation in the city. On their initiatives, a Patriotic
Society was formed along with members of the Qilu Church, another
Presbyterian congregation in the suburb of Shantou. Dispute was
caused by their attempt to change the name of their church by adding
‘Chinese Christian’ to the existing ‘Presbyterian Church’. The mission-
aries saw the change as a plot to gain control of the mission and
church properties. The dispute reached a climax when an announce-
ment was made in the name of the Shantou and Qilu congregations
declaring that as the missionaries had not condemned the Shanghai
shootings, the two congregations decided to break away from the Eng-
lish Presbyterian mission. Some radical church leaders were deter-
mined to separate themselves from the Synod and they called upon
other Presbyterian churches to do the same.
When the deacons of both congregations met together to discuss the
dispute, those responsible for the announcement refused to attend. At
the end, the deacons issued a statement to emphasize the denomina-
tional link with the English mission, but they pointed out that the
Shantou and Qilu congregations had been financially independent for
over ten years, and they were self-supporting pastorates in the Presby-
tery. Underlying this incident of intra-church dispute was serious fric-
tion between the missionary patrons and some well-established church
leaders (Hood 1986: 232-234). When some church leaders internalized
the Guomindang discourse of revolutionary nationalism, they chal-
lenged the subservient role assigned to them by the missionaries and
were determined to break away from the missionary control.
In August 1925, the pro-Guomindang Anti-foreign Committee in
Shantou issued a resolution that prohibited teachers and students from
attending any school under British control. Hur F. Wallace, the most
senior Presbyterian educational missionary realized that he could not
open the Anglo-Chinese College for the coming term. The mission-
aries were convinced that the Anti-foreign Committee had its contacts
with the Shantou Church, because Wallace announced on August 22
that the Anglo-Chinese College would be suspended for a term. Within
a few days, Wallace received a request on behalf of the Student Associa-
tion that the Mission Council should hand over the temporary manage-
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ment of the College to a Chinese Committee. The Presbyterian mission
saw it as a way to circumvent the resolution. As the missionaries re-
fused to back down, some students were reported to have organized a
new school in order to cut themselves off from the British mission-
aries. With the support of two sons of the founder of the Anglo-Chi-
nese College, Chen Yuting, the students wanted to re-register the
school property as ‘common property’ rather than ‘British mission
property’. This confrontation between the Presbyterian missionaries
and local students was suddenly transformed by the military comeback
of Chen Jiongming’s forces and the departure of the Guomindang offi-
cials. The change in the military situation affected the decision of the
local church leaders. In the autumn meeting of the Presbytery on Sep-
tember 22, 1925, the local church leaders re-established contact with
the missionaries, but they refused to condemn ‘the unruly section of
the Swatow (Shantou) congregation’ as the missionaries would have
wished (Hood 1986: 235-237; Hu 2004b: 106-122).
Nevertheless, Chen Jiongming’s military intervention failed to estab-
lish a new stronghold in Shantou because in November 1925, Jiang Jie-
shi launched the Second Eastern Expedition against Chen’s forces. The
return of the Guomindang army brought in Zhou Enlai as chief direc-
tor of the Civil Administration Department of the Eastern Expedition
Headquarters. During the next few months, Zhou Enlai took over the
control of mission schools from the hands of the missionaries, includ-
ing the Anglo-Chinese College, but he had no resources to pay teachers
and keep schools running. In this incident, Zhou Enlai settled political
scores at the expense of the students’ future (Hood 1986: 237-246;
Chen [comp.] 2004).
As Jiang Jieshi tightened his control over the Guomindang, he began
to target the Communists and ended Zhou Enlai’s administration in
Shantou. The Anti-Christian Movement officially ended in the winter
of 1926 and things returned to normal in early 1927. This change of
revolutionary policy had to do with political and social instability in the
countryside. Throughout the Hakka region stretching from Haifeng
district to the borders of Jiangxi province, cases of inter-/intra-village
violence merged with continuous fighting between Communist and
anti-Communist forces. There was an extensive attrition of missionary
activity over this vast mission field than that in Shantou, with fewer
staff, Chinese and foreign missionaries to serve it. The most serious
problem had to do with the killing of local Catholics and Protestants in
Haifeng and Lufeng districts under the control of Peng Pai’s Soviet
government. In October 1928, six churches were burnt and another 18
churches were demolished, with three preachers, an old elder, six dea-
cons and 30 Christians killed and many becoming homeless and flee-
ing elsewhere (Hood 1986: 247-256).
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It is ironic that during the Northern Expedition, the anti-Christian
movement increased popular support for the Guomindang leaders, but
the escalation of violence against Christians undermined the govern-
ment’s ability to establish effective control over the newly controlled
areas. The Guomindang decided to end the anti-Christian movement
in order to maintain social stability and prevent foreign intervention
(Murdock 2006: 211-278).
In the midst of political chaos, there were more incidents of intra-
church dispute during the late 1920s. The Jieyang Presbyterian congre-
gation had declared itself an independent church. They complained
about the slow progress towards self-support and self-government with-
in the Presbyterian circle. The Shantou Church had petitioned the
Presbytery to have more control over its resources. But the Presbytery
and the English missionaries rejected the idea that the stronger congre-
gations could enjoy independence by disassociating themselves from
the weaker ones. The dispute revealed a growing rift between this well-
financed urban congregation and the missionaries. In November 1928,
the dispute ended with a final split. Seven leaders of the Shantou
Church established their congregation under the name ‘New Chinese
Christian Church’. The themes of xenophobia and Western imperial-
ism were the main reasons for local Christians’ antagonism towards
the missionaries. This new congregation attracted the younger genera-
tion of Presbyterians in Shantou and continued to flourish till the
1950s (Shantou xinzhonghua jidujiaohui 1949).
Conclusion
Throughout the early twentieth century, China was in perpetual flux,
and the views of foreign missionaries and native Christians towards
the revolutionary activists, local warlords and Republican authorities
changed from time to time. The interaction between Protestant mis-
sions and state-building in Chaozhou was as complex as that in other
parts of China. On the one hand, the missions contributed to China’s
modernization and fostered the growth of new social and cultural
forces. On the other hand, these new forces were antagonistic towards
the missionary enterprises. There was indeed a similarity between the
xenophobia of the late-nineteenth-century Confucian scholars and the
anti-Christian sentiment of young intellectuals in Republican China.
Another indicator of the growth of national consciousness in the
1920s was the efforts of Chinese church leaders to loosen their ties
with the missionary societies. The ways in which the Jieyang Presbyter-
ian congregation declared itself an independent church, and in which
the Shantou Church controlled its own finance are illustrative. Though
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these local congregations were not always antagonistic towards their
denominational heritage, they did not want to run the church accord-
ing to some rigid regulations imposed by the missionaries. Instead,
they combined the Western church model with traditional networks to
create the Three-Self church in Chaozhou. If a single lesson emerges
from the rapid development of the Chinese Baptist and Presbyterian
movements, it is that local Christians established the churches accord-
ing to their own needs and the new political and social environment,
despite all the missionary efforts to shape them in the mold of the Old
Christendom.
Faced with the politicization of Chinese society in the 1920s, the po-
litical and social standing of Protestant missions in the local society
did not diminish. The missionaries and Chinese staff expanded their
role as educators, modernizers, relief workers and conflict mediators.
In addition, the missionaries still benefited from their privileged status
under the unequal treaty system. Their role as protectors, mediators
and welfare providers was enhanced in times of crises, and the foreign
missionary enterprises became what R. Gary Tiedemann (1999; 2004)
calls ‘a safe haven’ for Christians and non-Christians alike. As far as
the officials and elites in Chaozhou were concerned, Christianity be-
came an irresistible creed that offered direct access to foreign power,
and provided social advancement by means of a modern education at
the mission schools. There existed an informal political alliance be-
tween the Protestant missions and merchant communities in Chao-
zhou and Shantou. Once Jiang Jieshi established his control after the
Northern Expedition, the national political climate favored the Chris-
tian missions. Meanwhile, the Communist forces failed to have a far-
reaching impact in the 1920s. They retreated to the interior and gradu-
ally established themselves during the 1930s and 1940s.
The state – whether it was the late imperial government, local war-
lords or the Guomindang – was generally perceived by Chinese Chris-
tians as beneficial to the modernization of China. In the post-Boxer
era, the late imperial state initiated modernizing projects in order to re-
build the country and restore control at the local level. During the
1920s, the Guomindang state launched a series of anti-Christian cam-
paigns to foster a sense of unity in the national struggle against im-
perialism. Its representatives worked closely with pro-government
church members and mission school students to challenge the foreign
missionary enterprises in Shantou. In the religious sphere, the Guo-
mindang state had successfully intervened in the affairs of foreign mis-
sion bodies and local denominational churches. The expansion of state
power was part of a broader state-building pattern in early twentieth-
century China, and it increased in frequency in the post-1949 era (Lee
2007b).
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5 The Structure of Salt Distribution in
Taiwan, 1895-1945
Tsu-yu Chen
Introduction
Salt is a commodity necessary for daily life. There are salt resources all
over the world, yet not every region can produce table salt. A common
way to produce salt is by evaporating seawater. Taiwan is well suited
for this kind of activity. Retrieving salt from seawater started in Taiwan
very early since the island was inhabited.
Before 1895 the Taiwanese salt trade was part of the Chinese salt
trade. Since the second century B.C.E. the right to salt distribution be-
longed exclusively to the Chinese government and to licensed mer-
chants. Over time, there emerged a complex structure for the distribu-
tion of salt and a series of salt laws.
Salt distribution has attracted attention from historians (Liu 1989:
608-609, 617-623), but research on the Taiwanese salt trade is rather
scanty.1 Taiwanese salt production during the Qing dynasty did not pro-
vide self-sufficiency for Taiwan, nor did Taiwan play an important role
in the Chinese salt trade network. Before the twentieth century, local
governments paid attention only to the local distribution of salt. In the
twentieth century, in order to increase revenues, Japanese colonial
authorities started promoting new production techniques and develop-
ment of a distribution network according to the policies formulated un-
der the slogan, ‘chemical industries in Japan, raw materials and salt
from Taiwan.’ In the late 1930s the Japanese government decided to
develop chemical industries in Taiwan on the basis of local salt produc-
tion facilities. Salt and its by-products became the raw materials of a
nascent chemical industry. Thus salt provided a link to modern indus-
trial science and technology.
This article describes the process of establishing the salt monopoly
and the formation and development of its marketing network in order
to analyze the transformation of the Taiwanese salt trade from import-
substitution to export-oriented industry.
The establishment of the table salt monopoly
Background
After Japanese colonial rule was set up in Taiwan in 1895, a new Gov-
ernment-General was established to administer the island. The regula-
tions from 1896, especially paragraph 63, gave the Government-Gener-
al very broad powers: ‘the Government-General of Taiwan in the terri-
tory under his jurisdiction promulgates decrees with legal force’
(Taiwan so¯tokufu 1921: 2). The official orders of the Government-Gen-
eral had binding legal force.2
Taiwanese colonial authorities considered re-establishing a salt
monopoly in Taiwan. Draft regulations stressed that Taiwanese salt was
not sufficient to meet the needs of the local population. After consulta-
tions between the Ministries of Interior Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Agri-
culture and Commerce, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce fi-
nally allowed the Taiwanese local authorities to re-establish the salt
monopoly. On April 20, 1899 the Japanese prime minister in an offi-
cial letter to the Taiwanese Governor-general Kotama Gentaro¯ stressed
the conditions under which the Japanese government would permit
the Taiwanese salt monopoly to be established:
1. It is forbidden to purchase Chinese salt and resell it in Japan.
2. If there is a shortage of local salt in Taiwan and it is necessary to
import it from China, such salt imports need to be reported in ad-
vance to the Interior Affairs Ministry and to the Agriculture and
Trade Ministry.
3. Because foreign salt is imported to Japan only after the payment of
custom taxes, Taiwanese salt transported to Japan has to be sold at
current market prices (Taiwan so¯tokufu shenbaisenbaikyoku 1924b:
34-37).
The fact that Kotama decided to press Tokyo about permission for a lo-
cal salt monopoly had much to do with the head of the Taiwanese Civil
Affairs Department Goto¯ Shimpei. Immediately after taking office, he
employed the services of Gu Xianrong.3 Gu proposed the idea of re-es-
tablishing the salt monopoly to Goto¯:
The Qing dynasty officials and literati were the most powerful
local figures, but after Japan took over Taiwan all previous titles
became useless, and when their power was lost they encoun-
tered many hardships. If the new authorities showed benevo-
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lence towards the subjects and restored the salt monopoly privi-
leges to local elites, it would help greatly to improve local order.4
Goto¯ Shimpei agreed with the proposal (Tsurumi 1943: 285-287).5
In addition to Gu Xianrong’s suggestions, the success of the opium
monopoly in Taiwan also helped to convince local Taiwanese authori-
ties to re-establish the salt monopoly. The rules of the salt monopoly
were in fact based on the rules of the opium and camphor monopolies
(Takegoe 1985: 273). According to those rules, the Monopoly Bureau
employed a salt trade supervisor and a supplementary supervisor; both
salaried and wearing specially designed uniforms (Taiwan so¯tokufu
1926).
Financial problems faced by the new colonial authorities in Taiwan
were also among the reasons leading them to re-establish the salt
monopoly. Government funding from Japan was cut from seven mil-
lion to four million yuan. Kotama Gentaro¯ and Goto¯ Shimpei had to
find new financial resources for their administration (Yanohara 1985:
9). And the fact that a salt monopoly had existed in the past made rein-
troducing this institution much simpler.
The main reason for re-establishment of the salt monopoly was to
increase revenues for the colonial authorities and to pay the costs of
governing Taiwan from local resources. Revenues from the government
monopolies accounted for 40-50 per cent of the colonial government’s
general revenues. The revenues from the salt monopoly were always a
stable part of revenues derived from all government monopolies, con-
stituting 3 to 10 per cent of total revenues. In comparison, opium
monopoly revenue was 78 per cent of total monopolies’ revenues in
1899, but gradually fell to only 1 per cent in 1943. After 1924 cigarette
and alcohol monopolies provided most of the monopoly revenues, up
to 94 per cent in 1943 (Chen 1991: 594-598).
As I will explain in more detail later, the salt monopoly was also
helpful in controlling social behavior; Japanese authorities used it as a
tool for social control.
Another reason for re-establishing the salt monopoly was that it
helped the colonial authorities to cut the economic links that had
bound Taiwan and Mainland China and to promote economic ex-
change between Taiwan and Japan. The rules of the Taiwanese salt
monopoly were published in the Imperial prescript no. 51 regulating
the structure of the Taiwanese Salt Affairs Bureau, in law no. 7 con-
cerning the activities of the salt monopoly, and in law no. 14 governing
the structure of salt fields (Linji Taiwan kyukan cho¯sakai 1985: 274).
The Taiwanese Salt Affairs Bureau was subordinate to the office of the
Government-General and was in charge of salt purchasing and subse-
quent marketing, and the investigation of market conditions. The Tai-
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wanese Government-General decided the position of the Taiwanese Salt
Affairs Bureau in the administrative structure and its competences. In
April 1899, 20 Salt Affairs Bureau branches were established all over
the island (Taiwan so¯tokufu shenbaisenbaikyoku 1924b: 597-598).
Establishment of the salt monopoly
The main rules of the Taiwanese salt monopoly were proposed in a
draft by the Tax Office on June 8, 1898, approved by the governor in
July and promulgated by law no. 7 on April 26, 1899 (Ishinaga 1942:
93-94). Government decree no. 34 from April 1899 decided that the
salt monopoly would start operating on May 15, 1899 (Taiwan so¯tokufu
shenbaisenbaikyoku shomuka 1911: 804). Detailed Regulations were
also issued in April of that year in decree no. 32. Paragraph no. 4 of
the Detailed Regulations added that the officials responsible for inspec-
tion of salt fields and storehouses should carry their ID cards when on
an inspection tour (Taiwan so¯tokufu shenbaisenbaikyoku 1924a: 1-2).
Under the salt monopoly system the production of salt in Taiwan
rose significantly. The domination of big salt companies in the total
salt production enabled officials to take efficient control of the process.
In May 1901 imperial prescript no. 116 established the Monopoly Bu-
reau of the Taiwan Government-General, which joined the Taiwan Salt
Affairs Bureau and the Taiwan Camphor Bureau into one administra-
tive structure. In June of that year the Taiwan Salt Affairs Bureau offi-
cially ceased to exist (Taiwan shenbaisenbaikyoku 1941: 658-659). The
Taiwanese salt monopoly was re-established to increase administrative
revenues. The scope of the monopoly’s responsibilities was gradually
increased, enabling colonial authorities to control the salt industry.
Establishment of the local marketing structure
The Taiwanese salt monopoly started operating in 1899 and was admi-
nistered by the Salt Affairs Bureau. The bureau was responsible for
purchases of local salt as well as for imports of foreign salt. The loca-
tion of all the bureaus and their responsibilities are listed in table 5.1.
The most difficult task facing the new local authorities in Taiwan
was that they were not familiar with existing marketing networks. They
also lacked experience in salt transportation. The Japanese did not
know local customs regulating salt trade, nor did they know the local
language. Facing these problems, the Japanese authorities decided to
employ the services of local elites to build the foundation of the distri-
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bution network of the monopoly (Linji Taiwan kyukan cho¯sakai 1985:
275-276).
As a reward for their services, the local elites were given rights for
the wholesale marketing of salt. Gu Xianrong was able to profit from
this enormously, because of his close relations with the new authori-
ties. The Japanese hoped to win the loyalty of the Taiwanese gentry,
and in order to foster their cooperation gave them privileges in the salt
monopoly structure. The Monopoly Bureau in 1902 had a staff of one
bureau chief, nine general affairs officials, six engineers, three transla-
tors, clerks, technicians, and interpreters; a total of 144 persons. In ad-
dition to a headquarter in Taipei, the bureau operated branches in Ji-
long, Huwei, Youchegang, Houlong, Lugang, Beimenyu, Budaizui, Tai-
nan, Dagou, Miaoli, Taizhong and one branch in Kobe, Japan (Linji
Taiwan kyukan cho¯sakai 1985: 145).
The distribution structure of the salt monopoly experienced three
main adjustments:
a. The system of four steps (April 1899 - March 1905)
After establishing a syndicate for salt sale in Taipei, several merchants
set up general offices and branch offices around hub locations in Tai-
wan. The salt flow processes were as follows:
Government – Headquarters of salt sale syndicate – General office –
Branch office – Retail merchants – Consumers.
The chairman of the syndicate was Gu Xianrong. He selected inves-
tors (Taiwan so¯tokufu shenbaisenbaikyoku 1924b: 193-222; Taiwan so¯-
tokufu 1899). Goto¯ Shimpei’s teacher was appointed as the advisor to
the syndicate. Li Bingjun and Wang Qingzhong became vice-chairmen;
Chen Luo and Liu Tingyu became supervising directors (Gu 1939: 89-
90). There were also over 700 brokers called ‘middle merchants’, who
linked Salt branch offices with retailers. The general office paid a se-
Table 5.1 Organization and functions of the Taiwan Salt Affairs Bureau in 1899
Office Location Responsibilities
Jilong, Danshui, Houlong, Lugang Purchases of local salt
Budaizui, Beimenyu, Tainan, Dagou Imports of foreign salt and purchases of
local salt
Xinzhu Retail sales of salt
Taibei, Danshui, Jilong, Xinzhu, Houlong,
Dajia, Taizhong, Lugang, Pulishe, Yunlin,
Jiayi, Budaizui, Beimenyu, Tainan, Fengshan,
Dagou, Hengchun, Yilan, Taidong, Penghu
Islands
Twenty branches of Taiwan Salt Affairs
Bureau to take care of local affairs
Source: Linji Taiwan kyukan chōsakai (1985): 275-276. The wholesale salt system
THE STRUCTURE OF SALT DISTRIBUTION IN TAIWAN, 1895-1945 93
curity deposit to the headquarters of the salt sale syndicate, and the
branches paid security deposits to the general office.
The system of three steps (April 1905 - July 1926)
To simplify the organization and secure the profits from salt sales
more directly, in April 1905, the government disbanded the syndicate
and set up a general office for sales of salt. Gu Xianrong was the chair-
man of the general office (Taiwan so¯tokufu shenbaisenbaikyoku 1924b:
222-256). After 1916, the Organization for the Sale of Refined Salt was
founded. This organization was controlled by several Japanese mer-
chants; in 1920 it was replaced by the Taiwan Salt Production Com-
pany (TSPC).6 The Monopoly Bureau had six branches, located in
Shengyouchegang, Lugang, Budaizui, Beimenyu, Tainan and Wushu-
lin. The branches in Lugang and Budaizui were the biggest wholesa-
lers. The branches in Budaizui and Beimenyu were mostly responsible
for salt export (Taiwan so¯tokufu shenbaisenbaikyoku 1924b: 222-256).
The three step system was as follows:
Chart 5.1 The three step system
Government
General office 
for sale of the 
official salt
Organization 
for the sale of 
reproduced salt
Branch Retail merchants Consumers
c. The system of two steps (August 1926 - August 1945)
Because of rich salt production and convenient transportation for salt
distribution, the General Office and the Organization were both abol-
ished after August 1926. Gu Xianrong and the TSPC were appointed
as salt deliverers and took all transportation rights. The chairman of
the branch office became the wholesaler. The circulation of reproduced
salt (‘special salt’) followed a different system. The process of the two-
step system was as follows (Taiwan so¯tokufu 1926; Zhang 1955: 9):
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Chart 5.2 The two step system
Government
Wholesaler for 
salt
Wholesaler for 
special salt
Retail merchants 
for salt
Retail merchants 
for special salt
Consumers
Consumers
Salt was transported by the General office (wholesaler) during the peri-
ods in which the four-step and three-step systems were used (April
1899-July 1926), then wholesalers might directly sell or distribute to
branches. After the two-step system, Gu Xianrong and the TSPC deliv-
ered all the salt (Chen 1993: 46). The government decided the salt
prices in the circulation process.
The table salt distribution network experienced three main reorgani-
zations. A big change was also taking place in the number of salt retai-
lers. On August 1, 1926 the Official Salt Wholesale Main Office was
abolished and its local branches were changed into privately run whole-
sale firms (Fujuzaki 1985: 156).
Table 5.2 Changes in salt distribution network in Taiwan (1915-1944)
Year Official Salt Wholesale
general offices
Salt branch offices Retail merchants
1915 1 office 82 offices 3,934 people
1916 1 office 83 offices 4,080 people
1924 1 office 86 offices 2,623 people
1926.8 Refined salt wholesale
merchants
Table salt wholesale
merchants
Table salt retail merchants
1931 16 people 85 people 2,095 people
1934 16 people 83 people 2,310 people
1936 no information available 75 people 2,185 people
1937 12 people 75 people 2,615 people
1938 no information available 75 people 2,629 people
1940 no information available 75 people 2,658 people
1942 6 people 69 people 3,081 people
1943 no information available 69 people 2,947 people
1944 no information available 69 people 3,044 people
Source: Zhang Xiuwen 1955:9; Taiwan sōtokufu shenbaisenbaikyoku 1936: 23-29; Taiwan
sōtokufu 1985: 469.
Table 5.2 shows that salt distribution channels were constantly being
reduced, presumably to decrease abuses and illegal profiteering. More-
over, the control of these distribution channels became increasingly
centralized. Wholesale merchants decreased in numbers, but the num-
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ber of retail salt merchants increased. Wholesalers were also gradually
replaced by the Japanese, and the role for native Taiwanese in the salt
trade was increasingly limited to retailing.
In July 1905, 70 people were appointed as managers of Official Salt
Wholesale General Offices. Twelve of them were Japanese, the others
Taiwanese. However, in time Japanese control of the office increased
(Taiwan so¯tokufu shenbaisenbaikyoku shomuka 1911: 843-847). In
1941 out of 75 salt wholesale merchants working for the Taiwan Mono-
poly Bureau, only 12 were Taiwanese and all others Japanese (Taiwan
so¯tokufu shenbaisenbaikyoku shomuka 1911: 843-847). Who were
those Taiwanese that managed to obtain a salt wholesale license? One
example is Jian Langshan. He had served in the Japanese army head-
quarters at the beginning of Japanese rule in Taiwan. Afterwards he
was bestowed the honor of the sixth grade and became a member of
the council of the Taiwan Government-General. In addition, he served
as the chairman of the board of the Taoyuan Railway Company, and as
director of the board of the Japanese Development Company (Taiwan
sinminpo¯sha 1937: 64; Lin 1933: 33). Another example is Peng Song-
shou, a member of the Miaoli City Council and a board director in the
Miaoli Credit Union (Lin 1933: 20-21; Ko¯nan sinbunsha 1947: 357). Lin
Mugen, once a public school teacher, became an entrepreneur, engaged
in the cement trade and obtained a license for the wholesale of opium.
He was also a member of the Jiayi City Council, a vice president of the
Jiayi Commercial Association and a head of the southern office of Shu-
wa News. In 1936 he was appointed as a Tainan area councillor (Lin
1933: 111; Taiwan sinminpo¯sha 1947: 468-169). These examples show
that the Japanese authorities used Taiwanese supporters, but placed
their own nationals in the top administrative positions. The salt mono-
poly was very attractive to men coming from Japan for good jobs in the
colonial government, but the salt monopoly was also used to win over
the support of influential Taiwanese.
The unification of salt production and distribution
In the beginning of the salt monopoly, the colonial authorities encour-
aged people to restore old salt fields and to establish new ones. Both
Taiwanese and Japanese capital was invested in these salt fields. Table
3 lists the names of those investors who obtained special permits from
the Government General to set up salt fields.
Table 5.3 shows that Gu Xianrong of the General office and Chen
Zhonghe of the branch office in Dagou invested in salt production in
central and southern parts of the island. Chen Zhonghe worked for
Chen Fuqian’s family.7 In 1873 he shipped 5,000 bags of cane sugar to
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Japan and then stayed there for some time to conduct business before
returning to Taiwan. After Chen Fuqian died, Chen Zhonghe estab-
lished his own business (Zhao 1985: 4-10). During the Russo-Japanese
war, Chen and Gu Xianrong collaborated on Japanese military defence.
They dispatched ten junks and bamboo rafts to guard the Taiwan
Straits. When 38 Russian vessels were noticed, they immediately re-
ported it to Japanese colonial authorities. This intelligence helped Ja-
pan to defeat Russia (Sima 1987: 176-180). Those events illustrate the
close ties between Chen Zhonghe and the Japanese.
In 1901, Chen Zhonghe became a manager of the southern General
Office of Salt, and four years later he took charge of Dagou Salt branch
(Zhao 1985: 24). He used these positions to further the activities of his
salt producing company. In March 1922 Chen set up the Natural Re-
sources Company, as a family business with 1.2 million yen of capital
(Okata 1941: 431).
In addition to running a sugar business using new production tech-
niques, Chen also set up a salt production company in Yongan Town-
ship of Gaoxiong County. The company originally possessed only salt
fields. In 1923 the firm reorganized into Wushulin Company with
Chen as its president. In addition to salt production, the firm was also
involved in fish farming and the construction of railway tracks (Miyaza-
ki 1931: 29).
By the 1930s, the development of the salt industry in Taiwan was
tied to Japanese military aggression, as Taiwan became the base of Ja-
pan’s activities in Southeast Asia. The colonial government encouraged
the salt-producing enterprises to mass-produce salt, which was needed
by the growing chemical industry in Taiwan. After the outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Japanese government drew up a pro-
gram to further increase salt production for industrial use. In addition
to developing salt farms in the occupied north-eastern and northern re-
gions of China, Japanese zaibatsu founded Minami Nihon Yengyo¯
Kaisha (Southern Japanese Salt Industry Company) in central Taiwan
Table 5.3 Holders of special permits for salt production (1903)
Salt producer Location of salt field Field size
(ha)
Salt field productivity
(kg/ha)
Nozaki Budaizui 79.20 146,667
Gu Xianrong Lugang 86.13 139,394
Gu Xianrong Youchegang 21.78 127,273
Asano Dagou 69.30 72,727
Chen Zhonghe Dagou 49.50 72,727
Tu Jiancheng Beimenyu 49.50 165,455
20 other people (various) 288.09
Source: Ishisaka Sōsaku 1985: 54.
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in 1938 (capitalized at 10 million yen) to develop salt farms for indus-
trial use and for production of bromine. Nihon Soda Co., Nihon Yen-
gyo¯ Co., and Taiwan Takushoku Co. (Taiwan Development Co.) in-
vested in Minami Nihon Kagaku Ko¯gyo¯ Kaisha (Southern Japanese
Chemical Industrial Co.) in southern Taiwan. The new company pro-
duced and sold chemical industrial materials and products, medicines,
dyes, paper fiber, and also managed mining and metallurgical indus-
tries. The salt industry in Taiwan was monopolized by TSPC and
Southern Japanese Salt Industry Company, and was thoroughly trans-
formed into a modern industry, coordinating with the Southern Japa-
nese Chemical Industrial Company. Additionally, the Kanewuchi Soda
Co. was founded in 1942 and capitalized at 10 million yen (Zhang
1955: 13).
In 1944, the area of salt farms reached 6,543 hectares, three times
more than fifteen years before, and 18.5 times more than 45 years be-
fore. The TSPC owned 30 per cent of the farms and the Southern Japa-
nese Salt Industry Company owned 40 per cent.
The development of external markets
Before the Japanese occupation, Taiwan had to import salt from Main-
land China. At the beginning of Japanese rule, Japanese residents used
salt that was imported from Japan. But after the Japanese government
implemented the policies of the ‘Japanese Salt Industry Empire’ (in-
cluding Japan and her colonies), Taiwanese salt shipments to Japan
were officially encouraged and promoted.
Main external markets
Exports of Taiwanese table salt began in September 1899 to Japan. Ja-
panese officials managed shipments of Taiwanese salt and its import
to Japan. Kurihara Tomijiro, a salt wholesaler from Aichi prefecture,
was exclusively responsible for the distribution of Taiwanese salt in Ja-
panese markets (Ishinaga 1942: 227). As of 1907, the Japanese Mono-
poly Bureau directly arranged imports of Taiwanese salt to Japan, and
Kurihara was only contracted as a wholesaler for salt distribution. The
government assigned 3,000,000 yen to establish the To¯yo¯ (Orient) Salt
Industry Company and to take over the responsibility for salt distribu-
tion in the Japanese market from Kurihara in 1909. The To¯yo¯ Salt In-
dustry Company changed its name to the Taiwan Salt Industry Com-
pany the following year. The firm was merged with the Great Japan
Salt Industry Company in 1917. From then on, the Great Japan Salt In-
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dustry Company held a monopoly on Taiwanese salt imports (Zhang
1955: 10).
The goal of importing Taiwanese salt to Japan was originally to sub-
stitute it for European salt, which Japan imported in large quantities
(Kozawa 2000: 194-196). That is why the import of Taiwanese salt im-
mediately became very significant, as indicated in table 5.5.
Salt imports from Taiwan quickly increased, mainly because wages
of workers in Japan increased, which raised the cost of production and
the price of Japanese salt. Meanwhile the quality of Taiwan salt was
quickly improved.
Because of its climate and environment Japan was not able to pro-
duce salt using the technique of evaporation of sea water under the
sun. Instead, salt was produced mainly with the technique of boiling
saline water; therefore, the production costs were higher than those of
imported dried salt (Kozawa 2000: 116-117).
In the past, trade between Taiwan and Japan had been conducted un-
der export-import rules, but after the island came under Japanese rule
trade became ‘domestic’, and many trade barriers, such as custom du-
ties, diminished or disappeared (Yao 1977: 51-60). At first, the quality
of Taiwanese salt was lower than Japanese consumers were willing to
accept, so the sales volume was small. But as Taiwanese colonial autho-
rities encouraged production of better quality salt, the sales of local salt
on the Japanese market increased, as table 5.4 shows (Takegoe 1985:
280).
After the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, the most urgent task
for the Japanese government was to increase military expenditures.
Thus, in June 1905 the Salt Monopoly Law was promulgated to in-
crease government revenues and protect the domestic salt industry
from competition (Kozawa 2000: 114). As the war ended, salt from the
Liaodong Peninsula started to be imported into Japan. The monopoly
converted the price difference between cheap Taiwanese and Liaodong
salt and the Japanese salt into profits that increased government reve-
nues. In 1910-1911 the Japanese government conducted the first series
of local salt field consolidations in order to diminish the costs of do-
mestic salt production. The fields with the highest production costs
were closed down and decreased domestic salt production was covered
by imports (Kozawa 2000: 122-126). As indicated in table 5.4, salt im-
ports grew in the first decades of Japanese rule in Taiwan.
In particular, World War One presented Taiwan with a big opportu-
nity to develop its salt industry. As tables 5.4. and 5.5. show, after Japan
entered the war in 1914, its imports from Taiwan sharply increased.
Table 5.5 indicates that during the first three years of the Taiwanese
salt monopoly, Japan became its main market and the volume of sales
in Japan exceeded domestic sales in Taiwan. After Japan occupied and
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subsequently obtained leasing rights to Qingdao as a result of World
War One, Qingdao salt started arriving in Japan. The result of the eco-
nomic boom during the war and increasing wages led to increased salt
production costs and closures of many salt factories in Japan. This si-
tuation resulted in a sharply diminished supply of salt in Japan,
amounting to the supply levels were cut in half of the domestic produc-
tion in 1917-1918. Facing this impasse, the Japanese government or-
dered the import of additional salt from Liaodong, Qingdao and Tai-
wan. Most of the salt imports came from Taiwan (Ishinaga 1942: 232;
Tanaka 1985: 57-58).
Table 5.4 Japanese salt supply and demand (Unit: 10,000 tons)
Year Salt Supply Salt
Demand
Domestic Imported Salt Total
Kandoshu Taiwan Qingdao Sum of
Imports
1905 33.28 0.70 2.50 0 3.95 37.23 37.19
1906 56.48 1.14 2.61 0 4.18 60.66 60.61
1907 59.34 7.24 3.43 0 4.67 64.02 63.27
1908 62.28 2.49 1.62 0 4.46 66.74 60.68
1909 59.70 2.40 3.04 0 5.67 65.37 61.15
1910 56.77 1.98 3.35 0 5.37 62.14 60.55
1911 56.95 2.76 3.78 0 7.59 64.55 68.57
1912 62.01 2.15 3.13 0 5.28 67.28 67.01
1913 64.00 3.84 3.64 0 7.48 61.48 72.28
1914 61.09 4.92 5.62 0 10.54 71.63 71.03
1915 59.72 3.56 5.43 0 8.99 68.71 69.17
1916 62.05 4.94 6.37 0 11.32 73.37 73.98
1917 60.24 10.21 9.23 3.70 23.25 83.49 82.16
1918 40.32 9.48 7.71 16.42 35.75 76.07 76.80
1919 58.90 8.49 2.29 21.01 52.60 111.51 99.76
1920 54.40 8.84 1.31 15.23 37.87 92.27 73.46
1921 51.51 8.02 4.47 11.43 26.09 77.60 80.26
1922 66.50 8.05 5.77 10.09 29.96 96.47 86.75
1923 47.99 12.96 7.47 0.49 22.74 70.73 80.80
1924 63.72 14.80 10.96 0 32.13 95.85 81.65
1925 66.86 10.22 6.83 0 21.72 88.59 82.78
1926 61.41 7.04 5.49 6.85 24.14 85.55 85.98
1927 61.91 4.56 4.49 13.09 24.01 85.93 87.46
1928 63.79 5.91 4.54 16.43 28.13 91.92 90.17
1929 64.42 8.15 5.18 19.97 33.55 97.97 97.73
1930 62.87 15.30 8.24 12.50 37.32 100.19 94.35
1931 52.13 18.90 10.11 9.83 45.42 97.54 107.21
1932 57.26 14.72 8.33 13.58 63.84 121.10 120.45
Source: Kozawa Tokio 2000: 127.
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The Japanese government’s objective was to keep domestic salt as a
basic supply source of table salt for consumers and to turn cheap im-
ported salt into a raw material for the Japanese industry. The imported
salt was mostly used for further processing (refined salt) and for the
food industry. As table 5.5. indicates, because Taiwanese salt was the
cheapest and its supply volume the biggest, the Taiwanese salt mono-
poly was still very profitable. Taiwanese competition forced the Japa-
nese government to implement a second wave of domestic salt field
eliminations during 1929 and 1930 to get rid of the least efficient pro-
ducers. Due to these efforts, in 1931 Japanese salt production further
decreased to 87.2 per cent of the 1928 level (Kozawa 2000: 126-129).
The abrupt increase of Taiwanese salt imports in 1931 was caused by
the closures of domestic salt fields. The sharp increase in Taiwanese
salt imports after 1935 was linked to the second Sino-Japanese War.
The developing Taiwanese chemical industry increased the local de-
mand for salt, but big industrial salt fields were simultaneously
opened. Production of salt from those new fields was sufficient to meet
the growing local demand and significant growth of exports to Japan.
From 1939 until 1942, continued development of the Taiwanese chemi-
cal industry further increased local salt demand and caused constraints
on the supply side. Exports to Japan diminished by nearly half.
Taiwan also started exporting salt to Korea, Sakhalin, the Russian
Far East, Hong Kong and Manila (Ishinaga 1916: 421). Due to
shortages of domestic salt in Korea, salt had been formerly imported
from Japan. Most salt entered Korea through the port of Pusan. After
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Chinese dried salt started being
shipped to the Korean northwestern coast, and the volume of this trade
increased very quickly. In 1896 Korea imported only 120,000 kilo-
grams of salt from China (1 per cent of all salt imports); in 1903 it im-
ported 12,300,000 kilograms of salt from China (66.7 per cent of all
salt imports). Chinese salt was easily substituted for Japanese salt be-
cause of its low price. Korean and Japanese salt was sold at 4.37 yen
for one hundred catties while Chinese salt was priced at only 1.16 yen
(Tanaka 1996: 478-481).
In 1903, Japanese merchants imported 90,000 kilograms of Taiwa-
nese salt to Korea through Pusan. In 1908 the amount of Taiwanese
salt increased to 9,300,000 kilograms. Competition from Shandong
salt drove Taiwanese salt out of the Korean market after 1913. In 1923,
the salt imported from Liaodong and Shandong decreased, and Taiwa-
nese salt reappeared on the Korean market. But when in 1928-1929
Chinese salt exports to Korea again increased, imports of Taiwanese
salt immediately decreased. In 1930 Korean colonial authorities imple-
mented regulations, which declared how much Taiwanese salt should
be imported each year. Thus, the import of Taiwanese salt to Korea was
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guaranteed by the Korean Government-General and became very stable
(Tanaka 1997: 154). The share of Taiwanese salt on the Korean market
was on average only 7 per cent of imported salt (Tanaka 1997: 150-152).
Exports of Taiwanese salt to Sakhalin began in 1909. A contract was
signed with Sakhalin merchant Nishita Akari for marketing of Taiwa-
nese salt there. On September 17, 1914 the Taiwanese authorities
decided to annul the contract, and the next day they signed a new
agreement with the Taiwan Salt Industry Company giving it exclusive
rights for export of salt to Sakhalin (Ishinaga 1942: 231).
Improvement of the quality of Taiwanese salt
After the Japanese government gave permission to Kotama Gentaro¯ to
establish a Taiwanese salt monopoly, it became worried about the possi-
bility of Taiwanese competition and its harmful influence on the Japa-
nese domestic salt market. In June 1905 the Japanese Table Salt Mono-
poly law came into force, limiting the amount of salt that could be im-
ported to Japan in an attempt to protect domestic traders from the
competition.8 Supply of table salt for Japanese living in Taiwan was the
responsibility of the Taiwanese Government-General. Because Taiwa-
nese table salt formerly contained sizable quantities of mud and soil, it
had a bright yellow and black color. The Taiwanese people were used to
colored table salt, but the Japanese expected salt to be pure white. The
Taiwanese colonial authorities were thus obliged to temporarily orga-
nize the import of Japanese salt for the needs of their own citizens. In
the meantime they made efforts to improve the quality of Taiwanese
salt to substitute for these imports (Takegoe 1985: 276-277).
Improvements in production techniques improved the quality of Tai-
wanese salt so that Japanese consumers in Taiwan and in Japan ac-
cepted it. In the 1930s, the Japanese Monopoly Bureau set up salt qual-
ity standards that caused difficulties for imports of Taiwanese salt to Ja-
pan. In response, the head of the Taiwanese Salt and Camphor
Division urged salt producers to face new problems (Taiwan so¯tokufu
1985: 135-136). The quality gradually improved. It was able to compete
with Liaodong and Qingdao salt and eventually surpassed them in
quality (Hatanaka 1939: 279). This result laid a strong foundation for
further development of the industry.
Transport techniques and packaging were also improved to diminish
the marketing costs and to match the rise in the quality of the product.
Refined as well as natural salt had previously been packed into cheap
hemp bags. Rising standards of living made it necessary to improve
salt packing standards to meet sanitary standards and customers’ ex-
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pectations. Local authorities in Taiwan demanded that salt traders use
paper bags (Taiwan so¯tokufu shenbaisenbaikyoku a: 114).
Export of Taiwanese salt to Japan was linked to the development of
the Japanese soda industry. Japan utilized salt mostly to produce so-
dium carbonate and soy sauce. Before World War One, salt used for in-
dustrial purposes constituted only 4.5 per cent of the demand on the
salt market. After the outbreak of the war, Japan experienced a period
of fast industrial development. A new method of producing sodium
carbonate was developed. This method relied on salt; therefore stable
supplies of this raw material were needed. European and North Ameri-
can soda industries were usually established close to abundant re-
sources of rock salt or saline water; thus they could secure a cheap sup-
ply of salt, and the cost of raw materials within overall production costs
was very small. On the other hand, Japanese salt was traditionally used
as table salt, and because of its high quality and price, it was not well
suited to be used as a raw material in the industrial production of soda.
This was the main reason Japanese factories had to depend on salt
from colonies (Taiwan) or territories (Liaodong, Qingdao) controlled by
Japan. After the Mukden Incident of 1931, the military industrial needs
sharply increased the demand for caustic soda (Kozawa 2000: 199-
200). Stable supplies of salt became a very urgent matter for Japanese
entrepreneurs.
The soda industry was closely linked to military industrial needs. For
example, soda was obtained during electrolysis of salt and water.
Among the by-products of the process were hydrogen and chlorine. In
later years, hydrogen was used by chemical industries as a raw material
in the production of synthetic fertilizers, synthetic petroleum, and the
like (Hatanaka 1939: 282). During the war, the Japanese paid close at-
tention to the soda industry’s development. The demands of the soda
industry required an increase in the supply of industrial salt.
When Japan started preparing for war, a new policy determined that
all supply sources should be located within the Japanese imperial zone.
The Japanese government implemented ‘Close First, Far Away Second’
policies to guide the supply of salt for the empire. According to the dis-
tance of the salt-producing territory to Japan, the salt supply was di-
vided into three categories: close overseas salt, less close overseas salt,
far away overseas salt. Taiwan, Guandong, Manchuria and North China
all belonged to the ‘close overseas’ category. The goal of the govern-
ment was to increase salt supplies from ‘close overseas’ regions so that
they constituted 80 per cent of overall salt supplies. In order to meet
these demands, in 1937 Taiwan increased salt production to 50,000
tons, 5.5 times more than in 1932 (Taiwan so¯tokufu shenbaisenbaikyo-
ku 1938: 3-5).
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Japanese industry then invested in the development of big salt-pro-
ducing companies in Taiwan. Taiwan not only became the most impor-
tant supplier of salt to Japan, but also developed its own soda industry.
Conclusions
The Taiwanese salt distribution network was developed under the
monopoly system. The salt distribution network had to cover the whole
island. Colonial authorities initially gave monopoly licenses to local
power holders, and they utilized the monopoly and its dense distribu-
tion network to increase control over local society.
Those who profited the most from the monopoly were traders with
wholesale licenses. The monopoly enabled them to increase their fi-
nancial assets and to make close contacts with the officials. The whole-
salers became new local elites and the first entrepreneurs in the nas-
cent salt industry. Under the monopoly system the Japanese govern-
ment expanded distribution networks of Taiwanese salt overseas and
enabled Japanese zaibatsu to completely dominate the salt industry as
well as chemical industries related to it. The salt distribution system
linked Taiwan vertically to Japan in the division of work based on prin-
ciples of center-colony relations. Significant investment of Japanese ca-
pital brought new technologies to Taiwan and laid the foundations for
the industrial development of the relatively small island.
Notes
1 See: Lu 1954: 89-94; Lu 1955: 22-28; Lu 1956: 24-30; Lu 1958: 56-64; Lu 1972: 1-10;
Zeng 1953; Zhang 1955; Chen 1991: 579-608.
2 Taiwan so¯tokufu 1921: 2. According to the sixth paragraph of this law, it was to be in
force for only three years, but the period was continuously extended, until finally this
led to a movement for abolishment of ‘law 63’.
3 Gu Xianrong denki hensankai 1939: 51. When Goto¯ Shimpei was dealing with the
uprising of Jian Dashi and Chen Qiuju, a local official told him, ‘Formerly I accom-
panied official Gu Xianrong; he was dealing with affairs with great skill as he was re-
sponsible for relief efforts and design of all policies related to this field.’ Goto¯ then
sent an invitation to Gu’s family residence in Lugang asking Gu to become his advi-
sor.
4 Gu Xianrong denki hensankai 1939: 51.
5 Gu Xianrong denki hensankai 1939: 54-55. Goto¯ was in charge of the Monopoly Bu-
reau from June 1901 until November 1902.
6 A number of Japanese and Taiwanese founded the TSPC with a capital investment of
2.5 million yen. The Company purchased old salt farms and developed new ones
through government control of management, and worked to improve the quality of
salt. The government wanted to turn the salt industry into an enterprise in which Ja-
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panese and Taiwanese were bound by a common interest to implement its colonial
policy (Taiwan so¯tokufu senbaikyoku 1924b: 79-82).
7 Chen Fuqian (1834-1882) was a businessman involved in the export of sugar; he be-
came the richest man in southern Taiwan.
8 Japan’s Salt Monopoly Law was promulgated on December 31, 1904 and was in force
from June 1, 1905 until April 1997, when it was finally abolished (Kozawa Tokio
2000: 1-6).
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6 Semi-Colonialism and Cultural Interaction:
Chinese Indentured Labor in World War One France
and the Sino-French Connection
Paul J. Bailey
Introduction
During World War One, beginning in 1916, nearly 140,000 Chinese la-
borers (mainly from the northern province of Shandong) were re-
cruited by the British and French governments to make up for labor
shortages in France, as well as to release British dockworkers in France
for military duty. Although the French government looked principally
to its formal colonies and protectorates for labor manpower during the
war (recruiting 78,566 Algerians; 48,955 Vietnamese; and 35,506 Mor-
occans, for example), it imported nearly 37,000 Chinese workers.
Those recruited by Britain constituted a larger proportion of its over-
seas labor force used in France; organized into 195 ‘labor battalions’
and designated the Chinese Labor Corps, Chinese workers totalled
96,000 (compared to 48,000 Indians and 21,000 South African
blacks) (Cross 1980: 615-616; 1983: 35-36; Summerskill 1982: 163;
Horne 1985: 59). During their sojourn in France, these Chinese work-
ers were involved in a wide variety of war-related work such as unload-
ing goods and raw materials (e.g. coal) in the coastal docks, transporta-
tion, armaments and munitions production, machinery and equipment
maintenance, road and aerodrome construction and even burial of the
war dead.
In addition to sanctioning the British and French recruitment of
Chinese labor in 1916-1918, the Chinese government in Beijing itself
formally declared war on Germany in August 1917 (the only concrete
consequence of which was the sequestration of German property and
shipping in China). Together, these two acts earned China the right to
attend the Versailles Peace Conference at the end of the war. China’s
participation in the conference, in effect, symbolized for the first time
during the modern era the western powers’ acquiescence in China’s
membership of the international community following a century of re-
peated humiliations at the hands of western powers (and latterly Japan)
determined to enhance their economic, commercial and territorial pri-
vileges in the country. In many ways by the early twentieth century
China had become – in the later words of Mao Zedong – a ‘semi-col-
ony’, the ‘victim’ of an informal imperialism by means of which the
privileges held by foreigners and their governments in China impinged
upon the country’s sovereignty and limited its freedom of action. Such
a ‘colonial’ status was ironically demonstrated during the French re-
cruitment of Chinese labor in 1916-1917; Chinese workers were cate-
gorised together with workers from the French colonies and placed un-
der the administrative supervision of the Service d’organisation des tra-
vailleurs coloniaux (Colonial Labor Service).
Chinese hopes in 1919 for a new era of international relations in
which China would be treated as an equal ultimately foundered on the
rocks of realpolitik, as the Versailles Peace Treaty neither compelled Ja-
pan to return to China the leasehold territory of Jiaozhou (Shandong
province) that it had seized from Germany in 1914, nor amended in
any substantial way the ‘unequal treaty system’ in China. China’s only
gains from its contribution to the allied cause in World War One were
the postponement of Boxer Indemnity payments for five years, and a
slight increase allowed in import tariff levels. Decisions taken by the
big powers at Versailles thus seemed to confirm China’s status as the
helpless (and hapless) victim of western and Japanese imperialism
(further demonstrated by the fact that the anti-Chinese legislation so
prevalent in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand before World
War One continued unabated after 1918). Not surprisingly, the story of
Chinese indentured labor in World War One France has slipped into a
historical black hole – in the West because of the conventionally Euro-
centric approach often adopted by western historians of World War
One, and in China because it represents simply another shameful and
humiliating episode in the western exploitation of China during the
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries and therefore does
not merit any in-depth study.
This chapter will argue that the history of Chinese indentured labor
in World War One France should be placed within significantly larger
contexts. Not only was it an important episode in the longer history of
Chinese worker migration that began in the mid-nineteenth century
with the illegal ‘coolie trade’ carried out in China’s treaty ports, but it
also illuminates in very interesting ways Sino-French mutual percep-
tions and cultural interaction during the first two decades of the twenti-
eth century. Such interaction, and the fact that Chinese politicians and
intellectuals were active participants in the recruitment (and that they
invested the project with their own political, social and cultural agenda)
impels us to view China as a more autonomous actor on the world
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stage at this time than has hitherto been assumed in the general his-
tories of modern China. Finally, the chapter suggests that the specifi-
cally political use made by the Chinese government in 1916-1918 of
Chinese overseas workers intriguingly anticipates the attitude and prac-
tices of the new Chinese Communist regime after 1949, especially in
its relations with Africa.
Chinese support for the recruitment
Active Chinese support and participation clearly distinguishes the
French recruitment of Chinese workers during World War One from
the unregulated and illegal ‘coolie trade’ of the nineteenth century,
when up to 500,000 Chinese were recruited principally to work on su-
gar plantations in South America and the Caribbean (intriguingly, a
note from the French Foreign Ministry in 1863 suggested recruiting
Chinese men and their families from central Chinese provinces to cul-
tivate cotton and cereals in France’s African colonies).1 Both the French
and British recruitment of Chinese workers in 1916-1917 were based
on regulations first drawn up by the Qing government in 1866 (and
originally rejected by the British and French governments) that im-
posed a time limit on the indenture, insisted on transparency of con-
tracts (texts to be openly published in the Chinese press and to specify
clearly duration, wage rates and number of working hours), guaranteed
free medical assistance and free passage home after the expiry of the
contract, and provided for the stationing of Chinese official inspectors
both at the embarkation ports in China and in France to oversee the
Chinese workers’ welfare.
Two main Chinese constituencies were involved in the support for
the recruitment of Chinese labor in World War One France. The first
included government and official elites, who responded enthusiastically
to the French request for Chinese labor in late 1915 in order to enhance
China’s standing at a future peace conference. In fact, President Yuan
Shikai – in order to forestall the Japanese takeover of Germany’s con-
cession area in Shandong province (Japan had declared war on Ger-
many in 1914 as Britain’s ally) – had proposed (without success) Chi-
na’s military participation in the war on the side of the entente powers
as soon as war had begun (Chi 1970: 20,72; Lo 1976: 2.559-561). On
two further occasions, in 1915 and 1917, the Chinese government pro-
posed sending troops to the Dardanelles and the Western Front respec-
tively (La Fargue 1937: 83-84; Chi 1970: 129-130). Significantly, while
the British and American governments were not especially keen on the
proposals (mainly for logistical and financial reasons, but also because
of a lack of confidence in the potential usefulness of Chinese military
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participation) both the French government and military were. Joint pro-
posals drawn up by the French and Chinese governments in the spring
of 1918 (before the definitive shelving of any such plan for Chinese
military participation in March) would have provided for the financing
of a Chinese expeditionary force comprising 43 battalions (1,543 offi-
cers and 44,900 troops) and additional special units such as ‘police
contingents’, ‘sanitation brigades’ and ‘communications teams’.2
A second, and perhaps more intriguing, Chinese constituency in fa-
vor of the recruitment was a group of Francophile intellectuals and
educators who cultivated extensive links with both Chinese political fig-
ures and French official and intellectual circles. Since the early years of
the twentieth century, in fact, this Chinese Francophile ‘lobby’ had
been energetically promoting Sino-French cultural relations and the
importance of Chinese overseas study in France. The most prominent
member of this group was Li Shizeng (1881-1973), son of a Qing court
official and who himself had gone to France in 1902 as an ‘embassy
student’. While there he enrolled in the Ecole Pratique d’Agriculture in
Montargis (just outside Paris) and later, in 1905, studied chemistry and
biology at the Institut Pasteur in Paris. Other members of this Franco-
phile lobby included anti-Qing revolutionaries and future prominent
figures of the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) in the 1920s – Cai Yuan-
pei (1868-1940), Wu Zhihui (1864-1953) and Zhang Jingjiang (1877-
1950) – all of whom were in France at the same time as Li. Li Shizeng
became a fervent admirer of French culture (which included French
anarchism) and often contrasted the ‘worthy’ ideals of the French secu-
lar republic, which he described as representing ‘freedom’, ‘creativity’
and ‘pacifism’, with the apparently more ‘brutal’ German ideals of
‘autocracy, utilitarianism and militarism’. While in Paris Li built up a
wide network of contacts with French politicians and intellectuals, as
well as helping to publish a Chinese-language anarchist journal, Xin
shiji (New Century). Li also opened a night school for the Chinese
workers he had recruited after 1908 for employment in the beancurd
factory he had established in Garenne-Colombes outside Paris. For Li,
France was a republic par excellence, free of what he perceived as the
‘baneful’ influences of monarchy and religion – and thus an ideal en-
vironment in which to work and study. In 1912, on his return to China,
he founded the Association for Frugal Study in France (liufa jianxue-
hui), which helped send nearly 100 Chinese students to France before
the outbreak of World War One. In the same year Cai Yuanpei, who
had become the first minister of education in the new Chinese Repub-
lic, asserted that the French revolutionary ideals of freedom, equality
and universal brotherhood were comparable to such Confucian values
of ren (sense of compassion, humaneness) (Cai n.d.).
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The Sino-French connection and mutual perceptions
The French intellectuals and politicians with whom Li came into con-
tact were equally admiring of China; their inclination to link the tradi-
tions of French and Chinese cultures represented, in effect, a unique
aspect of general western attitudes towards China in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Of course, in many ways French
diplomats and officials at home and in China shared the same assump-
tions of western superiority and the imperative of the western ‘civiliz-
ing mission’ as their British, American or German counterparts. How-
ever, what set French attitudes apart was the assumption that France
was the one European country that could act as an effective mediator
between China and the West. This was not only because France per-
ceived itself as more sensitive to, and appreciative of, Chinese culture
but also because it was assumed in many ways that French and Chinese
cultures had much in common. Subscribers to these views included so-
cialist politicians such as Marius Moutet and Edouard Heriot, scholar-
politicians such as Paul Painleve´ and prominent academics such as the
historian Alphonse Aulard.3
What gave urgency to the French insistence that France’s role in Chi-
na was uniquely different from that of other western powers was an in-
creasing fear that China was inexorably falling under the sway of An-
glo-Saxon cultural influence, a consequence of Britain’s predominant
economic presence in China. In their effort to counter such an influ-
ence, French officials, politicians, intellectuals and scholars sought to
emphasize a complementarity between French and Chinese cultures.
Thus in its respect for learning, secularism, joie de vivre and aversion to
war, French culture was seen to complement the humanist values of
Confucius. Even the central role of the family in Chinese society found
an echo in the Frenchman’s respect for family life. As the president of
the Franco-Chinese Friendship Association (Association amicale franco-
chinoise),4 Georges Dubail (a former minister to China) noted in 1907:
The Chinese and French are profound and wise philosophers;
they are equally good family men (bons pe`res de famille), prudent
businessmen and faithful associates.5
The idea that the French and Chinese characters were alike in their
proclivity for hard work, down-to-earth wisdom and practice of family
virtues was reiterated in 1911 by another president of the Association,
Georges Ducrocq:
Of all the foreigners who are in China, there are few more cap-
able of adapting to China’s way of life than the Frenchman. Like
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us, the Chinese take a delight in family life; like us, they have
an appetite for work and a moralistic turn of mind, a practical
wisdom for daily life… that you will find in Confucius as in La
Fontaine.6
For Ducrocq, only France could play the intermediary role between the
West and China precisely because of the cultural affinity the two coun-
tries shared. It would be hard to imagine a British diplomat or scholar
(or an American, for that matter) of the time describing Sino-British re-
lations (or Sino-American relations) in quite the same way.
Li Shizeng and others of the Francophile ‘lobby’ not surprisingly
welcomed the prospect of France’s recruitment of Chinese labor in
1916 as part of their larger cultural and social agenda. Li confidently
predicted that enormous benefits would accrue to China, as Chinese la-
borers in France would form the vanguard of an educated workforce
contributing to the diffusion of industrial skills and reform of society
on their return.7 While in France, Li claimed, Chinese workers would
become truly ‘civilized’, divesting themselves of their ‘backward’ and
‘unseemly’ habits and customs. At the opening meeting of the Sino-
French Education Association (Huafa jiaoyuhui) that Li had helped cre-
ate in 1916 with the help of prominent French intellectuals such as Al-
phonse Aulard to promote the expansion of Sino-French cultural rela-
tions, the affinities between Chinese and French cultures were again
highlighted. Aulard himself, echoing Cai Yuanpei’s earlier observation,
declared that the humanist philosophy of Confucius anticipated the
ideals of the French Revolution.8 Two years later, a French military offi-
cial in China on a government mission to explore ways of enhancing
French cultural influence in the country, confidently proclaimed:
The Chinese is a philosopher, poet and artist, and it is for this
reason one says that he is the Frenchman of the Far East.9
The Chinese worker experience in World War One France
Significantly, however, actual French attitudes towards the indentured
Chinese workers during World War One, especially among officials
and employers, undermined (and belied) the grandiose Gallic rhetoric
of Sino-French cultural affinity. Mention has already been made of the
fact that Chinese workers were rather unceremoniously lumped to-
gether with workers from France’s colonies and placed under the ad-
ministrative control of the Colonial Labor Service. In the eyes of French
official authorities (as well as their British counterparts), Chinese work-
ers were often perceived and described in condescending terms as
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either ‘childlike’ or ‘malleable’. More intriguingly, there was always an
underlying fear of a ‘loss of face’ on the part of French authorities vis-
a`-vis the Chinese workers, a concern that revealed more about French
feelings of insecurity than anything else. Instructions from the Colo-
nial Labor Service to potential French employers of Chinese workers in
September 1916 perfectly illustrated this French obsession with
‘face’:10
The Chinese have considerable self-pride (amour-propre), and it
is therefore appropriate to treat them with kindness, and give
them a reward, however, minimal, every time they try to do
something well. An act of brutality will bring the opposite of
what is intended, since anyone giving in to anger will lose all
credibility in their eyes... It is imperative that employers, fore-
men, etc., realize that in the view of the Chinese, to give in to
an external manifestation of anger is proof of an inability to con-
trol oneself and thus (in the eyes of the Chinese) to remain a
barbarian.11
Furthermore, because indentured Chinese workers did not, in fact, be-
have in ways expected of them (i.e., to be ‘docile’, ‘passive’, ‘hardwork-
ing’), by 1918 French employers had become increasingly hostile to the
idea of employing them. Chinese workers often protested against
breaches of their contracts, the dangerous nature of their work, and
the harsh treatment they at times received. In some cases Chinese
workers, such as those at a munitions plant in St. Louis de Rhoˆne
(near Arles) simply walked off the job when refused overtime pay and
headed for the port of Marseille. At dockyards such as Saint-Nazaire
French employers continually criticized Chinese workers as ‘lazy trou-
blemakers’ who refused to unload coal because they considered such a
task unsafe (and not part of their contract). In some cases, disputes be-
tween Chinese workers and French soldiers (as happened in Rouen in
March 1918) could lead to violence.12 Dissatisfaction with the ‘unruly’
Chinese workers had reached such a fever pitch by 1918 that the Minis-
try of War was referring to them as ‘undesirables’. At the end of the
war meetings held by representatives of the Ministry of War, Ministry
of Justice and local army commands actually discussed complaints sent
in from local communities (especially from the Somme region and the
Pas de Calais) about the Chinese workers in their midst. Such com-
plaints referred to crimes ‘of all sorts’ and suggested that in certain vil-
lages local people no longer ‘felt safe’ and were contemplating quitting
their village unless the Chinese workers were withdrawn.13
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Conclusion
The story of Chinese indentured labor in World War One France ended
in disappointment and recrimination. As mentioned, the Versailles
Peace Treaty ultimately confirmed China’s status as a minor player on
the world stage and continued acceptance of sovereignty-undermining
foreign privilege in the country itself. Furthermore, the ambitious
plans of the Chinese Francophile lobby (of which Chinese indentured
labor in France would have constituted an element) to strengthen and
expand Sino-French cultural relations never came to fruition. The hos-
tility towards Chinese workers by French employers and local commu-
nities exposed the hypocrisy of French rhetoric concerning a ‘special re-
lationship’ between China and France (there is an interesting parallel
here with the sorry plight of Chinese immigrants in the United States
set against the context of an American discourse that highlighted a
‘special relationship’ between the US and China based on the former’s
genuine desire to ‘help’ and ‘assist’ the latter) (Hunt 1983).
Yet three little-known events in the wake of World War One indicate
that though China may indeed have been a ‘semi-colony’ during the
first decades of the twentieth century, Sino-French interaction at this
time (what I call the ‘Sino-French connection’) could proceed in two di-
rections. In September 1919, while Chinese Foreign Minister Lu Cheng-
xiang (1871-1949) was in France attending the Versailles Peace Confer-
ence, he met French President Raymond Poincare´; as a gesture of sup-
port for an impoverished France and to demonstrate China’s civilized
commitment to education, Lu donated 50,000 francs on behalf of the
Chinese government to help restore educational facilities in war-shat-
tered Verdun.14 This was not the only assistance China provided
France; two years later, at the height of the postwar economic depres-
sion in France, the Chinese government sent food relief in the shape
of 400 tons of eggs.15 In 1920, when Paul Painleve´ visited China to
confer on President Xu Shichang an honorary D.Litt. degree from the
University of Paris, he was in turn offered 100,000 francs as a Chinese
contribution to the newly created Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises in
Paris (and thereby hoping to enhance interest in Chinese culture in
France). Finally, post-1949 Chinese historiography may have consigned
the story of Chinese indentured labor in World War One France to the
dustbin because it was seen to represent simply another example of
China’s exploitation by the western powers, but in one fascinating re-
spect the approach adopted by the Chinese Republican government
during World War One in its support for the sending of Chinese work-
ers to France has parallels with the foreign policy of the post-1949
Maoist state. Chinese government officials in their discussions with
French and British authorities in 1916 made a point of describing Chi-
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na’s planned labor contribution to the war as an important symbol of
the country’s commitment to world peace – hence earning it the right
to be treated as an equal on the international stage once the war
ended.16 This specifically political use of Chinese labor overseas that
the Chinese government made at this time anticipated post-1949 Chi-
na’s use of overseas labor. Thus when the People’s Republic signed an
agreement with Tanzania in the late 1960s to help finance and build
the Tanzam Railroad with the aid of 15,000 Chinese technicians and
workers it was deliberately using this dramatic gesture of international
aid as a symbol of China’s political commitment to the non-aligned
world (and to Afro-Asian solidarity in particular). Such a parallel alone
indicates that the virtually forgotten story of Chinese indentured labor
in World War One France deserves to be revisited with a fresh perspec-
tive.
Notes
1 Note from Foreign Ministry to Ministry of Marine and Colonies (1863). Fonds minis-
te´riels/ge´ne´ralite´s: Carton 130, Dossier 1125. Centre d’archives d’outre-mer (Aix-en-Prov-
ence, France).
2 Fonds Clemenceau, 6N 130: Rapports des attache´s militaires. Archives de la service his-
torique de l’arme´e de terre (Chateau de Vincennes, Paris).
3 I have argued elsewhere that this modern French approach towards China drew on a
long tradition of cultural and intellectual relativism that dated from the sixteenth cen-
tury. See P. Bailey, ‘Voltaire and Confucius: French Attitudes Towards China in the
Early Twentieth Century’, History of European Ideas 14.6 (November 1992): 819-821.
4 Founded in 1907, the Association was one of a number of scholarly or semi-official
organizations established at this time to promote Franco-Chinese cultural relations.
5 Bulletin de l’association amicale franco-chinoise 1.1 (July 1917): 17-18.
6 Bulletin de l’association amicale franco-chinoise 3.3 (July 1911).
7 Lu¨’Ou jiaoyu yundong (The Educational Movement in Europe) (Tours: n.p., 1916): 82-
83. For another article Li wrote on the same theme in 1917, see Li Shizeng xiansheng
wenji (Collected Writings of Li Shizeng) (Taibei: Zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi
weiyuanhui, 1980), 1: 220-225.
8 The text of Aulard’s speech (translated into Chinese) is in Fufa qingong jianxue yun-
dong shiliao (Historical Materials on the Diligent Work and Frugal Study Movement
in France) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1979-1981), 1: 202-203.
9 Archives du ministe`re des affaires etrange`res (Paris), E-28-1/6.
10 Since western observations of the Chinese character often focused (and still do) on
the significant role of ‘face’ in Chinese personal interactions, this French obsession
with ‘face’ ironically provides another example of ‘cultural affinity’ between the two
countries (although not an example that contemporary French observers would ne-
cessarily have thought of).
11 Fonds Clemenceau, 6N 149: Mission de recrutement des ouvriers chinois. Archives
du service historique de l’arme´e de terre.
12 Archives nationales (Paris): F14 1131: Main-d’oeuvre exotique.
13 7N 2289: Affaires britanniques/travailleurs chinois. Archives du service historique de
l’arme´e de terre.
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14 La politique de Pe´kin (7 September, 1919).
15 La politique de Pe´kin (11 June, 1922).
16 The last few lines of a song dedicated to the Chinese workers in France and written
by a member of the Chinese official delegation at Versailles in 1919 also underlined
this point:
We, the children of sacred China, whose fate lies in heaven,
esteem the farmer and favor the artisan, but never resort to force.
Marching, marching ever marching.
All within the four seas are brothers.
We are an army of workers devoting ourselves to labor
in order to build peace for you, humanity.
La politique de Pe´kin (February 22, 1920).
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7 China’s Rise: Some Considerations
Dora Martins
Introduction
In the last years, the emergence of China as an economic, political and
cultural power has been a hot topic of discussion among scholars of
Chinese studies. The main driving force of China’s current re-emer-
gence is the policy of ‘reform and open up’ (gaige kaifang 改革开放)
initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, which stimulated specially its
economy. While some scholars and also some foreign governments ar-
gue that this emergence represents a threat, others maintain that Chi-
na is non-threatening. To respond to the perception that an emergent
China is a threatening China, the Chinese government promoted the
slogans of peaceful rise (heping jueqi 和平崛起) and peaceful development
(heping fazhan 和平发展). These concepts followed another one
adopted with the same spirit in the mid-1990s: the new security concept
(xin anquan guan 新安全观), a new pattern which China would follow
in the security relations with other countries. As defined by the Chi-
nese government the four main features were: mutual trust (huxin 互
信), mutual benefit (huli 互利), equality (pingdeng 平等), and coopera-
tion (hezuo 合作) later substituted by coordination (xiezuo 协作). This
concept was mainly used as a slogan to show neighbouring countries
that China was a peaceful and cooperative country. Both the new secur-
ity concept and China’s peaceful rise have been used by the Chinese gov-
ernment to show that China’s development does not represent a threat
to the region and to the world. These concepts were first used to try to
convince China’s neighboring countries of its cooperative intentions
but later they were promoted by China all over the world. However, it
is unclear whether China will always be peaceful in relating to other
countries. There are strong believes that whenever its interests are
threatened, China will use force.
In this article, I will first identify the main features of China’s cur-
rent emergence and the meaning of the slogan ‘peaceful rise’. Then I
will argue that this is not a new phenomen in Chinese history and I
will explain that the roots of the ‘peaceful rise’ concept can be found in
Chinese ancient philosophies such as Confucianism and Daoism. I will
conclude my article enquiring whether China will always adopt a
peaceful behaviour when in relation to other countries, and analysing
the main features of Chinese foreign policy.
China’s rise
In the last decade, there has been a widespread debate among aca-
demics and politicians on China’s rise and what impact it will have.
This discussion has generated a great number of articles and books in
China and around the world.1
From the economic point of view, since the policy of ‘reform and
open up’, China has indeed engaged in very rapid growth as one can
see in chart 7.1. In recent years, the Chinese economy has been grow-
ing at an average high growth rate of approximately 10 per cent. Ac-
cording to the International Monetary Fund, in 2007, China’s Gross
Domestic Product was estimated to have reached 9,928 billion yuan
(E 1,094 billion) and in 2013 it is expected to reach the 17,395 billion
yuan (E 1,918 billion) mark.
Chart 7.1 China’s GDP evolution (billion yuan)*
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According to the World Development Indicators released in 2008, Chi-
na is the second biggest economy based on purchasing power parity
(The World Bank, 2008). China is also the largest recipient of foreign
direct investment. China’s rapid growth is caused by high foreign in-
vestment, a very large, young and cheap labor force, growing industria-
lization and high saving rates. The Chinese government is promoting
China’s industrialization in order to become a manufacturing base,
producing and also assembling goods imported from other poorer
Asian countries to sell to developed countries. China also produces
technologically advanced products. In order to respond to its industria-
lization needs, China is becoming a large consumer of raw materials
and especially energy resources. The Chinese government is also en-
couraging its companies to ‘go global’ (zou chuqu 走出去) and in fact,
some Chinese companies, such as Huawei and Haier, are developing
worldwide name recognition. Moreover, Chinese companies are also
buying foreign companies, for example the Chinese-owned Lenovo
bought IBM’s PC division.
However, China is still a developing country and it must deal with
severe problems such as the big inequalities between inland and coast-
al areas, between rural and urban China, growing unemployment, the
inefficiency of state-owned companies, the inefficiency of its banking
system, real estate speculation, corruption, counterfeiting, environmen-
tal degradation and large energy needs. To develop, China needs large
quantities of coal, iron, steel, cement and especially oil. Since 2003,
China became the second largest oil consumer in the world, ahead of
Japan. China is also the largest consumer of cement, which is used in
the construction of its huge infrastructure including the facilities for
the Beijing Olympic Games.
Although at the national level the Chinese economy is growing very
fast, there are still great inequalities within the country regarding de-
velopment. In fact, only 38 per cent of the population lives in the
wealthy coastal areas between Liaoning and Guangdong provinces,
areas, which contribute 57 per cent of national GDP. The border re-
gions of Tibet and Xinjiang represent 37 per cent of Chinese territory
but the population in these regions produce only 2 per cent of the
country’s total GDP. About two thirds of the Chinese population live in
rural areas. If China is to continue growing, the Chinese government
needs to pay much attention to problems such as the regional econom-
ic inequalities, the growing unemployment, the corruption, the envir-
onmental degradation, and poverty. And indeed, it seems that this is
happening in recent years. Chinese leaders adopted the so-called ‘peo-
ple first’ (yi min wei ben 以民为本) approach, which suggests that the
priority will be to satisfy the people’s needs.
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The concept of China’s peaceful rise
Some scholars argue that when countries become economic powers,
they tend to focus on the development of military capability and may
even use force against other countries. The historian Alan J. P. Taylor,
who wrote one of the earliest books on great powers, said: ‘The test of
a great power is the test of strength for war’ (Taylor 1954). Later, in his
book about the rise and fall of the most powerful countries throughout
history, the so-called great powers, Paul Kennedy wrote: ‘The triumph
of any great power, or the collapse, is usually a consequence of long
fight between armed forces’ (Kennedy 1987).
In China’s case, its increasing economic power is reflected in its in-
creasing military power. Specially in the last decade China has greatly
increased its military expenditures. Every March, the Chinese govern-
ment releases the figure for the country’s national military expenditure.
In March 2008, it was announced that China’s military budget would
rise 17.6 per cent, to 417 billion yuan (E 38.7 billion) (Cit Lague 2008).
Some analysts argue that these figures are not accurate or even reliable
and most of them estimate that China’s real spending on defense is at
least three times greater than the publicly disclosed figure. The US De-
partment of Defense delivers an annual report to the Congress that
cites much higher figures for Chinese military spending: 2008’s report
mentions an expenditure of US$122 billion (E 77.7 billion). According
to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, one of the
most reliable research institutes on military expenditure, Chinese de-
fense spending is in fact only slightly higher than official Chinese fig-
ures. According to this Institute’s Yearbook, in 2007 China spent US
$ 58.3 billion on its military. According to this same report, the United
States still has by far the world’s largest military expenditure: US$ 547
billion (45 per cent of the total) and it is now higher than at any time
since World War Two.
The Chinese government justifies military expenditures by claiming
that it is necessary for defense purposes; this is supported by all Chi-
nese official policy papers on defense. Especially in the two last dec-
ades, Chinese leadership argues that it does not have violent purposes
and will not use force in the relations to other countries, that it solely
wishes to promote a much needed peaceful environment in the sur-
rounding areas and also around the world. This line follows Deng
Xiaoping’s 1985 statement on what he considered to be the top driving
principles of Chinese domestic and foreign policy: peace and develop-
ment (heping yu fazhan 和平与发展). Recently and following the resur-
gence of ‘China threat theory’ among other countries after some events
such as the Tian’anmen massacre and the Taiwan crisis in 1995-96,
the Chinese government adopted the ‘new security concept’ (xin an-
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quan guan 新安全观) and later on the concept of ‘China’s peaceful rise’
(zhongguo heping jueqi 中国和平崛起). These concepts became top slo-
gans in Chinese foreign policy and often appear in official speeches.
The so-called ‘new security concept’ was adopted during the Jiang
Zemin leadership. It was first mentioned in the Russian-Chinese ‘Joint
Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New In-
ternational Order’, in 1997. Since then the Chinese leaders including
the Chinese President, the Chinese Premier and the Chinese Foreign
Ministry started to refer the need to adopt a new security pattern in the
relation with other countries. In 1999, in the speech on the Confer-
ence on Disarmament in Geneve, the Chinese president Jiang Zemin
explained that the new security concept should include four elements:
mutual trust (huxin 互信), reciprocal benefit (huli 互利), equality (ping-
deng 平等) and coordination (xiezuo 协作). In reality, through the ‘new
security concept’, Chinese leadership wants to gain other countries’
trust, especially neighboring countries and the US, with the aim of pro-
moting a peaceful environment so that it will continue to grow
smoothly. The current Chinese government also endorses this peaceful
approach. In order to overcome great domestic problems resulting
from the Chinese rapid economic growth, such as regional inequalities,
environmental degradation, poverty and unemployment, the so-called
fourth generation of leaders including the Chinese president Hu Jintao
and the Premier Wen Jiabao adopted the ‘concept of scientific develop-
ment’ (kexue de fazhan guan 科学的发展观). This slogan was launched
in 2004 and includes four aspects of development: human develop-
ment, comprehensive development, coordinated development and sus-
tainable development. Through this concept the Chinese government
commits to promote the balance between rural and urban areas, be-
tween different regions, to solve economic and social issues, to solve
environmental issues, and finally to support the domestic development
and at the same time open up to the outside world. In practice the cur-
rent government has been putting a great deal of attention on solving
these problems arising from the quick growth rates and has adopted
several policies to try to overcome them.
At an international level, China wishes to project an image of re-
sponsible power that should not be feared by other countries. Since
coming to power in March 2003, the Hu-Wen leadership always speaks
of their aims as being peaceful in official speeches to foreign leaders
and in international organizations. Throughout 2003, there were some
discussions at the Communist Party level on the kind of strategy China
should adopt while pursuing its ‘rise’. Capital Teachers University’s
Professor Qi Shirong and Nanjing University’s Professor Qian Cheng-
dan were invited to give a lecture to Politburo members on the history
of the world’s great powers after the fifteenth century (Cit Peng 2004).
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Afterwards the concept of ‘China’s peaceful rise’ (zhongguo heping
jueqi) was formulated by Zheng Bijian, at the time a member of the
standing committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Con-
ference and former vice principal of the Communist Party School. In
the Bo’ao Forum for Asia 2003, he explained the path China should
undertake on its ‘rise’: while participating in economic globalization,
China should follow an independent, sovereign, peaceful and non-he-
gemonic path towards growth and development (Zheng Bijian, 2003).
According to him, China is following a peaceful approach while emer-
ging and should not be perceived as a threat by other countries. Based
on China’s foreign policy practice since 1978, he argues that China will
continue to follow a peaceful path, contrasting to other foreign coun-
tries such as Germany and Japan. Apart from peace, the other main
feature of China’s rise is the indepence.
References to this peaceful approach also started to appear in the
governmental speeches. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao referred to Chi-
na’s ‘peaceful rise’ in his speech at Harvard University, the following
December. After describing China as a peaceful civilization throughout
history, he explained China’s strategy:
China is a very large developing country. It is neither proper nor
possible for us to rely on foreign countries for development. We
must and we can only rely on our own efforts. In other words,
while opening still wider to the outside world, we must more
fully and more conscientiously depend on our own structural in-
novation, on constantly expanding the domestic market, on con-
verting the huge savings of the citizens into investment, and on
improving the quality of the population and scientific and tech-
nological progress to solve the problems of resources and the en-
vironment. Here lies the essence of China’s road of peaceful rise
and development (Wen Jiabao 2003).
‘China’s peaceful rise’ was also emphasized by President Hu Jintao that
same month during a seminar commemorating the 110th Anniversary
of Mao Zedong’s birth. Later, in the second session of the Tenth Na-
tional People’s Congress, in March 2004, the prime minister and the
foreign minister again used this expression in press conferences. Wen
Jiabao further explained the five aspects of the concept of ‘peaceful
rise’:
China will take advantage of world’s peace and endeavours to de-
velop itself, it shall succeed by making use of its own efforts and
based on its own strength whilst maintaining the open up policy
and developing economic and trade exchanges with all friendly
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countries; this rise will take a long period of time and hard work
of the people, and finally this rise will not represent an obstacle
or threat to other countries (Wen Jiabao, 2004).
Since mid-May 2004 this expression began to appear less often in offi-
cial speeches and almost disappeared. This change was encouraged by
Jiang Zemin who still had some leverage in Chinese politics.2 He be-
lieved in the primacy of the military to ensure a prosperous and strong
nation. So, according to him it was not completely accurate to use the
expression ‘peaceful rise’. This was especially true in the case of Tai-
wan, where Chinese leaders always admitted the possibility of using
force to take the island back.
Furthermore, the word ‘rise’ may be considered incorrect. On one
hand and according to some analysts such as Joseph Nye, the expres-
sion rise is not accurate: ‘reemergence would be more precise since by
size and history the Middle Kingdom has for long been a major power
in East Asia. Technically and economically, China was the world’s lea-
der (though without global reach) from 500 to 1500. Only in the last
half-millennium was it overtaken by Europe and America’ (Nye, 2005).
On the other hand, the question remains whether China is currently a
power that has already ‘risen’, having reached an overall development
from economic, political and social point of view. It seems that China
still has a long way to go and still needs to solve several domestic pro-
blems, while at the same time continuing to promote domestic devel-
opment in other areas. It is more accurate to use the expression ‘ris-
ing’.
Finally Chinese leaders often consider ‘rise’ to be a negative word of-
ten associated with hegemony, which they have always denied to be
their final goal. Since the end of 2004, the government has started to
use new less aggressive expressions such as ‘peaceful development’
(heping fazhan 和平发展), ‘peaceful resurgence’ (heping fuxing 和平复
兴) and ‘peaceful rejuvenation’ (heping zhenxing 和平振兴 ).
Looking to China’s culture and history
If we analyse the Chinese traditional culture and history, we can con-
sider the concept of ‘peaceful rise’ as deeply rooted in some Chinese
ancient philosophies as well as the predominant government practice
in the past.
For example, Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) spoke of principles such as
‘harmony despite difference’ (he er bu tong 和而不同) and ‘harmony as
the most precious value’ (he wei gui 和为贵) (The Confucian Analects
Lunyu, Chapter 1-12). This Chinese philosopher presented a humanist
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ethic of being and acting, not just within the family but also in society
and within the context of the state. This ethic was based on a hierarchi-
cal relationship of respect. Each person should respect those deemed to
be their superiors: subjects should respect the ruler, children should re-
spect their parents, wives should respect their husbands, younger
brothers should respect elder brothers and friends should mutually re-
spect each other. If each person acted according to these rules of re-
spect, then the society would be harmonious and the state perfect. Fi-
nally, peace and harmony are presented in the Chinese traditional cul-
ture as an ideal, maybe an utopia.
Also the Taoist philosopher Laozi (~ sixth century B.C.E.) presented
the universe as a whole in harmony, each part influencing the whole.
So everyone would be in harmony with nature. He also introduced the
ideal of wuwei (无为), which means non-action or letting life flow like a
river, not fighting against the flow.
Another Chinese philosopher Mozi (480-390 B.C.E.) further op-
posed wars and presented an ideal of universal love within an egalitar-
ian society founded on mutual support and devotion to common good.
Also a great military strategist Sunzi (fourth century B.C.E.), who
wrote about the art of war, developed a whole strategy aimed at con-
quering the enemy without using force. This means that even in a vio-
lent context, the Chinese always considered diplomacy as the most im-
portant instrument of foreign policy, not war.
These philosophies were created during the Warring States period
(475-221 B.C.E.) when the Chinese territory was divided into seven
kingdoms that all fought against each other. These kingdoms’ sover-
eigns would ask for advice on new strategies to conquer other states,
that’s why several philosophies and also military strategies came up
during this period. As a result, this period came to be known as the
period of ‘a hundred schools of thought’.
The Chinese people has the capability to absorb different cultural va-
lues from different ethics and mix them in a more or less harmonious
way. That idiosyncrasy allows the Chinese people to see the world as a
whole, generally in harmony with nature but at the same time using
the Confucian ethics when acting in the society. Harmony is then one
of the main aims when acting in the relation with others.
In the relation with other countries, China has adopted a mainly
peaceful foreign policy throughout history. Although China has fought
off attacks from other people, such as the Xiongnu, Turks and Mon-
gols, and even used force to conquer some territories, its behaviour has
been mostly peaceful. Some examples of China’s peaceful behavior in
foreign policy were the use of a tribute system, the use of the silk route
and the use of diplomacy during the maritime travels of Zheng He.
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After violently conquering other kingdoms under Qin Shihuangdi’s
rule, this short dynasty gave way to a more prosperous and peaceful
one. It was during the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220) that China
reached a very high level of development and established relations with
neighboring kingdoms through the ‘tribute system’. The ‘tribute sys-
tem’ was based on the neighboring countries’ recognition of China as a
superior civilization and thus they granted a tribute; consequently, the
Middle Kingdom gave these countries protection while respecting their
independence. Through this peaceful system, China established regu-
lar diplomatic relations with its neighbors. The tribute system is related
to the idea of ‘all under heaven’ (tian xia 天下), which means that all
kingdoms should be in harmony under heaven. Since the Chinese em-
peror was considered by the Chinese to be the representative of Heaven
on Earth, all other kings in neighboring kingdoms were seen to owe
him respect. While this system was in effect, there was a kind of pax si-
nica in the region. This system was improved throughout the centuries
and in the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) it reached its most developed
stage.
Also during the Han dynasty, the Chinese emperors used the eco-
nomic flows to promote peaceful relations with neighboring countries.
Although there were some problems between China and some north-
ern kingdoms, through the route of silk, the Chinese emperors im-
proved the relationship with these countries and build alliances. In
fact, it was in a diplomatic attempt to find allies during the Han dy-
nasty that Zhang Qian accidentally discovered the silk route in the year
139. This emperor’s envoy realized the importance that the silk trade
had for the relationship between the Chinese and the peoples of Cen-
tral Asia and persuaded the emperor to support this trade. Therefore,
there was an improvement in the trade relationships but also in the po-
litical and cultural relationships with these peoples. The silk route was
particularly prosperous during the Tang dynasty (618-907); during that
time also other trade routes developed. China became very prosperous
and cultural exchange between China and other countries prospered.
Later, during the Ming dynasty, China used diplomacy as the main
instrument of the foreign policy to establish relations with an even
broader range of countries and peoples. In 1405, Emperor Yongle no-
minated Zheng He as the chief diplomat and the admiral of a great
fleet on exploratory missions to the western world. Between 1405 and
1433, he carried out seven missions throughout the oceans to several
places in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Red
Sea and the East African coast. For the Chinese Emperor, the goal was
to establish diplomatic relations with other territories. Through these
trips, China established peaceful contacts with Asian and African peo-
ples, as well as commercial and cultural links. In these contacts, the
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Chinese would make valuable offers to the peoples they meet. This
means that the Chinese emperor privileged peaceful contacts instead
of force.
During Chinese history, there were also some violent events espe-
cially in conflicts with non-han people and when China expanded its
territory. However, during most of its history China has been a peace-
ful country in its relation with other countries.
Will China rise peacefully?
Currently the question remains: if China is advocating peace, why does
it need a strong military? Beijing follows the principle of ‘prosperous
nation, strong military’ (fuguo, qiangbing), which means that it does not
see peace and military strength as mutually exclusive. The Chinese
government advocates a strong military for defense purposes. Accord-
ing to the decision taken in the fifteenth study session of the Politburo
Standing Committee in July 2004, the strategy adopted should be to
‘prepare for war while talking about peace’ (nengzhanfang, nengyanhe
能战方能言和). In essence, the strategy is to use the act of preparation
for war as a way of disuasing war itself.
As mentioned above, some scholars believe that a country that is an
economic power tends to strengthen its military power so that it has
the ability to defend itself. Indeed the Chinese government has stated
that when feeling threatened, it will defend itself and eventually use
force. Some of the situations in which Beijing may use force are re-
lated to sovereignty claims, such as those involving Taiwan and other
territories in the South China Sea. These claims may be considered as
evolving a question of ‘face’ for China, the perception of its prestige in
the eyes of others. During the nineteenth century, the so-called century
of shame and humiliation, China lost its sovereignty over some terri-
tories. The current Chinese government does not want that to happen
again and admits using force to avoid this, if it deems it necessary.
This approach of the Chinese government is the so called defensive
realist one, which means that they are preparing the military to prevent
losses, not to conquer world power as offensive realists would aim to
do. The Chinese government’s stated intention is not to threaten other
countries.
Nevertheless, in recent years there has been a resurgence of belief
that China poses a military threat to other states, especially among
neighboring countries. This belief is prompted by China’s military ex-
penditures, its political system and its strong nationalism. China, with
its 9.5 million square kilometers, is the biggest country in the region
and the most populated country in the world with 1.3 billion inhabi-
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tants. This may cause suspicion and also fear among smaller neighbor-
ing countries, particularly when the government announces increases
in military expenditures. In the mid-1990s, these suspicions reached a
high level when China undertook military exercises in the Taiwan
Strait following Taiwan’s getting closer to the US and Taiwanese presi-
dential elections. Beijing’s behavior caused fear specially among neigh-
boring countries.
Furthermore, the idiosyncrasy of China’s political system with
authoritarian features and lack of fundamental rights motivates dis-
trust among western democratic countries. In recent years, there has
also been an increase in nationalism among Chinese people living in-
side China. In some cases, this nationalism has gotten out of control
and caused riots against foreign countries such as the US and Japan.
Two of the most important demonstrations of national pride among
the Chinese people in recent years occurred in 1999 against the US,
following NATO’s supposed accidental bombing of the Chinese Em-
bassy in Belgrade and in 2004 against Japan due to its plan to play a
more active role in the international system which reminded the Chi-
nese people of the aggression they had suffered at the hands of Japan
in the past. In these two cases, the Chinese people’s pride was hurt. In
order to take place, these riots must have official authorization, which
means that they were allowed by the Chinese government. These na-
tionalist protests may be seen as a strategy from the government to
unify the Chinese people in order to fight a perceived foreign threat.
Consequently, people’s attention is drawn away from domestic issues.
One of the countries, which sees China as a threat, especially as a
threat to its position as sole superpower, is the US. The US govern-
ment regularly criticizes China for its military spending and questions
its stated peaceful intentions. The US defense secretary Donald Rums-
feld once argued that China’s military spending threatens not only Tai-
wan and the US but also the delicate security balance of Asia (Cit
Shanker 2005). Also the international relations expert from the Univer-
sity of Chicago John Mearsheimer doubts China can rise peacefully
and predicts that ‘the United States and China are likely to engage in
an intense security competition with considerable potential for war’
(2005: 47). However, the relationship between China and US is irregu-
lar floating between mutual criticism and cooperation. Although China
supported the US ‘war on terrorism’, Washington continues to sell
weapons to Taiwan, which continues to angry China. The US govern-
ment continues to press Beijing to change the political system, to re-
spect more human rights and to promote changes in the economic
and monetary system. These moves may be seen as a way to slow
down China’s growth and prevent it from becoming a political power
in the region and in the world. However, too much pressure can make
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China feel uncomfortable and become more dangerous. As Henry Kis-
singer advises, containment is not going to work because ‘the chal-
lenge China poses for the medium term future will, in all likelihood,
be political and economic, not military’ (Kissinger 2005). A better en-
gagement of China in the international system may be the best choice
because it will make Beijing less eager to use force and the US as the
world’s superpower has a major role in this task.
The Chinese government always emphasizes that China follows a
peaceful behaviour in the international system. While rising and grow-
ing in terms of its economy, it will do it in a peaceful way not repre-
senting a threat to other countries. The Chinese leaders often refer to
the violent path followed by other countries seeking power throughout
history, such as Germany and Japan, as a bad example that China
wants to avoid. They argue that China is not seeking hegemony or a
violent way to increase its power. According to the Fudan University
Professor at the Center for American Studies Wang Yiwei, the strategy
of the emerging China has three elements: rise of peace, rise by peace
and rise for peace (Wang 2004). The rise of peace means that the
growth of China derives from a peaceful environment; the rise by
peace means that China has created a cooperative model of relation-
ship with other countries; and the rise for peace is related to the pur-
pose of promoting world peace and prosperity through its peaceful
path in foreign policy.
China’s model for its own emergence can be seen as a closed cycle
in which China’s growth is motivated by the international peaceful en-
vironment, which prompts Asia’s growth, which stimulates world
growth, inspiring an international peaceful environment. This is why
the Chinese government uses the ‘peaceful rise’ slogan spreading the
image of a responsible and peaceful country not to be feared by others.
The Chinese government seeks to demonstrate that its growth in
economic, cultural and political power benefits its neighboring coun-
tries and the world in general; this position is based on a notion of
common prosperity, a ‘win-win’ game. According to chart 7.2, China
will only grow and develop in a peaceful international environment.
This will be a catalyst for Asian economic growth and ultimately the
world’s growth. Ultimately, China needs a peaceful environment. As
China becomes more integrated in the Asian and international eco-
nomic system, it will represent less threats to other countries. The slo-
gan of China’s peaceful rise was designed to limit Asian countries’ ap-
prehension about China intentions in the region. The purpose of the
Chinese government for spreading the ‘peaceful rise’ slogan, is to in-
spire a reciprocal behavior from other countries, and in the long-term
maybe get some support against the US. China expects neigboring
countries to come closer and to support it in some international issues.
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Through strategic relationships and multilateral agreements, China is
creating a kind of buffer zone around its borders to protect itself from
the US. Also China has moved closer to the European Union, the cur-
rent major trade partner, looking for ways of cooperating in several
fields such economy and technology. This is a feature of its cooperative
behavior.
Chart 7.2 Chinese model for rise
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But as the commentator on Chinese affairs Frank Ching observes,
‘Beijing must realize that the world will not just listen to its words but
will be watching its actions as well’ (Ching 2004). And what has Beij-
ing been doing?
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China’s emergence path
Like a real great power, China has become a more active player in the
international system. China is deepening its relationships with several
countries all over the world, assuming an active role in world affairs
and developing partnerships with some major international players.
Current Chinese foreign policy is driven by three major components:
first, economic diplomacy, then comprehensive and cooperative secur-
ity, and finally the so-called soft power. For the reasons mentioned be-
fore, Chinese behavior has been mainly non-aggressive.
Since the end of the cold war, China’s priority has been the econom-
ic growth. In the foreign policy, the Chinese government started to use
its diplomacy to promote economic development. All over the world,
China essentially looks for markets for their products and new sources
of investment, resources and technology. Therefore, economic diplo-
macy not only includes trade, but also investment and economic aid.
China has been successful in this matter maintaining a positive trade
balance and receiving increasingly large amounts of foreign investment
and aid. In 2007, China’s total foreign trade reached US$2,174 billion
and the trade balance was positive for China in more than US$ 262
billion. China has several trading partners; the three main partners are
the EU, US and Japan. After the 2004 enlargement, EU became Chi-
na’s largest trading partner, ahead of the US and Japan. Regarding in-
vestment, the most important investment partners are Asian countries,
countries with whom China has historic relationships. In recent years,
China has itself increased its investment abroad following the ‘go glo-
bal’ (zou chuqu) policy adopted by Jiang Zemin in 1998.
Since Chinese government priority is the economic development, a
secure domestic and international environment is essential to guaran-
tee it. Since the end of the cold war, Chinese security is mainly coop-
erative. Cooperation is the base of the strategy proposed by Deng
Xiaoping in 1984 of ‘putting disputes aside and promote joint develop-
ment’ (gezhi zhengyi, gongtong kaifa 搁置争议共同开发). Cooperative
security (hezuo anquan 合作安全) is defined by the Chinese govern-
ment as the ideal way to deal with security issues, including a peaceful
settlement of disputes, as well as consultation and coordination on is-
sues of mutual concern to prevent conflicts. Although previously reluc-
tant to assume an assertive practice in security affairs, the Chinese gov-
ernment has changed its behaviour since the end of the cold war. It
has gradually been adopting a more active and cooperative attitude in
security issues in relation with other countries and also in international
organizations and forums. This behavior is one of the features of a
great power, which means China is gradually assuming the role of a
great power in the international system. In practice, the Chinese gov-
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ernment has actively participated in discussing and promoting talks in
regional affairs and it got involved in regional forums and organiza-
tions. Examples of this behavior include the hosting of the six-party
talks on North Korea nuclear program since 2003 and the participation
in regional and international forums and organizations such as the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ASEAN Regional Forum, and the
UN.
Apart from cooperation as its modus operandi, since the end of the
cold war, Beijing has also adopted a more comprehensive concept of se-
curity: zonghe anquan 综合安全. To respond to emerging transnational
security threats not limited to traditional military issues, states need to
adopt a broad perspective of security and must cooperate with other
states to solve them. These transnational threats particularly affect East
Asia; they include terrorism, environmental deterioration, diseases,
contraband, drug trafficking, and piracy. To respond to these threats,
states need a holistic security concept including economic security, en-
vironmental security, social security, etc. The Chinese government has
adopted a ‘comprehensive security’ concept, which includes non-tradi-
tional security. Cooperation is the preferred method to solve these is-
sues.
China still has several unsolved security issues mainly related to so-
vereignty, such as Taiwan and some islands in the South China Sea
and in the East China Sea. Although cooperation is recognized as the
best method to solve these disputes, Beijing does not deny the possibi-
lity of using force. As mentioned above, these territorial issues invoke
the concept of face and China’s desire to not loose perceived prestige
again.
Finally, the last feature of China’s rising power is soft power. Beijing
is learning how to use soft power to earn foreign countries’ trust. Ac-
cording to Joseph Nye, the soft power is a co-optative power, an ability
to change what others want, which may be supported by culture attrac-
tiveness and values or by the ability to manipulate political agendas
(Nye 2004). In fact, the Chinese government is doing that. In recent
years, Beijing is dedicating resources to actively spreading Chinese lan-
guage and culture through a network of Confucius Institutes, which
are opening up all over the world. Beijing is also promoting its devel-
opment model among developing countries. Beijing is after all using
its soft power to build relations with different countries all over the
world and win their trust.
This strategy has allowed China to become a great power. The path
to becoming a superpower is open. Although Beijing never admits its
desire to become a world leader, in fact it is achieving a key place in
world politics. This is part of a strategy of tao guang yang hui, (韬光养
晦) which means hiding one’s talents until the right moment comes.
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The question is whether China’s increase in power will make it a
superpower or not. In my opinion, it will not. To become a superpower
China would need to reach a leadership place among other countries
in different fields such as economic, political, military and cultural. It
is true that China is growing very rapidly and its economy has attained
very high levels. China’s economy is half the size of the US’s economy,
and according to the predictions before the financial crisis of the last
year, if it continued to grow annually by 6 per cent, while the US
grows by 2 per cent, China’s economy would catch up with the US’s
after 2025. Nevertheless, China still has major problems to solve in the
economic, social and financial fields. In spite of this fact, I believe that
in the long term, China will get a top position among the world’s most
powerful countries in the economic field and will use funds to moder-
nize its military, becoming a military power. The Peking University
Professor Pan Wei argues that China needs military to get peace not to
rise (Pan 2004). This is a relative power, meaning China’s power is re-
lative to world’s present situation, it should encounter other countries’
power.
Although China may reach a high economic and even military level,
I do not believe it is possible for China to become an overall super-
power. To be a superpower China should have enough power in several
areas so as to influence world economy, politics and culture. I do not
think that is going to be possible either in the near or in the far future.
First, I do not believe the Chinese political system is going to be
adopted as a model by other countries in the world; it is too specific.
China’s political and economic model includes elements of its culture
and political ideology; it is a model with Chinese characteristics. It ulti-
mately results from China’s idiosyncrasy. The political system may be
adopted by countries that are culturally close to China, and the eco-
nomic model may be adopted by developing countries. However, I don’t
believe that these models may be adopted worldwide. Furthermore, as
far as Chinese culture is concerned, it may be close to that of other
Asian countries that also follow Confucianism but not to other coun-
tries throughout the world. Chinese movies, art and language are be-
coming popular worldwide but not as popular as US ‘culture’.
China may be considered a great power with great economic power
and eventually great military power in the future. But it won’t be a
complete superpower as the US is today.
Chinese leaders also refuse to consider themselves as leaders in
world politics. They often use the principle ‘bu dang tou’ (不当头)
which means not to assume a leadership role. Beijing leaders fear that
if they would admit the desire to become a hegemonic power, this
could generate fears among other countries and negative reactions,
which Beijing wants to avoid. Due to China’s growing economic power,
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there have been some sinophobic reactions among European countries
and the US. Beijing wants to avoid these reactions.
On the other hand, the international system has changed and today
it is very difficult for a single country to achieve the status of a super-
power. There are checks and balances to prevent one single superpower
from consolidating too much power and ultimately to prevent a violent
competition with the current single superpower. In addition, I believe
the US would not allow the emergence of a superpower, which would
mean its defeat.
For the future, I believe we can expect China to growth in a mainly
peaceful manner. With the status of a great power, China’s foreign af-
fairs will continue to follow its three major driving forces: economic di-
plomacy, comprehensive and cooperative security and soft power.
Notes
1 Just to name a few foreign scholars’ articles and books: Vogel, Erza (2004); Nye, Jo-
seph S. (2005); Economy, Elizabeth (2005); Sutter, Robert G. (2005); Ross, Robert S.
(2006); Shirk, Susan L. (2007). The Peterson Institute will soon publish a book on
the challenges and opportunities of China’s rise by Fred Bergstein, Charles Freeman
and Nicholas Hardy. Chinese academics have also been discussing these issues. See
for example Yan, Xuetong (1998 and 2001); Xu, Chengfang (2001); Liu, Jie (2004);
Pan, Wei (2004); Peng, Peng (2004); the theorist of the China’s peaceful rise Zheng
Bijian (2005) and Hu Angang (2007). In 2007, a Chinese scholar and an American
scholar, Zhu Feng from Peking University and Robert Ross from Boston College, co-
ordinated a book on China’s rise, both in theory and practice that was published in
Shanghai and is forthcoming from Cornell University Press under the title China’s
Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics.
2 Until September 2004, Jiang Zemin still had some influence in Chinese politics, but
at that time he stepped down as leader of the Central Military Commission.
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8 A Snapshot of Internet Regulation
in Contemporary China:
Censorship, Profitability and Responsibility
Jinqiu Zhao
As one of the few developing countries performing well overall on the
indicators for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by
UNDP, China has been enjoying the fastest sustained economic ad-
vance in human history, with its GDP growing at an annual rate of
9.67 per cent from 1978 to 2006. The liberalized economic environ-
ment and the information revolution have become the foremost drivers
of China’s fast telecommunication development in the last ten years.
On April 20, 1994, China opened a 64K international dedicated circuit
to the Internet through Sprint Co. of the United States, realizing a full-
functioning linkage (‘Evolution of’ 2003). With the installation of ad-
vanced network technology driving Internet penetration across the me-
tropolitan areas, China’s government is determined to extend Internet
Protocol (IP) connectivity and make the Internet a tool to boost the na-
tion’s economy.
With the government drive, the Internet in China is undergoing phe-
nomenal growth. It has revolutionized the ways Chinese communicate
and interact. After modest beginnings in the mid-1990s, the number
of Internet users1 jumped from 0.62 million in 1997 to 210 million by
December 2007, ranking China second in the world in terms of Inter-
net users (CNNIC 1997; CNNIC 2008). In 2007, there were about
nine million domain names registered under ‘cn’ (shorthand for China
as a country code) and 1.5 million websites in China (CNNIC 2008).
The Internet remained unregulated during the emerging years of
the technology in China. The first set of regulations on the Internet
was formally announced in 1996 and in the ensuing years several laws
were passed to tighten the government’s control over the Internet. The
October 2000 legislation is concerned with the involvement of foreign
investments in the Internet sector and the responsibility of Internet
service providers (ISPs) over their websites. A month later, another im-
portant legislation regarding news content and discussion forums was
implemented. The December 2000 legislation specified that ‘spreading
rumors, defamation or publishing harmful information, inciting the
overthrow of the country’s government, the socialist system or a divi-
sion of the country’ should be deemed as cyber crime or cyber dissi-
dence (‘Review of China’ n.d.: 2).
As many as 12 government agencies in China are involved in censor-
ing the Internet, though their powers may vary, including the General
Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), the State Administra-
tion of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), the Ministry of Informa-
tion Industry (MII), the State Council Information Office (SCIO), the
Central Propaganda Department (CPD), the Ministry of Public Security
(MPS), the State Secrecy Bureau (SSB) and China’s judiciary.
The Chinese government has taken a pragmatic approach towards
regulating the Internet. Guided by the principle of ‘guarded openness’,
the government on the one hand seeks to benefit from the economic
advantages offered through openness to global information, on the
other hand it intends to guard against the harmful influences that they
believe the web may have upon social values and national integrity.
Nevertheless, the effective regulation of Internet content remains a
formidable task to the Chinese government, given the vast possibilities
of information exchange enabled by digital media and the apparent de-
ficiencies in legislative control. This study selected two controversial is-
sues confronting the Chinese government – news copyright and online
satire. Through reviewing and evaluating China’s attempts at regulat-
ing the Internet regarding the abovementioned issues, this research ef-
fort aimed to highlight an underlying tension in the current policies of
the Chinese government, which promote a more open market econo-
my while maintaining tight censorship over news media and freedom
of speech, and aimed to consider the socio-economic implications of
Internet censorship on media, society and people in China.
News copyright
The SCIO and MII are the two main government agencies responsible
for administering the operations of domestic websites that engage in
posting news. ‘The Interim Provision on the Administration of Inter-
net Web Sites Engaged in News Posting Operations’ issued jointly by
the SCIO and MII in November 2000 prescribes the following (CECC
2006):
Article 5: The legally established websites of central news units,
news units of all departments of the central government’s agen-
cies and the news units directly under the provinces, autono-
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mous regions and independent municipalities and the munici-
pal people’s governments for the provinces and autonomous re-
gions (‘news websites’) may engage in news posting operations
after receiving authorization. Other news units may not inde-
pendently establish news websites, but after receiving authoriza-
tion may establish news web pages and engage in news posting
operations on the news website established by a central news
unit or a news unit of a province, autonomous region or inde-
pendent municipality.
Article 7: Non-news units that establish general interest websites
(‘general interest non-news unit websites’) that possess the qua-
lifications set forth in Article 9 of these Provisions, may engage
in operations of posting news promulgated by central govern-
ment news units, the news units of departments of central gov-
ernment agencies, and the news units directly under the pro-
vinces, autonomous regions and independent municipalities,
but may not post news from their own sources or news from
other sources. Other Internet websites that are established by a
non-news unit in accordance with the law may not engage in
news posting operations.
Article 8: General interest non-news unit websites that engage
in news posting operations shall, in accordance with Article 7 of
these Provisions, after receiving examination and approval from
the people’s government information offices for the provinces,
autonomous regions and independent municipalities, submit to
examination and verification by the SCIO.
Given these Provisions, the SCIO keeps a tight control of licensing
news websites as well as the legalization of the sources of news feeding
those general interest websites. In general, news information websites
must be part of the official media system, and must register with the
government in order to begin operation. The Provisions envision a sys-
tem in which most news websites are extensions of currently-existing
news units, thereby the setting up of news websites has been exclu-
sively restricted to the news units of government agencies both at the
central and local levels. Non-news websites are deprived of the possibi-
lities of doing their own reporting and they may only post news from
news units officially acknowledged by the SCIO.
One of the most recent sets of regulations is the ‘Provisions on the
Administration of Internet News Information Services’, issued jointly
by the SCIO and the MII in September 2005. As compared to the
2000 Interim Provision, the 2005 Provisions range from the establish-
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ment, regulation and supervision of Internet news information service
work units to the legal duties and administrative penalties for violation
of any part of the Provisions. Superseding the division of news web-
sites and non-news websites in the 2000 Interim Provision, the Inter-
net news information service work units have been categorized into
three types: Internet news services established by news work units that
post news information which has already been published or broad-
casted by the same news work units, Internet news services established
by news work units that post news information beyond that which the
same news work units have already published or broadcasted, and In-
ternet news services established by non-news work units. What’s more,
the new Provisions set strict restrictions on the involvement of foreign
forces and stipulate that any ventures with foreign investment are pro-
hibited from engaging in providing Internet news information services
(CECC 2006).
With regard to the source of information, the Provisions allow the
Internet news services to reprint and transmit news issued by the exist-
ing news work units officially acknowledged by the central and local
government, provided that the sources of information should be clearly
denoted and the contents of news should not be distorted. For those In-
ternet news services established by non-news work units, they may not
post news they have gathered or edited themselves, and those breaking
the rules are subject to a fine between RMB 5,000 and 30,000
(US$ 625-3,750).
Limited to reprinting news stories generated by other media outlets,
the overwhelming majority of the commercial websites have to turn to
print media for news content. As a result, online news in China is
more or less equivalent to ‘online digest’ (Bi 2006). Since the reposting
of media content has by and large become permissible under the Provi-
sions, most Internet news services select material from Chinese news-
papers and other media outlets as they see fit, and payment for such
reuse is typically symbolic or entirely absent.
Since the emergence of the commercial Internet portals in 1996, the
Chinese print media have been handing over the news that they gath-
ered to the major Internet portals that featured news almost for
free. However, it took almost a decade for the print media to realize
that what they had offered up to the portal websites was not only news
information, but also advertisers and audiences. According to research
conducted by the China Renmin University Media Management Re-
search Institute, the total revenue of the newspaper industry in the first
half of 2005 was decreasing, with advertising revenue falling between
ten per cent to 30 per cent, and some newspapers by more than 40 per
cent (Liu 2006).
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Alarmed by the aggressive challenge, some newspapers started to
launch a collective counterattack by forming an alliance to ban Internet
websites from using their content gratis. The chief editors attending
the 2005 Chinese Metropolitan Newspapers Chief Editors Study An-
nual Conference in Nanjing concluded with a ‘Nanjing Declara-
tion’. The core content was that they ‘will no longer tolerate the com-
mercial websites from using print news products for free’ (Liu 2006
and Wu 2006).
Shortly afterwards, at the 12th Innovations and Developments in
Newspaper Enterprises Forum in Guangzhou held in January 2006,
the Liberation Daily Group (the Shanghai Communist Party’s flagship
newspaper) appealed to the 39 party newspaper groups in the country
to form a national newspaper content alliance and raise the threshold
for Internet reposting in order to safeguard their intellectual property
rights (Liu 2006 and Wu 2006).
Despite the outcry over the apparent infringement of news copy-
right, there seems to be a lack of enthusiasm about the boycott attempt
among other major newspapers. They suspect that a lot of noise is
being made without specific action and the Nanjing Declarations have
not been and are not expected to be implemented in practice (Liu
2006 and Wu 2006).
Online satire
With the growth of an affluent middle class in China, young Chinese
consumers are not especially concerned with politics, but are enthu-
siastic about participating in websites that give them opportunities to
express their thoughts and opinions regarding lifestyles and trends.
For instance, some surfers prefer popular sites that allow diners to post
restaurant reviews while others often visit those recording amateur
singers’ efforts and ranking them according to users’ responses.
Likewise, the spoofing culture, called e-gao in Mandarin, has started
to emerge as the most popular form of online satire, passionately em-
braced and widely followed by young ‘netizens’. The exemplar is the
online trailer for MURDER CAUSED BY A BUN produced by blogger and
freelance filmmaker, Hu Ge. The 20-minute video appeared on the In-
ternet in early 2006 as a parody of Chen Kaige’s (the Oscar-nominated
director of 1993’s FAREWELL MY CONCUBINE) latest movie THE PROMISE.
The spoof was intended to criticize the Chinese film industry mono-
poly and the loss of local character under the influences of the interna-
tional market. It is no surprise that THE PROMISE did not deliver satis-
faction to viewers as promised by its promotional campaign. It is also
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no surprise that Hu Ge gained huge support when Chen Kaige wanted
to sue him for piracy.
The official attitude towards the spoofing craze at the very beginning
of its emergence remained relatively tolerant as it took time to dissect
and understand its political and social implications. An article titled
‘Parody can help people ease work pressure’ in China Daily2 depicts
spoofing as ‘a popular subculture that deconstructs serious themes to
entertain people with comedy effects... that is characterized by humor,
revelry, subversion, grass-root spontaneity, defiance of authority, mass
participation and multi-media high-tech’ (Huang 2006).
However, spoofs soon become the target of Internet censorship as
they begin to touch on political and historical figures. A recent example
of the trend was a video called ‘Sparkling Red Star: Pan Dongzi Com-
peting in Singing Contest’ using clips from the 1974 patriotic film
about the Chinese revolution SPARKLING RED STAR. The video dubbed
the movie clips to tell the story of a boy competing in the 12th CCTV
(China Central Television) singing contest. In the ten-minute video,
Pan Dongzi, the hero of the 1974 movie, entered the CCTV singing
contest to gain fame. The evil landowner became a foolish judge in the
contest. Pan’s father changed from a peasant in the original movie to a
Beijing real estate tycoon. The video also mocked the quiz section of
the CCTV singing contest and the winners’ instant fame.
The short film about the singing contest incurred severe criticism.
Some commentators believe satire should not go too far and the distor-
tion of heroes and China’s revolutionary history is immoral and unac-
ceptable (Xinhua News Agency 2006). According to the Beijing News,
SARFT plans to issue a new set of regulations to monitor video content
on the Internet in the wake of a surge in short satirical films online.
Video clips will have to be registered with SARFT before they are pub-
lished on the Internet. Listed Internet companies such as sina.com,
sohu.com, netease.com, tom.com, etc. will be allowed to show video
clips under the new regulations (Beijing News 2006).
The move is part of a wider campaign by Chinese authorities to con-
trol Internet content. According to the ‘Management Methods on
Audio and Video Broadcasting over Information Networks Including
the Internet’, or SARFT Document [2004] no. 39, operators must re-
ceive a network audio and video-broadcasting license before they may
send programming over the Internet. In particular, it stipulates that
Article 7: Exclusively foreign-owned enterprises, Sino-foreign
joint ventures, or Sino-foreign contractual joint ventures may
not engage in the operations of broadcasts of audio-visual pro-
grams through information networks.
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Article 20: Agencies with a permit shall establish a management
system to complement the examination and safe broadcasting of
programs, implement a chief program editor responsibility sys-
tem, and equip staff program examiners to examine the contents
of the programs being broadcast.
Article 21: Operators of information networks may not provide
services related to broadcasts of audio-visual programs to agen-
cies that do not hold a permit to broadcast audio-visual pro-
grams through information networks.
Article 23: When relaying audio-visual programs through infor-
mation networks, only radio and TV programs on the radio and
TV stations may be relayed. No illegal programs can be relayed,
nor can any overseas programs be relayed.
Even though the Measures did not specifically address Internet spoof-
ing, it does mention that audio-visual programs refer to programs with
an audio/video frequency that is composed of continuous images and
continuously audible sounds, shot and recorded by a motion-picture
camera, video camera, sound recorder, and other audio-visual fre-
quency equipment for producing programs. The violators of the Mea-
sures may face a fine of up to RMB30, 000 (US$ 3,750).
Censorship, profitability and responsibility
Despite the Chinese government’s determination to tighten its control
over the Internet, the new medium poses challenges to such censor-
ship because of its unique features. Ang and Nadarajan (1997) contend
that freedom and openness are imbedded within Internet culture,
which makes the Internet different from earlier media platforms. First,
the distribution and gathering of information over the Internet grows
at an exponential rate. It is a formidable task for the government to
censor the content on the web considering the sheer breadth of infor-
mation. Second, there are problems of law enforcement. Certain re-
stricted materials may originate from overseas websites and it is diffi-
cult to penalize such breaches since one country’s legislation does not
apply to another. Therefore, sources of content may be remote from
the jurisdiction of the country and there are fierce debates in the inter-
national arena in terms of what should be allowed to be published on
the Internet and what should not. Third, government regulations can
hardly catch up with the rapid development of the convergent technol-
ogy, let alone control it effectively (Ang and Nadarajan 1997).
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Therefore, the pre-existing policies and measures of the Chinese gov-
ernment that have proved to work effectively to regulate print and
broadcast media may not apply to the Internet. China’s media has long
been structured as an integral part of the communist political system
(Chang 1989). It functions as an extension of political control of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The party principles, which deter-
mine all issues in media work, assure the CCP’s domination over the
media (Yan 2000). News media must take the party’s guiding ideology
as their own and must propagate the party’s programs, policies and di-
rectives. The media must also be subordinate to the party’s leadership
and stick to the party’s organizational principles and press policies
(Zhao 1998).
Before the economic reforms in 1978, both the print and broadcast
sectors operated under the ‘party-organ model’, where the party-state
was the proprietor, the regulator, financier, and practitioner of the med-
ia. With the adoption of an ‘open door’ policy and market economy, the
role of the media has changed dramatically owing to the liberalized
economic environment and an increasing diversity of information
sources for the general public. Under the ‘market-based party organ
model’, media not only served as an ideological party mouthpiece and
government cheerleader, but also as an instrument of economic devel-
opment and social modernization (Pan and Chan 2000; Kalathil
2002).
The new system of ‘socialist market economy with Chinese charac-
teristics’ has created ‘a phenomenon of “duality”’ in the media scenario’
(Wei 2000: 335). The media needs to strive for a balance between a
party mouthpiece and a profitable business. In response to the coun-
try’s state of stability, the press policy has undergone great volatility in
the last two decades. On one hand, the party wants to continue exercis-
ing strict ideological control and supervision over the news media to
ensure the public’s support and social stability. This explains why the
reporting style remains to be rigid and prudent as long as political con-
tent is concerned. On the other hand, the government seems to be
more lenient and tolerant towards entertainment programs and publi-
cations (Yan 2000).
The licensing of news websites and the ban on news gathering and
reporting by non-news websites clearly indicate the government’s deter-
mination to ensure new media such as the Internet should function as
extensions of the existing system of news media, whose operation and
management is kept in line with the party policies. However, the in-
tense conflict between the commercial news portals and the print med-
ia seems to be a direct result of Internet regulations. In order to main-
tain consistency and congruence and exclude ‘deviance’ from public
discourse, the interests of the print media are sacrificed at the expense
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of offering the news they have gathered to non-news Internet portals
almost for free. Deprived of the right to gather news, commercial web-
sites have to use published content copied from the print media.
However, whether the print media and commercial portals would
like to play by the rules and for how long remains questionable. Ka-
lathil (2002) argued that the acceptable reportage boundaries have
been pushed farther by small news websites, which make national or-
ganizations follow suit. The public often log in to find exclusive stories
and the most up-to-date news, which can hardly be expected from tra-
ditional media.
Negative news stories are frequently disclosed on the web portals
first, and then the government and state media are compelled to make
quick responses. Moreover, the far-reaching effect of cellular phones
and the multi-facet communication they provide such as Short Mes-
sage Service (SMS) has also made the traditional control of information
more difficult.
For instance, during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
outbreak in 2003, the government-controlled media organizations
could only tamely follow the orders issued by the government, but the
proliferation of the Internet and other new high-tech information
sources provided the public with new channels of communication. The
leaking of information via the Internet and great social anxiety caused
by rampant rumors forced the central government to readjust its strat-
egy in handling the SARS crisis (Zhao 2003).
With a host of Internet-related issues on the agenda, Chinese policy-
makers are being reactive rather than proactive because the architec-
ture of the Internet makes censorship difficult at its core. Seeking to
turn service providers into policemen and forcing ISPs to filter undesir-
able content and refuse access to undesirable users may prove to be
fruitless and futile. Hu Ge’s case indicates that a new content or appli-
cation provider can emerge from nowhere to become an extraordinary
success with a relatively low investment and without having to obtain a
government license to offer new services. Despite the regulatory efforts
directed at curbing online satire, individual users still have ways of by-
passing censorship and letting their voices be heard in cyber commu-
nities. Pranksters may not choose to broadcast their films on the Inter-
net. Instead, they could send them peer-to-peer or through Internet-
based instant messaging networks, such as MSN.
The two Internet-related issues covered in this chapter reflect the so-
cial and economic tensions resulting from the conflicts between the
free and decentralized architecture of the Internet and the relentless ef-
forts of the Chinese government to assert controls over the technology
as well as the content carried over it. On the one hand, the government
endeavors to foster an enabling environment for the development of a
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more open market economy. On the other hand, it is tightening con-
trols over news media and freedom of speech.
With the Internet reaching 16 per cent of the world’s largest popula-
tion, new technology will greatly facilitate information exchange and
knowledge sharing among Chinese people. As the Internet emerges as
a critical national infrastructure for the economy and society, the gov-
ernment has legitimate interests in having a degree of control over In-
ternet activities and content. Striking the right balance between control
and flexibility seems imperative as the Internet itself is undergoing
constant transformations.
In summary, many perceived problems of the Internet should not be
taken as defects to be fixed but instead as characteristics of the net-
work. Most important of all, the value of openness should be upheld
rather than downplayed if the government determines to serve a useful
and better function, because openness fuels the innovation of technol-
ogy as well as economic and political freedom.
Notes
1 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) defines Internet users as Chi-
nese citizens aged 6 and above who have ever used the Internet over the last six
months.
2 The China Daily is a state-run publication with the widest print circulation (200,000
per issue) of any English-language newspaper in China.
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